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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and : 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, ROBERT and JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, ROBERT and JORJA 
SHIPPEN, dba SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, 
ROBERT SHIPPEN, an individual, and 
MARRIOTT HOMES, LLC. 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-015 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST 
Plaintiffs, Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed, hereby give notice of those exhibits which 
may be used in the trial of this matter in compliance with this Court's August 3, 2010 Order 
Setting Trial and Pre-Trial Conference as follows: 
Exhibit EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION STIPULATED Defendant's 
# (YIN) Objection 
1 MLS Listing on SUbject Real Property (SRP) Y 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST - 1 
2 Snake River MLS Change Form dated 112/07 Y 
3 Purchase and Sale Agreement and Y 
Addendums 
4 Warranty Deed (lnst #359999) (Shippen to Y 
Goodspeed) 
5 2009 pictures of SRP sub-water taken by N Relevance 
Shawn & Shellee Goodspeed. 
Sa Picture of tennis ball in water by stairs N Relevance 
5b Picture of dumbells in water N Relevance 
5c Picture of box soaked by water N Relevance 
5d Picture of ruler in water by door and carpet N Relevance 
5e Picture of ruler in water (ruler centered in the N Relevance 
picture) 
Sf Picture of feet in water with ruler N Relevance 
6 DVD recording of 2009 sub-water N Relevance 
7 09126/08 WSD Letter to Robert Shippen N Not proper party 
8 10/29/08 WSD Letter to Robert Shippen N Not proper party 
9 11/19/08 Letter from Robin Dunn N Attorney 
conclusion 
10 02/15/10 WSD Letter to Robin Dunn N Legal 
conclusion; 
improper party 
11 Home Improvement Receipts N Relevance 
12 2009 Tax bill receipt on Property N Not accurate for 
value 
13 Medical Records Shellee Goodspeed N Court ruled no 
medical expenses 
14 Medical Billings & Prescription Receipts for N Court ruled no 
Shellee Goodspeed medical expenses 
15 Xcel Construction Invoice (7/23/06) N Foundation 
16 Deed of Trust on SRP (lnst # 342206) N Relevance 
(Jenkins to Shippens) 
17 Deed of Reconveyance (Inst #358688) N Relevance 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST - 2 
(Shippen to Jenkins) 
18 Member Service Agreement 04/24/06 (Public Y With testifying 
Record) (Inst #348023) witness 
19 District 7 Septic Permit (Public Record) Y With testifying 
04/26/06 witness 
20 Shippen Home Equity Line of Credit N Relevance 
Agreement 06/14/05 
21 Building Permit & Policies (public Record) Y With testifying 
05/8106 witness 
22 Wilson Associates Design of Residence Y With testifying 
(Public Record) 12/1/02 approved 05/08/06 witness 
23 Jefferson County 05123106 Letter to Shippen Y With testifying 
Construction (Public Record) witness 
24 Building Inspection Tickets (Public Record) Y With testifying 
witness 
25 Bureau of Occupational Licenses printout N Relevance 
identifying Robert Shippen as registered K'or 
02/17 110 (Public Record) 
26 Marriott Homes LLC Custom Detail N No probative 
Transaction Reports (10105 ~ 03/07 & 111/06 value 
- 12124/07) 
27 Invoices after 12/06 from Carpet Concepts, L N No probative 
& F Electric, Halko Heating, Fullmer value 
Excavating 
28 Home Depot Receipt 09/07/06 paid by card # N No probative 
-0129 value 
29 Lowes Receipts 10/31/06 and 11/02106 paid N No probative 
by card #-0129 value 
30 Shippen Construction Accounting (01/06- N No probative 
12107) and Handwritten Deposit Split Slip value 
31 RE-26 Property Disclosure Form signed by Y wi testifying 
Goodspeeds witness 
32 FA TCO Check (Bank Scan & Check Stub) N No probative 
07/03/07 value 
33 FATCO Final Statement signed by the N No probative 
Shippens value 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST ~ 3 
34 Shippen Taxes 2005 - 2009 N No probative 
value 
35 Marriott Taxes 2006 - 2009 N No probative 
value 
36 Shippen Inc. Taxes 2006 - 2008 N No probative 
value 
37 Commercial General Liability Coverage Part N Insurance 
(Farm Bureau, "WC") agreements non 
admissible 
38 06/18110 WSD letter returned by Robin Dunn N Communication 
with handwriting of attorney not 
relevant 
39 Shippen Property Asset List produced in N No probative 
Discovery Regarding Vehicles and Tax value 
Assessment Notices for property and property 
parcels. 
40 Money Market Transfer Documents N Claims cannot 
(12112/06) identify 
document 
41 Jeff Stoddard House Master Home Inspection Y wi witness 
Report testimony 
42 Subdivision On-Site Form & Test Hole Y wi testifying 
Drawing (08/31/04) witness 
43 Woodhaven Creek Estates Plat Map (Inst Y 
#335643) 
44 District 7 Health Letter from Ray Keating Y wi Ray Keating 
(09/01/05) testifying 
45 Robert Meikle Survey Report N 
46 Robert Meikle Survey Bill N 
47 Mark Leible Appraisal N 
48 Mark Leible Appraisal Bill N 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to use any other exhibits which have been identified in the 
course of discovery. 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST - 4 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to use additional exhibits for purposes of rebuttal or 
impeachment. 
Dated this d!Q... day of December, 2010. 
----~~-
-== ~ON&I)AVIS,ESQ. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this .czQ'.. day of December, 2010, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442-0277 
Hon. Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
L:\wsd\- Clienls\74 1 1.1 Goodspeed\Trial Exhibit List.wpd 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST - 5 
[ ] Mailing 
.H Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
( ] E-Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Courthouse Box 
[ ] 
[ ] 
WESTON S. DAVIS (1.S.8. # 7449) 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This case involves the purchase and sale of real property and the defendants' 
misrepresentations as it relates to the sale of the property. The resulting claims are (1) breach of 
express warranty for failing to disclose prior sub-water issues and to protect against future sub-
water issues; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for 
misrepresenting the history and future of the sub-water on the subject real property; (3) breach of 
the implied warranty of habitability for subsequent sub-water issues on the subject real property; 
(4) that the corporate veil of Marriott Homes, LLC andlor Shippen Construction, Inc. be pierced 
to promote justice and recognize the unity of interest between the individual defendants and the 
entities; (5) that Robert and Jorja Shippen have been unjustly enriched for obtaining the market 
value of the home as if sub-water were not an issue; (6) that the Shippens fraudulently concealed 
a known defect by misrepresenting the fact of sub-water on the subject real property; (7) that 
such conduct also constituted a misrepresentation of a known fact; (8) that such conduct was also 
used to fraudulently induce the Goodspeeds to purchase the subject real property; and (9) that 
punitive damages be permitted to punish such misconduct and prevent future misconduct. 
Robert and Jorja Shippen are liable both individually and through their marital community. The 
builder and seller of the subject property are also liable for breach of warranty and contract 
claims. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Parties 
Plaintiffs, Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed, purchased the subject real property located at 
319 N. 3709 E., Rigby, Idaho in July of2007. Defendants, Robert Shippen andlor JOIja Shippen 
and/or Marriott Homes, LLC andlor Shippen Construction, Inc., built the home incorporated into 
the subject real property. Robert and JOIja Shippen, as owners of the real property, sold the 
subject real property to the Goodspeeds. 
B. The Facts 
1. Defendants Were Aware of Sub-Water Before and After Construction of the 
Residence. 
The facts will show that Robert and Jorja Shippen purchased a lot in Woodhaven Creek 
Estates on August 31,2005, with the knowledge that sub-water was an issue in that subdivision. 
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Prior to the purchase. Paul Jenkins, the original owner of the property, disclosed to the Shippens 
that high sub-water existed in the subdivision. Both Robert and JOlja Shippen acknowledge they 
have been aware of the sub-water in the area for at least the past twenty years. 
In the spring of 2006, the Shippens, allegedly through their entities Marriott Homes, LLC 
and/or Shippen Construction, began building a spec home on that lot excavating a foundation to 
include a basement. The Seventh District Health Department materials, reviewed by Mr. 
Shippen before excavation began, called for the placement of an enhanced septic system to be 
excavated no deeper than three feet below ground level due to high sub-water levels. 
Despite (1) the high sub-water in the area, (2) the Shippens' prior knowledge and 
warnings regarding the sub-water in the area, and (3) the restriction calling for an enhanced 
septic system, Defendants did not hire an engineer or hydrologist to determine the maximum 
depth of excavation for the residence. 
In approximately June or July of2006, Daniel Fohrenck, a framing sub-contractor who 
worked on the residence, notified Mr. Shippen he observed sub-water rising out of a test hole dug 
near the basement of the residence. Robert Shippen stated he knew about it and was going to 
install a sub-pump from being an issue to the homeowner. Robert Shippen acknowledged in his 
deposition that he watched the sub-water rise in his test hole by the walk out basement area 
during the construction of the property. 
2. Defendants Failed to Disclose the True Sub-Water Issues Related to the 
Subject Real Property and Misrepresented the Sub-Water History and 
Future. 
Then, in approximately August of 2006, the Shippens through their real estate agent, 
Dave Chapple, listed the property for sale stating on the MLS listing that the property had not 
had any sub-water issues and that the builder would install a leaching system to prevent the 
possibility of there ever being sub-water issues. 
Within approximately a month of listing the property, it flooded from sub-water to a 
depth of approximately 1 h - 2 inches. Robert Shippen admitted this fact in his deposition. He 
also admitted he told his wife, Jorja Shippen, about the flooding, which Jorja acknowledges in 
her deposition. Robert Shippen amended the MLS listing approximately four months after the 
flooding to extend the listing date but did not change the MLS listing to remove the 
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representations related to the sub-water. Neither Robert Shippen nor JoIja Shippen made any 
other changes to the MLS listing. 
The Goodspeeds, residents of Tennessee, were looking to purchase a home in 
southeastern Idaho to relocate for work related purposes. In the course of searching for a home 
with their real estate agent, Randy Stoor, the Goodspeeds saw the MLS listing related to the real 
property in question. They relied on the representations of the Defendants as it related to the sub-
water. 
The Goodspeeds expected to purchase a home that would be fit for human habitation. 
For that reason, in the contract, they requested "Builder to provide a standard Builder's Warranty 
for a minimum of I year". While doing a walk through of the property with Robert Shippen, he 
told them that the leaching system would protect against snow melt and fast rainwater runoff 
from coming into the basement-he did not mention the sub-water flooding of 2006. The 
Goodspeeds also had a standard home inspection done on the property, relying on the builder's 
representation that sub-water had not been and would not be an issue. 
On July 3, 2007, the Goodspeeds tendered the purchase price of $272,000.00 to Robert 
and Jorja Shippen via the title company in exchange for the residence. 
3. Within One Month of Moving In the Goodspeeds I __ earned of the Past Sub-
Water Issues and Continue to Experience Sub-Water Issues Today. 
In August of2007, approximately one month after purchasing the property, a neighbor 
stopped by to notify the Goodspeeds that the basement had flooded to a depth of approximately 
two (2) inches in the summer of 2006. Shawn Goodspeed called Robert Shippen about the 2006 
flooding, whereupon Robert Shippen told Shawn the house would not flood. 
The premises then began to experience rising sub-water on Labor-Day Weekend of2007 
whereupon Robert Shippen came to inspect the property and again told the Goodspeeds the 
house would not flood. 
The property has subsequently continued to sustained sub-water intrusion on the 
premises and inside the house. The Goodspeeds have attempted the mitigate these intrusions by 
installing a second sub-pump to remove water from the basement area and by running the pump 
previously installed by Robert Shippen. The Goodspeeds have also attempted to mitigate their 
damages by halting all improvements to the basement, placing all items in the basement on 
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blocks, and removing all carpet and placing it on blocks. 
Despite the continual and consistent sub-water intrusion, the Defendants have refused to 
purchase the home back from the Goodspeeds and have further refused to attempt to repair the 
problem under the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act. Defendants have notified Plaintiffs the 
problem cannot be fixed. 
III. LIABILITY 
A. DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE EXPRESS WARRANTY. 
1. Defendants Breached the Express Warranty. 
The Defendants created an express warranty to the Goodspeeds. An express warranty is 
an assurance by overt words or action of the seller guaranteeing a condition of the agreement 
upon which a buyer may rely. Clearwater Minerals Corp. v. Presnell, 111 Idaho 945, 949 (Ct. 
App. 1986); 17A Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 410 "Warranties", and Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd 
Pocket Ed., Bryan A. Gamer (2001) "Warranty: Express Warranty". Restated, a seller can create 
a warranty by representing the thing being sold is as represented or as promised. In Clearwater, 
the Supreme Court held a warranty was created by a representation found in a brochure regarding 
the extent of mineral rights available. 111 Idaho at 949. A warranty is intended to relieve the 
buyer of any duty to ascertain the fact for himself. Id.; 17 A Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 410 
"Warranties". 
In the sale of goods, the standard is the same. I.e. § 28-2-313(I)(a). The seller does not 
need to use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" when creating a warranty nor does a 
seller even have to intend to make a warranty. I.e. § 28-2-313(2). 
In this case, like in Clearwater, two express warranties were made in the MLS listing: (l) 
the property had not had sub-issues and (2) it would not have sub-issues. Further, the seller and 
builder agreed to an express warranty by promising to provide a "Standard Builder's Warranty" 
for a minimum of one year. The Goodspeeds understood the MLS listing representations were 
part of the standard builder's warranty. They believed that a standard builder's warranty would 
warrant a protection against conditions that would make the premises uninhabitable. 
The Goodspeeds learned after purchasing the house that it had in fact flooded from sub-
water despite the warranty that it had not. Thus, the warranty was breached as soon as the 
Goodspeeds closed on the property. The Goodspeeds contacted the Defendants prior to 
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instigating this litigation in an effort to resolve the defect. The Defendants failed to remedy or 
even attempt to remedy the defect. Therefore, the Defendants again breached the warranty that 
the house had not had sub-issues and would not have sub-issues. 
2. Parole Evidence Allows the MLS Listing To Be Considered As Part of the 
Express Warranty. 
When a contract is ambiguous and therefore subject to differing interpretations or where 
the language is nonsensical, a finder of fact may consider evidence outside of the four corners of 
the written agreement to determine the intent of the parties for the purpose of resolving the 
ambiguity in the contract. Potlach Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlach School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630 
*2 (20 1 0); Perron v. Hale, 108 Idaho 578, 581 (1985). An ambiguity can either be evident on the 
face of the document or manifest itselflater when applying the document to the facts as they 
exist. Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 828 (2000). 
In this case, the purchase and sales agreement executed by both parties expressly states a 
minimum of a one year standard builder's warranty will apply. The scope of the warranty, 
however, is not defined in the sales agreement. Because the scope is ambiguous, evidence 
outside of the agreement is necessary. 
The Goodspeeds relied on the MLS listing that the residence had not had sub-water 
issues and that a leaching system would prevent the possibility of sub-water being an issue. It 
would follow that because Defendants made a written assurance regarding the condition of the 
property to the public to give the public peace of mind that the Defendants should not be 
surprised to learn that the Goodspeeds would expect the MLS representation was part of the 
warranty. 
B. DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING. 
In every contract there is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Idaho First 
Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 287 (1991). 
'This duty obligates the parties to cooperate with each other so that each may obtain 
the full benefit of performance .... [T]he duty of good faith does not extend to 
obligate a party to accept a material change in the terms of the contract. ... Nor does 
it inject the substantive terms into the parties contract. Rather, [the implied 
covenant] requires only that the parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed 
by their agreement. ... Thus, the duty arises only in connection with terms agreed to 
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Jd. citing Badgett v. Security State Bank, 116 Wash.2d 563,807 P.2d 356 (1991). In Idaho First, 
the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the Washington Supreme Court's definition of the implied 
covenant cited above. A violation of the implied covenant is a breach of contract. Idaho First, 
121 Idaho at 288. 
In this case, Defendants had a duty to stand by their representation in the MLS agreement 
that the property had not had sub-issues and would not. The covenant was breached by 
misrepresenting the status of the property prior to selling it to the Goodspeeds. 
Additionally Defendants again breached the covenant, after the Goodspeeds learned 
about the 2006 flood and approached Defendants about it. Robert Shippen claimed the 2006 
flood was the result of a freak canal rupture and promised the house would not flood. When the 
property continued to experience sub-water issues, the Defendants would have fulfilled their 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by remedying the problem or by rescinding the contract in 
the event they could not remedy the problem. Defendants failed to do so and therefore breached 
their duty. 
C. DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABIT ABILITY. 
As a matter of public policy, implied in the sale of newly constructed residences is a 
warranty of habitability by the builder-vendor that the structure will be fit for habitation. Tusch 
Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 46 - 47 (1987). "It depends upon the quality of the home 
delivered and the expectation of the parties." Id. 
{TJ he trend of judicial opinion is to invoke the doctrine of implied warranty of fitness 
in cases involving sales of new houses by the builder. The old rule of caveat emptor 
does not satisfy the demands of justice in such cases. The purchase of a home is not 
an everyday transaction for the average family, and in many instances is the most 
important transaction of a lifetime. To apply the rule of caveat emptor to an 
inexperienced buyer, and in favor of a builder who is daily engaged in the business 
of building and selling houses, is manifestly a denial ofjustice. The implied warranty 
of fitness does not impose upon the builder an obligation to deliver a perfect house. 
No house is built without defects, and defects susceptible of remedy ordinarily would 
not warrant rescission. But major defects which render the house unfit for habitation, 
and which arc not readily remediable, entitle the buyer to rescission and restitution. 
The builder-vendor's legitimate interests are protected by the rule which casts the 
burden upon the purchaser to establish the facts which give rise to the implied 
warranty of fitness, and its breach. 
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Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 67 - 68, 415 P.2d 698, 710 - 711 (1966) (emphasis added). 
This implied warranty is a warranty whereby a purchaser is able to rely on the skill of the builder: 
The mores of the day have changed and the ordinary home buyer is not in a position 
to discover hidden defects in a structure. A home buyer should be able to place 
reliance on the builder or developer who sells him a new home, the purchase of 
which in so many instances, is the largest single purchase a family makes in a 
lifetime. Courts willjudicially protect the victims o/shoddy workmanship. Consumer 
protection demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely on the skill of the 
builder and that the house is constructed so as to be reasonably fit for its intended 
use. The average purchaser is without adequate knowledge or opportunity to make 
a meaningful inspection of the component parts of a residential structure. 
Tusch, 113 Idaho at 47 citing Moxley v. Laramie Builders. Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo.1979) 
(emphasis added). 
Idaho law also provides that the seller of a house under construction impliedly warrants 
that the house will be completed in a workmanlike manner. Bethlahmy, 91 Idaho at 67. 
The implied warranty of habitability extends to latent (concealed or dormant) defects 
which manifest themselves within a reasonable time. Tusch, 113 Idaho at 50. It extends to latent 
defects because "it is unrealistic to expect buyers to consult geotechnical and other experts about 
defects that are not even apparent." Id. at 47. The builder is the one who created the latent 
defect and the builder is in the better position to remedy and guard against such defects. Id. 
If the habitability of the home is impaired, liability attaches the builder-vendor of the 
residential property regardless of fault - a form of strict liability. Id. at 46 - 47; Phillip L. Burner 
& Patrick J. 0 'Connell on Construction Law, §9:72 (2002). The implied warranty of 
habitability also extends from the seller/vendor of the residence if the seller/vendor has expertise 
in the construction business and exercised control over the construction of the residence. Tusch. 
113 Idaho at 47 - 48. 
In this case, the facts will show that major defects exist with regard to sub-water that 
substantially impair the use of the house and render it unfit for habitation. These defects cannot 
be remedied. These defects were latent at the time of the sale and defendants' misrepresentation 
regarding the history and future of the house did not put the Goodspeeds on notice for an 
inspection of a latent defect. Beyond the builder liability, the facts will also show that Robert 
Shippen, as an individual and vendor ofthe property, has expertise in the construction industry 
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and exercised control over the construction of the residence. Jorja Shippen had sufficient 
knowledge regarding the history of the latent defect that she should likewise be liable as a 
vendor. 
D. DEFENDANTS FAILED TO DISCLAIM ANY WARRANTIES. 
To the extent Defendants intend to claim they disclaimed any express or implied 
warranties, such an argument must fail. 
Disclaiming a warranty requires a conspicuous provision (text in large, bold, or capital 
letters) which is clear and unambiguous, fully disclosing the consequences of its inclusion. 
Tusch, 113 Idaho at 45 - 46; Myers v. A.a. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc" 114 Idaho 432, 437 
(et. App. 1988). A disclaimer is construed against the builder-vendor. Tusch, 113 Idaho at 45 -
46. This places a heavy burden on the builder to show the buyer has relinquished the protection 
afforded to the buyer by public policy and that the buyer has done so knowingly. Id. '''By this 
approach, boilerplate causes (ready made or form language), however worded, are rendered 
ineffective thereby affording the consumer the desired protection without denying enforcement of 
what is in fact the intention of both parties. '" Id. citing Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W. 2d 
879 (Mo. 1978); Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd Pocket Ed., Bryan A. Garner (2001) "Boilerplate". 
A knowing waiver of a warranty will not be readily implied and should be obtained with 
difficulty. Tusch, 113 Idaho at 46; Myers, 114 Idaho at 437. 
Restated, it should be clear to both the seller and the buyer that a disclaimer was intended 
and accepted. If it is not clear or the disclaimer is found in mere boilerplate language, the 
disclaimer is construed against the builder-vendor. 
The facts in this case will show not only that the purchase and sale agreement used for 
the purchase of the subject property was a standard boilerplate agreement, but also that the type 
font of any alleged disclaimer is identical to that of all of the other provisions in the contract. 
Therefore, it is not conspicuous. Further, the customized language in the purchase and sale 
agreement specifically provided for a warranty for a minimum of one year. 
E. DEFENDANTS CANNOT RELY ON AN "ACT OF GOD" DEFENSE. 
A party may not claim that an 'Act of God' (an act that occurs by a superhuman cause or 
one beyond the control of human agency) as a defense, when the party by use of ordinary care 
could have guarded against the same and the effects thereof. Johnson v. Burley Irrigation 
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District, 78 Idaho 392, 398-399 (1956). 
In that case, the defendants attempted to avoid liability for flooding caused by a canal 
rupture which resulted from gophers burrowing into the banks of the canal. ld. at 395. The 
defendants were aware there was a problem with burrowing gophers but failed to take corrective 
measures to police the area when the water in the canal did not reach its maximum flow. ld. at 
396 - 397. The Court held that even though the defendants did not cause the gopher problem, the 
fact that the defendants knew of the existing gopher problem and failed to remedy it imputed 
liability to the defendants: "The distinguishing characteristic of an 'act of God' is that it proceeds 
from the force of nature alone to the entire exclusion of human agency." ld. at 398. 
In this case the facts will show the defendants, Robert and Jorja Shippen, have not only 
known about the sub-water issues in the area for nearly their entire lives but they also could have 
guarded against sub-water by reducing the depth of excavation for the basement. Robert Shippen 
has thirty years of construction experience and could have easily built the subject property at a 
higher elevation to protect from sub-water intrusion. Thus this defense must fail. 
F. THE JURY SHOULD PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL TO HOLD ROBERT 
AND JORJA SHIPPEN INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE. 
In the event the jury were to find only the entities liable for the breach of express or 
implied warranties mentioned above, Robert and Jorja Shippen must still be held individually 
liable. 
A corporation or limited liability company may be established to limit personal liability 
of the shareholders or members of that entity. However, "[t]here are times when the form of a 
corporate entity [(a corporation or an LLC)] is disregarded and imposed on a corporation's 
shareholder and president of a corporation. This is called the doctrine of 'piercing the corporate 
veil.'" VFC VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 335 (2005). See also Alpine Packing Co. v. H.H. 
Keirn Co., Ltd., 121 Idaho 762 (et. App 1991) affirmed in Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 
Idaho 604 (2005). 
To pierce the corporate veil, two requirements must be met: 
(1) [T]here must be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities ofthe corporation and individual no longer exist, and (2) there must be 
a showing that, ifthe acts are treated as those ofthe corporation, an inequitable result 
will follow or that it would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. 
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VFC, 141 Idaho at 335. 
1. The Shippens Held a Unity of Interest with Marriott Homes, LLC and 
Shippen Construction, Inc. 
In detennining whether a unity of interest exists, any of the following factors may be 
considered: 
[1] was the sole shareholder acting as president of the corporation; [2) was there a 
lack of corporate formalities, such as directors' meetings; [3] did the shareholders fail 
to submit the corporate contract and inventory revisions to the board of directors; and 
[ 4] were business transactions completed without approval by any director or officer 
of the corporation. 
Id. A court may also consider: [5] the disregard for the separateness of the corporation. In re 
Weddle, 353 B.R. 892,898 (2006); [6] Whether the sole owner/shareholder acted as the president 
of the company. Alpine, 121 Idaho at 764; [7] Using or anticipating the profits from one 
corporation to offset losses from the other corporation (i.e. satisfaction of inter-company claims). 
ld.; and [8] The individual using his or her name interchangeably with the corporation's when 
dealing with third parties. Hutchinson v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936, 941 (Ct. App. 1997); Minich 
v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 917 (1979), disagreed with on other grounds by 
Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74 (1982). 
2. An Inequitable Result or Fraud or Injustice Would Occur If the Veil Is Not 
Pierced. 
In addition to showing a unity of interest, the entities' actions must lead to an inequitable 
result, sanction a fraud or promote injustice. 
Acting to perpetuate fraud qualifies as an inequitable result. In re Weddle, 353 B.R. 892, 
899 (2006). An inequitable result or injustice might also be promoted where the targeted 
corporation was undercapitalized and thus lacked the resources with which to pay its debts or 
judgments incurred against it. ld. at 899 fn 9; Hutchinson v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936,941 (Ct. 
App.1997). 
The enumerated factors listed above for showing either a unity of interest or an 
inequitable result "are not exclusive because the conditions under which corporate entity may be 
disregarded vary according to the circumstances to the case." VFC, 141 Idaho at 335. Therefore, 
it is conceivable other factors may be considered as grounds for piercing the corporate veil and 
not all the factors above must be proven to pierce the veil. 
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In this case, the facts will show that Marriott Homes, LLC and Shippen Construction, 
Inc. are merely an alter ego of Robert and Jorja Shippen and that the veil should be pierced. The 
Shippens are the sole shareholders of the entities. Their actions and admissions show they are 
not aware of corporate formalities as it relates to signing on behalf ofthe entity or notifying 
others of their formal entity names. Robert Shippen used his name interchangeably with Shippen 
Construction, Inc., and Marriott Homes, LLC as it relates to the subject real property. Robert 
Shippen reports to noone in making transfers to himself and to his entities. The Shipp ens pay 
their personal expenses directly from their entities' checking accounts. The Shippens offset the 
losses and/or satisfied inter-company claims not collecting payment from Marriott Homes, LLC 
for substantial foundation work done by Shippen Construction, Inc. on the Shippen's properties. 
The Shippens have failed to register the entities in compliance with the Idaho Contractor's 
Registration Act (I.C. § 54-5201 et. seq). Instead, only "Robert D. Shippen" is a registered 
contractor with the State ofIdaho. Marriott Homes, LLC (the purported general contractor) also 
used Shippen Construction, Inc.'s (the purported subcontractor's) general liability insurance to 
cover the subject real property during its construction. Shippen Construction, Inc. paid the 
insurance premiums without reimbursement from Marriott Homes. Additionally, Marriott 
Homes, LLC has virtually no assets. 
Further, Robert and Jorja Shippen, whether as business owners or as individuals, knew 
the subject real property had sub-water issues and represented otherwise. They also mis-
represented the future condition of the property. Such actions constituted a fraud. In light of the 
unity of interest between the Shippens and their entities, and in light of the inequitable result that 
would result through both fraud and the Goodspeeds' inability to collect against the 
undercapitalized entities, the veil must be pierced subjecting Robert and Jorja Shippen to 
personal liability. 
G. ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN WERE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED. 
"The doctrine of unjust enrichment sounds in quasi-contract or implied-in-Iaw contract." 
Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1997). The theory is "based upon the defendant 
having received a benefit which would be inequitable to retain at least without compensating the 
plaintiff to the extent that retention ofthe benefit is unjust." Id. In a plaintiffs' prima/ada case 
for unjust enrichment, the plaintiffs must show: 
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Id. 
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the 
defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under the circumstances 
that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to 
the plaintiff of the value thereof. 
Therefore, even if the jury were to find that a breach of the express or implied warranties 
did not occur, Plaintiffs may still bring an unjust enrichment claim against the individuals who 
were paid and received the proceeds of the sale-in this case, Robert and Jorja Shippen. The 
Shippen's acceptance of the financial benefit was unjust considering the condition of the 
property. 
H. ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN COMMITTED FRAUD. 
1. Fraud in General. 
To prevail on an action for fraud or misrepresentation, the following elements must be 
established: 
(I) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of 
its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the 
person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his 
consequent and proximate injury. 
Aspiazu v. Mortimer, 139 Idaho 548,550 (2003). 
a. Representation and Falsity. 
A nondisclosure of material facts amounts to a fraudulent misrepresentation. Tusch, 113 
Idaho at 42. "A duty to speak arises in situations where the parties do not deal on equal tenns or 
where infonnation to be conveyed is not already in possession of the other party." G&M Farms 
v. Funk Irrigation, Co., 119 Idaho 514, 521 (1991); See also Sorensen v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708 
(1977) overruled on other grounds ("Silence in circumstances where a prospective purchaser 
might be led to hannful conclusion is a fonn of 'representation"'). 
b. Materiality. 
A representation is "material" if: 
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in 
detennining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or (b) the maker of 
the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely 
to regard the matter as important in detennining his choice of action, although a 
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reasonable man would not so regard it. 
Watts v. Krebbs, l31 Idaho 616, 620 (1998) citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538(2) 
(1977). 
c. Knowledge, Intent, and Ignorance. 
"Actual intent to deceive need not be shown when a seller knows of facts that would have 
apprised a person of ordinary prudence of the truth." Tusch, 113 Idaho at 43. 
Two cases illustrate the principals of representation and intent clearly for the Court: 
i. Bethlahmv v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) 
Bethlahmy involved a failure to disclose in the purchase and sale ofreal property. 
In that case, prior to the home's construction, the seller (Bechtel) enclosed an open 
irrigation canal running across the real property. Id. at 57. This was accomplished by means of 
burying conduit laid in a trench which was dug along the course of the existing canal. Id. The 
joints of the now underground concrete conduit canal were not sealed. Id. The house was then 
constructed over the conduit canal in such a manner that the conduit ran under the garage's 
concrete floor. [d. As the house was constructed, the builder mopped the exterior basement 
walls with tar and hydrosealed the snap tie holes. Id. at 58. No additional measures were taken 
to waterproof the basement. /d. 
Prior to the completion of the house, some buyers (Bethlahmy) inquired about the 
purchase of the house. The seller told the buyers that the houses he built were the finest and of 
first quality construction, assuring them the home would be ready for occupancy on May 15 th of 
that year. Id. at 57. After visiting the property on two separate occasions to inspect it, the 
buyers purchased the home and moved in on May 171\ even though the house was not entirely 
finished at the time. Id. The buyers worked through punch lists with the sellers as construction 
was completed and any defects discovered were remedied. Id. 
The seller, who knew about the conduit canal, did not disclose the conduit canal. Id. at 
58. 
Then, in July, about two months after the purchaser's moved in and after the irrigation 
season had commenced, water began seeping into the basement rooms and floors. Id. The 
builder made several attempts to reroute the water, but none of these efforts were successful. /d. 
The buyers sued the seller for fraud based upon the seller's failure to disclose the 
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defective condition of the home. The Supreme Court ofIdaho recognized that a "[fJailure to 
disclose such defects would support a finding of fraud." Id. at 59. The opinion cites several cases 
nationwide where sellers were held liable for a failure to disclose major defects in the real 
property involved (for example, the failure to disclose a concealed cesspool, a defect in a furnace 
boiler, termites, disease, a leaky house, a defect in floor, and a house built on filled ground). Id. 
at 60. 
The Court then adopted the Kentucky standard regarding fraudulent concealment: 
It cannot be controverted that actionable fraud or misrepresentation by a vendor 
may be by concealment or a failure to disclose a hidden condition or material fact, 
where under the circumstances there was an obligation to disclose it during the 
transaction. If deception is accomplished, the form of deceit is immaterial. And the 
legal question is not affected by the absence of an intent to deceive . ... 
Id. at 60, citing Kaze v. Compton, 383 S.W.2d 204, 207 (1955). Emphasis added. 
The Court then recognized that in the sale of real property, a seller has superior 
knowledge regarding the condition of the real property and therefore has a duty to disclose 
defects to the buyer. Id. at 62. It held that in the sale of real property, a confidential relationship 
arises and the buyers are able to rely on the representations or lack thereof by sellers. !d. The 
Court further reasoned: 
The purchase of a home is not an everyday transaction for the average family, and in 
many instances is the most important transaction of a lifetime. To apply the rule of 
caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer, and in favor of a builder who is daily 
engaged in the business of building and selling house, is manifestly a denial of 
justice. 
Id. at 67. 
Because the seller in Bethlahmy was aware of the unsealed conduit canal and failed to 
disclose its existence and further stated that the house was of the finest construction, the Court 
held that a finding of fraud was appropriate regardless of the seller's intent. !d. at 61 - 64. 
ii. Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987) 
Tusch also involved a failure to disclose in the purchase and sale of real property. 
In that case, a seller (Coffin) who had extensive experience in the road construction 
decided to build three duplexes along with his wife. Id. at 38, The seller hired a contractor and 
told the contractor that the building site was cut out of the mountain and assured the contractor 
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that no fill dirt was used on the site (fill dirt settles and can cause foundations to settle and crack). 
Id. at 39. The contractor told the seller that the ground looked soft and the two of them agreed 
that the ground for the third duplex did not look like original ground. Id. The seller asked the 
contractor to do what the contractor had to do to take care of it. /d. 
After the duplexes were completed, a buyer in partnership with her relatives (Tusch 
Enterprises) approached the seller about purchasing the duplexes as investment properties. Id. at 
39 - 40. In the negotiations prior to purchasing the property, the seller informed the buyer that he 
worked for a construction company, had access to the site preparation equipment, and that he had 
personally participated in the site preparation. [d. at 40. The seller also stated that the duplexes 
were of "good quality construction." Id. The buyer relied on these representations. [d. The 
seHer failed to notify the buyer of the foundational conditions. /d. 
Prior to purchasing the property, the buyer had the property inspected and found no major 
defects. Id. About a month after purchasing the properties, however, the walls in the third 
duplex began cracking around the windows and the doors would not shut properly. /d. Further 
investigation found that the foundation was cracking because a portion of the property was built 
on fill dirt that had begun to settle. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court again recognized the Bethlahmy standard that non-disclosures 
amount to misrepresentations in transactions regarding real property where the seller has superior 
knowledge regarding the property. Id. at 42. The Court reaffirmed the Kaze holding that "fraud 
or misrepresentation by a vendor may be by concealment or failure to disclose a hidden condition 
or material fact. .. ". lei. at 43. 
The Court stated that after the seller's conversation with the contractor, the seller knew or 
should have known that the third duplex was at least partially built on fill dirt. Id. Considering 
the seller's experience in the construction industry, albeit unrelated to the building of houses, the 
Court found that the seller would have known the implications of the fill dirt. Id. The seller did 
not notify the buyer of the condition and instead stated that the duplexes were of quality 
construction. [d. The Court also held that the buyer had a right to rely on the representations and 
non-disclosure by the seller where the seller was of superior knowledge. !d. 
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d. Ignorance, Reliance, and Right to Rely on Representation 
Furthennore, a buyer has a right to rely on the seller's failure to disclose hannful 
conditions. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this in both Bethlahmy and Tusch, even where 
both sets of buyers inspected the properties. 
To further illustrate the point, in Sorenson v. Adams, a fanner agreed to sell fannland to 
interested buyers. 98 Idaho 708 (1977) The farmer provided to the buyers a paper from the 
United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, 
stating that the land to be sold contained 1,238 acres offannland. Id. at 710. After purchasing 
the property, the buyers subsequently discovered that the actual farmland only contained 1,076 
acres. Id. Even though a legal description was provided to the buyers and the buyers were able 
to inspect the property before they purchased it, the Court held that the non-disclosure of this 
material fact could constitute fraud: 
In short, the general rule is that 'a vendor may be liable in tort for misrepresentations 
[ ... regarding real property], notwithstanding such misrepresentations were made 
without actual knowledge of their falsity. The reason, of course, is that the parties 
to a real estate transaction do not deal on equal tenns. An owner is presumed to 
know [. .. about his property]. If he does not know the correct information, he 
must find it out or refrain from making representations to unsuspecting strangers. 
'Even honesty in making a mistake is no defense as it is incumbent upon the 
vendor to know the facts. ' 
Id. at 715. Citations omitted. Emphasis added. The Supreme Court held that because the 
property owner had reason to know that the acreage of the farmland was less than that 
represented by the U.S.D.A. paper he provided to the purchasers, a claim for fraud could be 
supported. Id. It further held this silence was a form of a representation or statement and that: 
False statements found ... to have been made and relied on cannot be avoided by the 
[sellers] by the contention that the [buyers] could have, by independent investigation, 
ascertained the truth. The [sellers] having stated what was untrue cannot now 
complain because [the buyers] believed what they were told. Lack of caution on the 
part of the [buyers] because they so believed and the contention that the [buyers] 
could have made an independent investigation and determined the true facts, is no 
defense to the actioll. 
Id. Emphasis added. 
Such a holding is consistent with the Watts decision wherein the Supreme Court of Idaho 
affirmed that a purchaser of real property had a right to rely on the vendor's failure to disclose 
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that a portion of the land being sold had been harvested for timber prior to the sell. Watts, 131 
Idaho at 621. Again a finding of fraud was sustained even where the purchaser could have 
discovered the fact of the harvesting prior to purchasing the property. !d. 
2. Parole Evidence Can Be Utilized to Establish Fraud. 
In cases involving fraud and misrepresentation, the parol evidence rule (which excludes 
evidence outside of the agreement) does not apply and a finder of fact may always consider 
elements of evidence not found in the contract. Aspizau v. Mortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 550 - 551 
(2003); Tusch, 113 Idaho 37, 45 (1987); Corbin on Contracts § 580 (1960); and Restatement 2nd 
a/Contracts § 214 (1981). "Agreements and communications prior to or contemporaneous with 
the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish fraud." Tusch, 113 Idaho at 45 
n.5. 
As such, a party may reference an MLS listing as evidence that fraud was committed in 
the purchase and sale of real property. Large v. Cafferty Realty, Inc., 123 Idaho 676, 680 - 682 
(1993). "Any misrepresentation made by [the real estate agent] as agent of [the seller] would be 
imputed to [the sellers]." ld. at 681 
3. Robert and Jorja Shippen Fraudulently Concealed a Known Defect. 
In this case, the facts will show that Robert and Jorja Shippen knew that the subject real 
property had sub-water issues before they listed it for sale with their realtor. Robert Shippen then 
met with the realtor and agreed that language should be added to the MLS listing that the subject 
property had not had sub-water issues and would not have sub-issues. This MLS listing was 
published to the general public. In this manner, the seller intended to give all potential buyers 
"peace of mind." Even after the property flooded from sub-water in 2006, neither Robert nor 
Jorja Shippen requested that their realtor amend the MLS listing to notify the public of the 
flooding or sub-water issues. The Shippens did not disclose the fact of the 2006 sub-water to the 
Goodspeeds. Robert Shippen told them the pump would take care of snow melt and rainwater 
runoff. In this manner, the Shippens fraudulently concealed a known defect of sub-water 
intrusion from the Plaintiffs. The Goodspeeds did not know about sub-water issues on the 
proeprtyand reasonably relied on the Shippens' representations to their detriment. 
PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF - 17 -
4. Robert and Jorja Shippen Fraudulently Misrepresented a Known Fact. 
See Section H(3) Fraudulent Concealment of a Known Defect. The Shippens' actions and 
failures to disclose the known information regarding the sub-water on the subject property 
constituted a fraudulent misrepresentation of a known fact. 
5. Robert and Jorja Shippen Fraudulently Induced the Goodspeeds to Purchase 
the Property. 
See Section fi(3) Fraudulent Concealment of a Known Defect. The Shippens's actions 
and failure to apprise the Goodspecds of the truth constituted fraud which induced the 
Goodspeeds to purchase the subject real property. Had tlie proper disclosures been made to the 
Goodspeeds, they would not have purchased the subject real property. 
J. THE JURY SHOULD PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE SHIPPENS FOR 
THEIR FRAUDULENT CONDUCT. 
"It is well established in [the State ofIdaho] that punitive damages may be awarded when 
the Defendant has committed fraud." Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 710 (1983). Accord 
Walston v. Monumental Insurance Co., 129 Idaho 211, 220 - 221 (1996). "Additionally, 
exemplary [(punitive)]damage awards are appropriate when the defendant is engaged in 
deceptive business practices operated for profit posing danger to the general public." Id. The 
purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendants to deter similar conduct from happening 
again in the future. Walston, 129 Idaho at 221. 
An award of punitive damages requires a showing of(1) a bad act and (2) a bad state of 
mind. Id at 220. With regard to showing a bad act/omission, the movant must show that "the 
defendant acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, 
that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its likely 
consequences." Seiniger Law Office P.A. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 250 (2008). 
In showing a bad state of mind, the movant must show "the defendant acted with an extremely 
harmful state of mind, whether or not that state be termed 'malice, oppression,/raud, or gross 
negligence'; 'malice, oppression, wantonness'; or simply 'deliberate or willful.'" Umphrey, 106 
Idaho at 710, (1983); Doe v. Cutter Biological, 844 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D. Idaho 1994) (citations 
omitted). A showing of fraud satisfies both the prong of a bad act and the prong of a bad state of 
mind to support a claim for punitive damages. I.e. § 6-1604(1); Umphrey, 106 Idaho at 710; 
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Walston, 129 Idaho at 220 - 221 
Additionally, in a claim for punitive damages, "a defendant's financial status may be 
considered in determining whether a damage award will have any deterrent effect." Umphrey, 
106 Idaho at 710. 
In this case, Robert and JOlja Shippen understood that they were undertaking the building 
of a residence intended for human habitation. Despite the realm of their knowledge regarding 
sub-water on the property and in the area they represented otherwise. The Shipp ens had superior 
knowledge regarding the condition of the subject real property and its latent defects. The 
Shippens knew the statements contained in the MLS listing were false and failed to take 
corrective action. These actions and inaction should be punished to deter future similar conduct 
from happening in the future. 
IV. DAMAGES 
Generally speaking, "A person who, tortiously or in breach of contractual obligation does 
an act which has injurious consequences is liable for the damages caused by such wrongful act." 
22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, § 4. In this case, damages can be separated into (1) breach of contract 
claims, (2) claims in tort, (3) claims in equity, and (4) punitive damages. 
A. BREACH OF CONTRACT/BREACH OF W ARRANTY(IES) DAMAGES. 
Contract damages are determined in two ways: (1) rescission and (2) restitution. Ervin 
Construction Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695,699 (1993). 
"Rescission" is an equitable remedy that totally abrogates the contract and seeks to restore 
the parties to their original position. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State Dept. of Admin., 137 
Idaho 663 (2002). Rescission of contract is available "when a party has committed a material 
breach which destroys the entire purpose of entering into the contract." Id. See also Ervin, at 
699; Bethalamy, 91 Idaho at 711 ("Major defects which render the house unfit for habitation and 
which are not readily remediable, entitle the buyer to rescission and restitution."). When a 
breach of contract is only incidental and subordinate to the main purpose of the contract, 
rescission may not be available. Ervin, 125 Idaho at 700. Whether a breach is material or 
incidental is a question of fact. Id. 
"Restitution" is a return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or 
status. Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd Pocket Ed., Bryan A. Gamer (2001) "Restitution". Where a 
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contract is rescinded, the buyer is restored to the purchase price of the contract. However, when 
a home or property may be repaired for a reasonable value, the defect is not significant. Ervin. 
125 Idaho at 700. In such a case, damages are assessed at the value of the repair of the property. 
Id. at 702. 
In addition to rescission and restitution, consequential and incidental damages may be 
awarded. Consequential (Incidental) damages are those losses and expenses which have 
occurred and which foreseeeably arise as a result of the breach of the contract over and above the 
expectation damages. U.S. v. Silver, 245 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir 2001). 
Damages arising from breach of contract under the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act 
may not exceed the purchase price of the residence or fair market of the property without the 
construction defect, whichever is greater. I.e. § 6-2504(4). 
In this case, the facts will show that the Shippens' breach of contract and breach of the 
express and implied warranties destroyed the entire purposes of the real estate contract-providing 
a house that was fit for habitation and providing a house that had not and would not have sub-
water issues. The facts will show the house had flooded from sub-water prior to the sale, despite 
the Shippen's representation that it had not. Thus the warranty was breached as soon as the 
Goodspeeds bought the residence. The facts will further show that the house has since had 
subsequent years of sub-water intrusion, including flooding of both the basement and 
landscaping. The Goodspeeds purchased a home with the intention of inhabiting the entire 
house, basement included. The sub-water has prevented such from happening. As a result a 
material breach has occurred. With the understanding that the house would be habitable, the 
Goodspeeds attempted to finish the basement incurring additional consequential damages. They 
also incurred additional costs to remove the sub-water from their basement. 
The Goodspeeds should be entitled to rescission of the contract and restoration of the 
contract price or fair market value of the property without the construction defect, whichever is 
greater. Only in the event the breach is not considered material, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover 
the difference between the contract price and the value of the property received (i.e., the cost to 
repair the defect and prevent future sub-water issues.). 
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B. TORTIOUS CONDUCT (FRAUD) DAMAGES. 
Generally, the measure of damages in a fraud case is the "difference between the actual 
value of the property and the value it would have had ifit had been as represented." Walston, 
129 Idaho at 217. However, this measure of damages is not the exclusive remedy for fraud cases. 
Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338, 346 (1966). 
Rescission may also be granted in fraud cases. See Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 
777 (et. App. 1987) ("No fault is necessary to warrant rescission of such a contract, though 
rescission is also available where the defendant is guilty of fault, such as fraud."); McEnrow v. 
Morgan, 106 Idaho 326, 329 eet. App. 1984) ("Fraud on the part of the seller in inducing a 
purchaser to enter into a land sale contract renders the contract voidable and gives the purchaser 
the right to rescind."); Moon v. Brewer, 89 Idaho 59,62 - 63 (1965) (A victim of fraud may seek 
rescind the contract and sue for restitution but may not obtain a double recovery in doing so). 
When seeking to rescind a contract due to fraud, proof of monetary damages is 
unnecessary. Layh v. Jonas, 96 Idaho 688, 690 (1975). Further, in considering damages 
resulting from fraud, Idaho does not mandate the out-of-pocket rule: "the underlying principle is 
that the victim of fraud is entitled to compensation for every wrong which is the natural and 
proximate result of fraud. The measure of damages which should be adopted under the facts of a 
case is the one which will effect such result." Id. at 690 - 69l. 
In this case, again, the facts will show that the Goodspeeds were defrauded into 
purchasing a house that had flooded from sub-water and where the Shippens had an 
understanding that high sub-water was a prevalent issue in the area. The Shippens failed to 
disclose these material defects in the home to the Goodspeeds and in fact represented to the 
contrary. These actions give right to the Goodspeeds to rescind the contract and recover any 
monies spent improving their home. In this manner, the Goodspeeds will be fully restored their 
actual damages. 
C. DAMAGES IN EQUITY (UNJUST ENRICHMENT). 
"The measure of damages for unjust enrichment is the value ofthe benefit bestowed upon 
the defendant which, in equity, would be unjust to retain without recompense to the plaintiff." 
Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 666 (1988). 
In this case, the facts will show the Shippens obtained a purchase price for a home that 
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would not be defective. The problem is the house was defective. Further, because the home is 
materially defective, it has no value and the Goodspeeds should be entitled to recover the 
purchase price of the house. 
D. PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
In the event Plaintiffs are able to prove their case of fraud, they may be entitled to 
punitive damages in addition to any compensatory damages. Umphrey, 106 Idaho at 710 - 711. 
These damages are to be assessed and in the jury's sound discretion. IDJl2d 9.20.5. "The law 
provides no mathematical formula by which punitive damages are calculated, other than any 
award of punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual harm done, to the 
cause thereof, to the conduct of the defendant, and the primary objective of deterrence." [d. See 
also Walston, 129 Idaho at 222 - 223. 
Courts have sustained punitive damage awards that are four and six times the amount of 
compensatory damages. [d. Idaho Statute has capped punitive damages to $250,000.00 or three 
times the amount of compensatory damages, whichever is greater. I.C. § 6-1604(3). However, no 
instruction is to be given to the jury regarding a cap on punitive damages. Id. 
In this case, the facts will show a purchase price of the residence was $272,000.00. 
Plaintiffs also incurred additional damages of$42,861.86 exclusive ofattomeys fees. Total 
compensatory damages less attorneys fees is$314,861.86. Therefore the cap on punitive damages 
should be $944,585.58, which is awardable in addition to compensatory damages. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Goodspeeds suffered significant damages by the Shippen's misrepresentations and 
failure to disclose a known material defect in a defective property. The Shippens should be 
prohibited from placing that burden on the Goodspeeds and should be liable for Goodspeeds' 
damages. The jury should find in favor of the Plaintiffs. 
DATED this ~ day of December, 2010. ~.---
WESTON S. DAVIS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and . 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and : 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, ROBERT and JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, ROBERT and JORJA 
SHIPPEN, dba SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, 
ROBERT SHIPPEN, an individual, and 
MARR]OTT HOMES, LLC. 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-015 
PLAINTIFFS' SPECIAL VERDICT 
WE, THE JURY, ANSWER THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS FOLLOWS: 
QUESTION NO.1: Did Robert andlor Jotja Shippen fraudulently induce the Goodspeeds to 
purchase the subject home? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.1: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered "Yes" please check all defendants that apply: 
Robert Shippen [ ]; JOIja Shippen [ ]. 
PLAINTIFFS' SPECIAL VERDICT - 1 
QUESTION NO.2: Did Robert and/or Jorja Shippen fraudulently conceal a known defect in the 
course of selling the subject home to the Goodspeeds? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.2: YES [ NO [ ] 
lfyou answered "Yes" please check all defendants that apply: 
Robert Shippen [ ]; Jorja Shippen [ ]. 
QUESTION NO.3: Did Robert and/or JOIja Shippen fraudulently misrepresent a known fact in 
the course of selling the subject home to the Goodspeeds? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.3: YES [ NO [ ] 
lfyou answered "Yes" please check all defendants that apply: 
Robert Shippen [ ]; Jorja Shippen [ ]. 
QUESTION NO.4: Did the defendant(s) breach their contract with Shawn and Shellee 
Goodspeed? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.4: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
lfyou answered "Yes" please check all defendants that apply: 
Robert Shippen [ ]; Jorja Shippen [ ]; Marriott Homes, LLC [ ]; 
Shippen Construction, Inc. [ ] 
QUESTION NO.5: Was the defendant's(s') breach of contract a material breach? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 5: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
QUESTION NO.6: Did the defendant(s) breach their express warranty with Shawn and Shellee 
Goodspeed? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.6: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered "Yes" please check all defendants that apply: 
Robert Shippen [ ]; Jorja Shippen [ ]; Marriott Homes, LLC [ ]; 
Shippen Construction, Inc. [ ] 
PLAINTIFFS' SPECIAL VERDICT - 2 
QUESTION NO.7: Was the defendant's(s') breach of express warranty a "material" breach? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.7: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
QUESTION NO.8: Did the defendant(s) breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.8: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered "Yes" please check all defendants that apply: 
Robert Shippen [ ]; Jorja Shippen [ ]; Marriott Homes, LLC [ ]; 
Shippen Construction, Inc. [ ] 
QUESTION NO.9: Was defendant's(s') breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing a "material" breach? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.9: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
QUESTION NO.1 0: Did the defendant(s) breach the implied warranty of habitability? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 10: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered "Yes" please check all defendants that apply: 
Robert Shippen [ ]; Jorja Shippen [ ]; Marriott Homes, LLC [ ]; 
Shippen Construction, Inc. [ ] 
QUESTION NO. 11: Should the corporate veil of Marriott Homes, LLC and/or Shippen 
Construction, Inc. be pierced to hold Robert and/or Jorja Shippen individually liable for the acts 
of their entities? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 11: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered "Yes" please check those who should be held liable: 
Robert Shippen [ ]; Jorja Shippen [ ] 
QUESTION NO. 12: Were Robert and Jorja Shippen unjustly enriched by their actions in this 
case? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 12: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
PLAINTiFFS' SPECIAL VERDICT - 3 
QUESTION NO. 13: If you answered "Yes" to any of questions 1 - 3 above, please assess an 
award of damages: 
A. The contract should be rescinded: YES [ ] NO[ ] 
B. The Plaintiffs should be restored the 
purchase price of the property. YES [ NO[ ] 
Purchase Price of Property: $ 
C. The Plaintiffs should be reimbursed 
damages for money spent improving the 
property. YES [ ] NO[ ] 
Damages to Improve Property: 
D. The Plaintiffs should be reimbursed 
damages related to clean up of sub-water. YES [ ] NO[ ] 
Damages for sub-water cleanup: 
E. Shellee Goodspeed should be reimbursed 
her medical bills and prescription expenses. YES [ NO[ ] 
Damages for medical expenses: $ 
QUESTION NO. 14: If you answered "Yes" to any of questions 1 - 3 above, you may assess 
additional punitive damages against Robert and/or Jorja Shippen. Punitive damages are awarded 
in the amount of $ 
------------------
QUESTION NO. 15: As a separate form of measuring damages, if you answered "Yes" to any 
of questions 4 - 12, please assess an award of damages: 
A. The contract should be rescinded: 
B. The Plaintiffs should be restored the 
purchase price of the property. 
Purchase Price of Property: 
C. The Plaintiffs should be restored the 
fair market value of the home as if the 
house did not have a defect. 
PLAINTIFFS' SPECIAL VERDICT - 4 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
D. 
Fair Market Value of Home 
without the defect: $ 
Please enter the greater amount found 
in 15(B) or 15(C) 
----------------
$----------------
E. The Plaintiffs should be reimbursed 
damages related to clean up of sub-water. YES [ ] NO [ ] 
Damages for sub-water cleanup: 
E. Shellee Goodspeed should be reimbursed 
her medical bills and prescription expenses. YES [ NO [ ] 
Damages for medical expenses: 
THIS CONCLUDES THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES. UPON FINISHING THE 
QUESTIONS, PLEASE SIGN THE DOCUMENT WHERE INDICATED: 
1. ________________________ _ 
Foreman 
5. ________________________ ___ 
6. ______________________ _ 
7. _______________________ _ 
8. __________________ ___ 
9, ____________________ ___ 
10, ___________________________ _ 
11. ____________________________ _ 
12. ___________________________ _ 
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Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, ROBERT and JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, ROBERT and JORJA 
SHIPPEN, dba SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, 
ROBERT SHIPPEN, an individual, and 
MARRIOTT HOMES, LLC. 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-015 
PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO 
DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COME NOW Plaintiffs by and through counsel of record and respectfully object to 
Defendants' proposed jury instructions as follows: 
1. IDJI 1.41.2: Defendants have requested this instruction as a stock instruction, but 
this instruction ca1ls for insertion of claims made by the Plaintiff and a question to be asked 
about that specific claim. Defendants have offered no such language to be inserted into the stock 
instruction. As the form instruction stands alone, it has no instructive effect. Plaintiffs object to 
the insertion oflanguage by Defendants at a later date, as Defendants have had ample time to 
PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
weigh the issues and complete a special verdict form that would adapt to the course ofthe trial-a 
requirement of all special verdict forms in any case. Plaintiffs, however, have timely submitted 
such a special verdict form and statement of the issues. (See Plaintiffs' Special Verdict form and 
Plaintiffs requested jury Instruction (hereinafter "PrjI',) No.9). As a result, a request of a stock 
instruction to be filled in at a later date is inappropriate. 
2. IDJI 1.41.3: Plaintiffs object to this request for the same reasons they object to 
Defendants' proposal ofIDJI l.41.2 above. There is no instructive effect to this instruction as 
proposed and Defendants have had sufficient time to complete this form in anticipation of the 
claims alleged by Plaintiffs. 
3. DEFENDANTS' GENERAL REQUEST TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO 
SUBMIT A SPECIAL VERDICT SHOULD BE DENIED: Plaintiffs object to Defendants' 
request to supplement or submit a special verdict form until after this court rules on Defendants' 
anticipated motion for directed verdict. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants have a duty to submit a 
special verdict form with their proposed jury instructions. These special verdict forms may be 
modified to retract certain questions based upon a ruling for a directed verdict. Therefore, it is 
incumbent on both parties to draft a special verdict form that can be modified to weigh each 
claim individually. If the judge denies a motion for a directed verdict, all issues alleged remain at 
issue. Defendants have failed to comply with their duty to provide a special verdict form that 
addresses all claims in a manner Defendants see fit. Defendants have further failed to explain to 
this Court how this case is different from any other case where mUltiple claims are alleged. 
Defendants should therefore be precluded from submitting a special verdict form immediately 
before the jury goes to deliberate. It is a violation of the pretrial orders and I.R.C.P. 51(a)(1). 
4. Instruction No.1 and 2: For brevity, both of these instructions may be 
consolidated to state "entities" rather than establishing a separate instruction for an LLC and a 
corporation. See PrjI No.4. 
5. Instruction No.6: This jury instruction is incomplete. The bottom section does 
not present the elements of the contract that are not in dispute. If all elements of the contract are 
disputed by Defendants, Defendants should have modified the jury instruction to state that 
Defendants contest a contract even exists or which specific elements ofthe contract they do not 
contest. See PrjI No. 22. 
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6. Instruction No.8: Plaintiffs believe this jury instruction does not accurately 
cover the elements of fraud alleged in this case. This proposed jury instruction uses the words 
"statement" or "stated a fact". This will lead a jury to believe that there must be a statement and 
that silence cannot amount to fraud. Such an assumption is in contravention to the Tusch, G&M, 
Sorensen, and Belhalmy decisions (See Plaintiff's Trial Briefpp. 12 - 17). In this case, fraud was 
committed not only by Defendants' written and oral misrepresentations, but also by their silence 
when they had a duty to speak. For this reason the elements of fraud as outlined in the Aspiazu 
decision (See Plaintiff's Trial Briefp. 12) more accurately accounts for fraud by silence by use of 
the word "misrepresentation" instead of "statement." For clarification to the jury on these 
elements, Plaintiffs' submitted PrjI Nos. 39 - 43. Furthermore, element number 4 of Defendant's 
proposed jury instruction again alludes to the requirement of an affirmative statement ("statement 
was true at the time the statement was made") rather than allowing for fraud by silence. The 
authority cited under the form proposed jury instruction do not deal with fraud by silence in a 
home construction case. PIjI No. 38 remains identical in all other respects to IDJI 4.60 and 
should be the jury instruction used by this Court. Plaintiffs would concede that the paragraph at 
the bottom of their PrjI No. 38 is repetitive and may be redacted as Defendants have done. 
7. Instruction No.9: Plaintiffs object to the length of this jury instruction as a point 
of reference as it is eight pages long and is bound to confuse the jury. Each claim should be a 
separate jury instruction. Furthermore, there is no legal authority cited by Defendants for the 
proposition of the elements in each claim. Therefore, neither Plaintiffs nor the Court can verify 
the source of Defendants purported instruction. 
For example, Defendant's Count One Breach of Express Warranty appears to 
combine IDJI 6.08.4, 6.08.5, 6.10.1 and fails to instruct the jury on ambiguity of contract and 
parole evidence. These numerous issues are best dealt with by separate instructions to reduce 
confusion by the jury and to ensure the legal standards are fully presented to the jury. See PIjI 
Nos. 22 - 28. 
The same objections apply to all of the subsequent counts alleged by Defendants 
in this proposed jury instruction. 
Additionally, with regard to the Count Two: Breach of the Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing instruction, it fails to take into account that a breach of this 
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covenant can occur by the failure to perform the terms of the contract on the part of seller (see 
subpart (1». It also fails to address that this breach is implied by the fact there is a contract (see 
subpart (3»-not that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be expressly agreed to. 
(See Plaintiffs Trial Briefpp. 5 - 6 and PrjI No. 29). 
Count Three: Breach of Implied Warranty: This instruction (See subpart (1) fails 
to state that liability can also be imputed on the seller/vendor not just the builder (PrjI No. 31) . 
It (See subpart 2) fails to instruct the jury that this warranty applies to latent defects, and not just 
that information known to the builder/seller (PrjI No. 32). It (See subparts (3 and 4» fails to 
identify the correct standard that this warranty is implied as a matter of public policy not only by 
written agreement (PrjI No. 32). It also adds an element of disclaimer and fails to discuss cost of 
repair (See PrjI Nos. 33 and 34). All of these elements are best dealt with on an individual basis 
to be accurately conveyed to the jury. See Plaintiff's Trial Brie/pp. 6 - 8 and PrjI Nos. 30 - 34. 
Count Four: Alter Ego/Veil Piercing: Again, no legal authority is cited and it fails 
to give the jury proven examples of what may constitute veil piercing. For a fairly complicated 
issue, instruction to refresh the juror's mind of the complete standard would be appropriate. See 
PrjINo.35. 
Count Five: Unjust Enrichment: This instruction should coincide with IDJI 6.07.2 
is on point with a claim for unjust enrichment and should be the model for jury instruction. 
Plaintiffs removed the language in the model instruction stating "Even though there is no 
agreement between the parties", as such language is very presumptuous where a claim for breach 
of contract also exists. This is an alternative theory for recovery by Plaintiffs and the jury should 
not be led to believe that the court believes a contract does not exist. Therefore, PrjI No. 36 . 
should be the instruction given to the jury. 
Counts Six Seven and Eight: Fraud Claims. Subsection 4 should state "The 
plaintiffs' ignorance of its falsity" instead of "defendant's". Subsection 6 should state "The 
plaintiffs' reliance was reasonable." See IDJI 4.60. Plaintiffs have consolidated all claims on 
fraud into PrjI No. 38, but do not object to having each claim of fraud separately set forth in a 
manner generally proposed by Defendants. Defendants' instructions also fail to account for other 
elements necessary to the fraud claim in this case, namely that information covered by PrjI Nos. 
39 - 43 including those issues of fraud by silence, intent to deceive, superior knowledge, parol 
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evidence, and materiality. Therefore, Plaintiffs believe Defendants' proposed instructions related 
to fraud do not fully instruct the jury on necessary elements of Plaintiffs' claims. 
Count Nine: Punitive Damages: IDJI 9.20 is directly on point. Plaintiffs claim 
for punitive damages is that the Defendants committed fraud. Where the language in the model 
jury instruction uses the disjunctive word "or", the word "fraudulent" should be the only word 
modifying the standard for punitive damages. See PIjI No. 51. The jury may incorrectly confuse 
"fraud" with "malice" when each is its own standard for punitive damages. 
Affirmative Defense: Inspection of Property: Defendants have not cited authority 
for this defense. Furthermore, this defense is in direct contravention to PIjI No. 41. See 
Plaintiff's Trial Briefpp. 16-17. Without supporting authority, Defendant's proposed jury 
instruction appears to be in direct contrast to the rulings of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Affirmative Defense: No Warranties Exist for Ground Water: Defendants fail to 
cite the correct standard for an "Act of God" as they fail to recognize the exception to an "Act of 
God" defense, which is that Defendants can still be liable for an "Act of God" if they could have 
used ordinary care to protect against it. Whether the Defendants acted with ordinary care to 
protect against sub-water is the correct analysis for the jury. See Plaintiff's Trial Briefpp. 8 - 9 
and PrjI No. 44. 
Paragraph on Page 8 of Requested Instruction No.9: This paragraph is 
unnecessary. Further, it is confusing to a jury as it may lead a jury to believe that the Plaintiffs 
are burdened with proving all nine of their nine causes of action and a failure to prove anyone of 
the nine causes of action justi fies a dismissal of the case on all other eight counts. Meeting the 
proposition of each count should be dealt with on an individual basis and not with a blanket 
instruction covering seven prior pages of instruction. If the Plaintiff does not meet its burden on 
a cause of action, the jury will obviously not find for the Plaintiffs on that cause of action. 
8. Instruction Nos. 11, 12. and 13: These instructions fail to instruct the jury on the 
measure of damages for each cause of action. It is an incomplete form ofIDJI 9.03 and 
combines IDJI 9.12 into the same instruction. In short, there is no instructive value. This is in 
contrast to PrjI No. 47 and 48, which defines the measure of damages for a breach of contract 
claim. See also Plaintiff's Trial Briefpp. 19-21. 
9. Instruction No. 14. This instruction is condescending and discredits the theory of 
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veil piercing by using the words "tries" and "is attempting". The proper instruction for veil 
piercing should focus on the elements of law as set forth in PrjI No. 35. This instruction is also 
repetitive of Defendants' requested jury Instruction No.9. 
10. Instruction No. 15. This Instruction is repetitive of Defendant's requested jury 
Instruction No.9. Furthermore, it instructs the jury that if Plaintiffs can make a claim for breach 
of contract, Plaintiffs cannot even argue the theory of unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs have 
protected against a double recovery for contract theories by consolidating all damages related to 
principles of contract into one damage assessment under the special verdict form. 
11. Instruction No. 16. This instruction fails to discuss a remedy of restitution and 
rescission in the event of fraud. See Plaintiff's Trial Brief pp. 21 and Prj! No. 50. 
12. Instruction No. 17. This instruction leaves out the instruction regarding the 
purpose of hearing about the defendants' wealth. See IDJI 9.20.5. Plaintiffs believe it is 
important that the jury understand that evidence has been presented for a calculated and 
permitted purpose and not as a presumptuous debtor's examination. See PrjI No. 52. 
13. Instruction No. 18: See Plaintiffs prior objection to Count Nine: Punitive 
Damages. 
DATED this -L day of January, 2011. 
~~ . ---. 
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T&T REPORTING 
Depositions - Videography - Video Conferencing 
P.O. Box 51020 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405 - 1020 2011 JAN -5 PH 2: 34 
December 20, 20) 0 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Re: State of Idaho, County of Jefferson 
GOODSPEED vs. SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION 
Case No.: CV-09-015 
Deposition of: W. Roger Warner 
Taken: December 14,2010 
Dear Mr. Davis: 
•••• ~. . " .'. I..J \ ••• : .J f\ , 
,en th ::'ON COUNTY. IDAHO 
Pursuant to Rule 30 (t) (I), I have enclosed the original and a certified copy of the transcript for the 
deposition taken in the above captioned matter. The E-Transcript has been electronically sent. I am also 
enclosing the original exhibits for the depositions taken in the case in a sealed envelope. 
Mr. Dunn has been sent a certified copy of the transcript for the deposition taken in the above captioned 
matter. The E-transcript has been sent electronically. 
The witness has been sent a copy for the "Read and Sign." 
If you have any questions, please cont t our office. 
Sincerely, 
Enclosures 
cc - Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
Clerk"ofthe Court 
File 
Offices at: 525 Park Avenue • Suite IE • Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1020 
TELEPHONE 208.529.5491 • 800.529.5491 • FAX 208.529.5496 
T&T REPORTING 
Depositions - Videography. Video Conferencing 
P.O. Box 51020 20" JAN - 5 PH 2: 3 4 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405 - 1020 
December 29, 2010 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Re: State of Idaho, County of Jefferson 
GOODSPEED vs. SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al. 
Case No.: CV-09-015 
Video Deposition of: David Chapple 
Taken: December 23, 2010 
Dear Mr. Davis: 
Pursuant to Rule 30 (f) (I), I have enclosed the original and a certified copy of the transcript for 
the deposition taken in the above captioned matter. The DVD and the videographer's certificate 
for the deposition are also enclosed. The E-Transcript has been electronically sent. 
Mr. Dunn has been sent a certified copy of the transcript for the deposition taken in the above 
captioned matter. The E-Transcript has been electronically sent. 
A copy of the transcript will be available at our office for the witness to "Read and Sign." 
If you have any questions, please contact our office. 
Sincerely, 
jjLM~ (?~(~Y1±; 
for: "----
John Terrill 
Enclosures 
cc - Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
Clerk of the Court 
File 
Offices at: 525 Park Avenue. Suite IE • Idaho Falls. ID 83405-1020 
TELEPHONE 208.529.5491 • 800.529.5491 • FAX 208.529.5496 
• 
.. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby,ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
et. aL 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------) 
Case No. CV 09-015 
MOTION(S) IN LIMINE 
COME NOW, the defendants named above, by and through the undersigned 
counsel, and moves the above-entitled court for limine orders. The defendants recognized 
the court cannot rule on some issues until the plaintiff offers or intends to introduce 
evidence. Theses limine motions are designed to apprise the court of certain objections or 
requests that the defendant(s) may have at trial The motion(s) in limine are on the 
following matters: 
1. The purchase and sale agreement (plaintiffs' exhibit 3) provides for a one (1) year 
builders warranty. The warranty deed between plaintiffs and Robert and Jorja 
Shippen was recorded July 7,2007 (plaintiffs' exhibit 4, paragraph 4). Any 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
Pagel 
warranty would end on July 7, 2008. Any matters which plaintiffs attempt to enter 
into evidence, either on liability or upon damages would be barred by the written 
agreement and irrelevant. All named defendants would request the court to 
exclude any testimony or evidence that would occur after such date of July 7, 
2008. 
2. All defendants would request that any reference to water issues, either surface or 
subsurface be stricken, whether it includes exhibits or testimony, as acts of nature 
are not warrantable and no express provision of any contract warrants the same. 
3. Any reference to income tax returns of any of the defendants, including but not 
limited to, Robert and Jorja Shippen, as individuals; Martiot Homes, LLC; 
and/or Shippen Construction, Inc. should be excluded from evidence as the same 
have no relevancy and do not purport to prove any element of plaintiffs' case. 
Income of any particular year does not purport to show wealth or net assets of an 
entity or individual Income does not correspond to individual holdings or assets 
or an entity or individual Plaintiffs' exhibits 34, 35 and 36 are the income tax 
returns in question. The plaintiffs' exhibits are intended to inflame the jury and 
do not add any probative value. 
4. Plaintiffs' exhibit 37 is a statement of liability insurance. Insurance references are 
prohibited in court settings. Furthermore, the insurance document is for 
coverages on acts which may occur during construction. These documents are 
prohibited &om being presented to the jUfY. 
5. Plaintiffs' exhibits 7-10 should be excluded as correspondence between attorneys. 
Such correspondence is not proper to be presented to the fact-finder (jUfY) and is 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
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merely statements between cOU1l8el for each party. Mr. Davis would need to be 
called as a witness to lay the foWldation and to testify as to the letters. These 
exhibits should not be allowed. 
6. Plaintiffs' exhibit 11 are home improvement receipts ~ the purchase of the 
home. These receipts have nothing to do with the defendants, Robert and Jorja 
Shippens', sale to the plaintiffs. Any measure of damages, if any, would be the 
home as sold and the condition of the home after any alleged damages. 
7. Plaintiffs' exhibit 14 has been excluded by Judge St. Clair's ruling. 
8. How the defendants, Robert and Jorga Shippen, financed the construction of the 
home in question is irrelevant and plaintiffs' exhibit 20 should be excluded. 
9. Any communications of a "neighbor" concerning water in the basement during 
construction, without actual viewing, are hearsay and non-admissible and should 
be excluded &om the testimony process. 
10. Plaintiffs' exhibit 6 is a video of alleged water flooding attributed to the 
defendants and has self-serving narrative on the video exhibit. The video, to what 
extent applicable for the jury, should not have sOWld on the video as the 
statements are self serving, hearsay and not covered by any exception. None of 
the defendants participated in the video document and voiced statements. 
ADDITIONAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
These defendants believe more jury instructions may be applicable as the trial 
unfolds but cannot predict what evidence or exhibits the jury may be allowed to 
hear or view. As such the defendants, individually or severally, reserved the right 
to supplement or to suggest to the court the need for additional jury 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
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instruction(s ). 
DATED this 10th day of January, 2011 
~Q~ 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of January 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
Postage-prepaid mail 
--X- Facsimile Transmission 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
208.523-7254 
~CiSt == 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy To: Honorable Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
MOTIONS IN UMINE 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
"-
... i 
\ 
WESTON S. DAVIS (1.S.B. # 7449) 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and . 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and : 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, ROBERT and JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, ROBERT and JORJA 
SHIPPEN, dba SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, 
ROBERT SHIPPEN, an individual, and 
MARRIOTT HOMES, LLC. 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-015 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 
LIMINIE 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs and file the following Motion in Limine for purposes of 
excluding the use of certain portions of the testimony of David Chappel contained in his 
December 23, 2010 deposition. 
Plaintiffs move to strike the testimony of David Chappel contained in pages 23:22 - 25:7 
(Video time 9:31 :22 - 9:32:58) on the basis of relevance (See Exhibit "A" attached hereto). The 
issue before this Court is whether the Goodspeeds, at the time of the transaction, intended to 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINIE - 1 
inhabit the subject property and whether Robert and Jotja Shippen et al. misrepresented the 
condition of the home to the Goodspeeds, not what Mr. Goodspeed mayor may not do with the 
home in the indefinite future. 
Further, such line of questioning exceeds the scope of direct examination and is therefore 
improper. Defendants have not given notice of their intent to present Mr. Chappel as a witness 
on their behalf to establish any affirmative defenses. This was confirmed by counsel and the 
Court the morning ofJanuary 11,2011. 
Dated this _'_I day of January, 2011~~~ 
.. '- STON S. DAVIS, ESQ. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this I;)" day of January, 2011, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442-0277 
L:\wsd\- Clients\74 1 1.1 Goodspeed\Molion in Limine .wpd 
[ ] Mailing 
XHand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] E-Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Courthouse Box 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINIE - 2 
,_' .-
Video Deposition of: David Chapple December 23, 2010 
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1 calls for a legal conclusion. 
2 Q. (BY MR. DUNN:) You can answer. You're 
3 a real estate expert. 
4 A. Would you ask the question again, 
5 please. 
..... • ... 6~~_jF)'4ll!IP'f)ne!:,thf> deed, warranty deed, ultimately 
7 conclude the sale? I believe you said yes. 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Is the purchase and sale agreement a 
10 preliminary document to the final closing and 
11 recording of a warranty deed? 
12 MR. DAVIS: Again, I object. I think 
13 that calls for a legal conclusion. I don't think 
14 it's been established that Mr. Chapple is, in fact, 
1 5 a real estate expert. 
16 TIlE WI1NESS: Based on our training, 
17 yeah. This is a document that needs to be prepared 
18 for a sale to eventually take place. 
19 Q. (BY MR. DUNN:) Is that a standard real 
o estate document? 
1 A. Yes. 
22 .. _ .. Q . ... I believe it's got a number on it that's 
3 fairly common in southeast Idaho. 
24 What is that number? 
25 A. RE-21. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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Q. And so in your experience, could you 
tell the jury what's the purpose of Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 3, which is the RE-21 ? 
MR. DAVIS: Objection. Again, calls for 
a legal conclusion. 
TIlE WITNESS: The purpose of this 
document? 
Q. (BY MR. DUNN:) Correct 8 
A. The purpose of the document is to 9 
present an offer from a prospective buyer through a 1 0 
Realtor to another Realtor who represents a 11 
prospective seller in order to eventually consummate 12 
a sale. 13 
Q. And in that -In this particular 14 
instant, this was presented to you as representative 15 
of the is that correct? Marriott Homes, 16 
Shippen? 17 
Correct, yes. 18 
Q. Was there a sale that was consummated in 19 
this particular case? 20 
A. Yes. 21 
Q. And you had conversations with the 22 
Goodspeeds, in particular William Shawn Goodspeed; 23 
is that correct? 24 
A. Yes. 25 
Q. Did he tell you his reasoning for 
purchasing this property? 
A. He had sold his home in Tennessee, I 
believe, and took a job here as an independent 
contractor at the engineering laboratories and 
purchased a home upon moving here. 
Page 24 
Q. Did he explain to you what he had done 
in purchases in the past and his intentions with 
this home? 
A. He said - I don't know to what extent 
how many times, but he said he bought a home in 
Tennessee, worked as an independent contractor, sold 
that home, made money, moved out here, took another 
job as an independent contractor, bought this home, 
and would probably do the same in the future. 
Q. And did he explain to you his length of 
employment as independent contractors - as an 
independent contractor? 
A. I believe it was - I think it's four to 
five years. I believe it's four to five years. 
Q. And then he would move on to another 
independent contracting job. 
Was that his explanation? 
A. I don't know that he would move, 
technically pick up and move from his home, but that 
Page 25 
he would just -- after that one was up and then he 
would pursue another one. That's what our 
conversation entailed. 
Q. And did he explain to you his intent was 
to purchase and eventually sell and make money on 
this particular home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At this period of time when this home 
was built, listed, and sold, was this a fairly · 
typical turnaround time for this type of home? 
A. Yeah. For the price range it was in, 
yes. 
Q. Now, you had an opportunity to view this 
home during the construction process; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you ever observe any water 
standing at any point that you observed, the 
particular home, in the basement area? 
A. No, not in the basement area. 
Q. Did you ever observe that there was a 
leaching system placed in this structure for the 
purpose of water removal? 
A. Yes. 
And this lar area of Jefferson 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
SHA WN AND SHELLIE GOODSPEED, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, ETAL, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV -2009-15 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 
January 11,2011, Court convened at the hour of 10:08 a.m. in open court at Rigby, Idaho, the 
Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge, presiding. 
Ms. Karen Konvalinka, Court Reporter, Ms. Nancy Andersen, Ms. Karol Drake, Deputy 
Court Clerks and Roger Poole, Deputy, were present. 
The plaintiffs were represented by Mr. Weston Davis and Sam Angel. 
The defendants were represented by Mr. Robin Dunn. 
Prior to Court convening, the jury panel viewed a film regarding jury service, the roll was 
called, all jurors were present, and twenty prospective jurors were called and seated as follows: 
Adam Sullivan 
Rhonda Price 
Terry Foster 
Michael Casteel 
Steven Golder 
Janet Benedict 
Darryl Pinnock 
Gloria Murilla 
Patricia Hennington 
Bonnie Wehausen 
LeAnn Ferguson 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY - 1 
Megan Martinson 
Michele Bradshaw 
Michael Bezzant 
Rand Dixon 
Jerrie Lee 
Johns Schernecker 
Dawn Holman 
Austin Lords 
Amber Nicholl 
The parties stipulated that the 20 jurors were pulled. 
Upon inquiry from the Court, counsel stated they were ready to proceed. 
The Court introduced the Court staff, counsel and the defendant. 
The Clerk administered the oath of voir dire to the jurors. 
The Court advised the jury panel regarding voir dire and challenges for cause. 
The Court conducted voir dire examination. 
The Court excused Mr. Adam Sullivan was excused for cause. Ms. Ariana Jurez was called 
and took her place on the jury panel. The Court excused Ms. Ariana Jurez for cause. Ms. Cynthia 
England was called and took her place on the jury panel. The Court excused Ms. Megan Martinson 
was excused for cause. Ms. Donna Reed was called and took her place on the jury panel. The Court 
excused Mr. Rand Dixon for cause. Ms. Diana Myers was called and took her place on the jury 
panel. The Court excused Ms. Amber Nicholl was excused for cause. Ms. Corie Waddoups was 
called and took her place on the jury panel. The Court excused Ms. Corie Waddoups for cause. Mr. 
Richard Jones was called and took his place on the jury panel. The Court excused Ms. Rhonda Price 
was excused for cause. Mr. Dallin Gambles was called and took his place on the jury panel. The 
Court excused Mr. Dallin Gambles was excused for cause. Mr. Kevin Young was called and took 
his place on the jury panel. 
Mr. Davis conducted voir dire examination. 
Mr. Davis challenges Ms. Diana Myers. 
The Court excused Ms. Diana Myers for cause. Mr. David Solomon was called and took his 
place on the jury panel. 
Mr. Davis passes the panel for cause. 
lUR Y TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY - 2 
Mr. Dunn conducted voir dire examination. 
Mr. Dunn passes the panel for cause. 
The Court instructed the jury panel regarding peremptory challenges. 
The plaintiff exercised the following peremptory challenges: 
Michael Bezzant, Steven Golder, Darryl Pinnock, Terry Foster 
The defendant exercised the following peremptory challenges 
Janet Benedict, Austin Lords, Donna Reed, Michael Casteel 
The following jurors were sworn to well and truly try this cause: 
Cynthia England 
Kevin Young 
Gloria Murillo 
Patricia Hennington 
Bonnie Wehausen 
LeAnn Ferguson 
Michele Bradshaw 
David Solomon 
Jerrie Lee 
John Schernecker 
Dawn Holman 
Richard Jones 
The Court dismissed those jurors challenged or not called to serve in this cause. Upon 
inquiry from the Court, counsel accepted the jury panel as seated. 
The Court admonished the jury and the Court and jury recessed for a short break at 11 :58 
a.m. 
Court and counsel convened in open court outside the presence of the jury at 12:24 p.m. 
Counsel indicated they had no objection to the proposed jury instructions. 
The Court addressed the jury panel and then read jury instructions nos. 1 through 3. 
The Clerk read the Prosecuting Attorney's Information to the jury. 
Mr. Davis presented an opening statement. 
Mr. Dunn presented an opening statement. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY - 3 
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1,2 & 3 were admitted by stipulation. 
William Shawn Goodspeed, being called on behalf of the Plaintiff, was duly sworn and 
examined by Mr. Davis. 
1: 13 Mr. Dunn objected - overruled. 
1: 18 Mr. Dunn objected - overruled. 
Mr. Davis had the witness view Exhibit #4. Mr. David moved to admit Exhibit #4. No 
objection. Exhibit #4 was admitted. 
1 :27 Mr. Dunn objected - sustained. 
1 :32 Mr. Dunn objected - sustained. 
Mr. Davis had the witness view Exhibit #7 and Exhibit #8 
1 :38 Sidebar 
Mr. Davis continues and moved to admit Exhibits #7 and Exhibit #8. Mr. Dunn objected. 
Mr. Dunn objected - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Dunn objected -leading - sustained. 
Mr. Dunn objected - reading from the exhibit - sustained. 
Mr. Dunn objected - legal conclusion/leading - sustained. 
Mr. Davis again moved to admit exhibits. 
Mr. Dunn objected - sustained. 
Mr. Dunn objected - offer of settlement - sustained. 
Mr. Dunn objected - asked for answer to be stricken because of warranty time - overruled. 
Mr. Dunn made a statement. 
Mr. Davis continued. 
lUR Y TRlAL MINUTE ENTRY - 4 
1 :56 the Court adjourned for the day. The court admonished the jury. 
The jury leaves the courtroom. 
Wednesday, January 12. 2011 
Court reconvened at 8:39 a.m., January 12, 2011, with counsel and parties at 8:39 a.m. 
outside the presence of the jury. 
Mr. Dunn addressed the Court regarding defendants' motion in limine on certain exhibits. 
Mr. Dunn asked the Court to impose a cutoff point of the evidence that would be presented regarding 
contractual issues as of 71712008. 
Mr. Davis responded in objection to the motion in limine. 
Mr. Dunn replied. 
The Court denied the motion in limine in regards to paragraph 1. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument on defendants' motion in limine regarding paragraph 2. 
Mr. Davis presented argument in objection. 
The Court denied the motion in regard to paragraph 2. 
Mr. Dunn cannot argue "act of god" to the jury at this point. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument in support of motion in limine regarding paragraph 3. 
Mr. Davis presented argument in objection. 
Mr. Dunn responded. 
The Court denied the motion in limine regarding paragraph 3. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument to the motion in limine regarding paragraph 4. 
Mr. Davis presented argument in objection. 
Mr. Dunn responded. 
JURY TlUAL MINUTE ENTRY - 5 
The Court granted the motion regarding paragraph 4. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument to the motion in limine regarding paragraph 5. 
Mr. Davis presented argument in objection. 
Mr. Dunn responded. 
The Court withheld ruling. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument to the motion in limine regarding paragraph 6. 
Mr. Davis presented argument in objection. 
Mr. Dunn submitted. 
The Court denied the motion regarding paragraph 6. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument to the motion in limine regarding paragraph 7. 
Mr. Davis presented argument in objection. 
Mr. Dunn stated that Judge St. Clair already ruled on this issue. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument to the motion in limine regarding paragraph 8. 
Mr. Davis presented argument in objection. 
Mr. Dunn responded. 
The Court denied the motion in regard to paragraph 8. 
Mr. Dunn withdrew motion regarding paragraph 9. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument to the motion in limine regarding paragraph 10. 
Mr. Davis presented argument in objection. 
The Court stated that the video may be shown without audio. 
JURY TRJAL MINUTE ENTRY - 6 
limine. 
Mr. Davis addressed the Court and presented argument in support of the plaintiffs' motion in 
Mr. Dunn presented argument in objection to the motion. 
Mr. Davis submitted. 
The Court withheld ruling. 
Mr. Davis addressed the Court regarding the insurance issue. 
Mr. Dunn responded. 
Mr. Davis submitted 
The Court held that the response would be inadmissible. 
The Court recessed at 9:51 am 
The Court reconvened at 10:01 
The jury joined the proceedings at 10:04 a.m. 
Mr. Davis called his witness, William Shawn Goodspeed, who was still under oath, and 
continues examination. 
Mr. Dunn objects - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Dunn objects - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Dunn objects - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #11 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to admit Exhibit # 11. 
Exhibit #11 was admitted without objection. 
Mr. Dunn objected - sustained. 
Mr. Davis presented a proposed list of damages for Court, counsel and witness to review. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY - 7 
Mr. Davis asked to mark the document as Exhibit #11A. 
Mr. Dunn objected - relevance - sustained. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit # 12 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to admit Exhibit #12. No objection. Exhibit #12 was admitted. 
Mr. Dunn objected - overruled. 
Nothing further from Mr. Davis 
Mr. Dunn begins cross-examination. 
Mr. Dunn reviewed previously admitted Exhibit #3 with the witness and the jury. 
Mr. Davis objects - overruled. 
Mr. Davis objects - calling for legal conclusion - overruled. 
Mr. Davis objects - relevance - sustained. 
Mr. Davis objects - hearsay - overruled. 
Mr. Davis objects - overruled. 
Mr. Davis objects - overruled. 
Mr. Dunn has nothing further. 
Mr. Davis begins re-direct. 
Mr. Dunn objects - overruled. 
Mr. Davis reviews previously admitted Exhibit #3 with the witness. 
Mr. Dunn objected -
11 :34 Brief recess. 
11:47 Court reconvened with counsel, parties and all jurors present. 
Previous objection overruled. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY - 8 
Mr. Dunn objected -leading - sustained. 
Mr. Davis reviews previously admitted Exhibit #1 with the witness. 
Nothing further, the witness stepped down. 
Mr. Davis called his next witness, Mr. Randy Stoor, who was duly sworn and took the stand. 
Mr. Davis began examination. 
Mr. Dunn began cross-examination. 
Mr. Dunn reviewed previously admitted Exhibit #3 with witness. 
Mr. Davis began re-direct. 
Mr. Dunn asked the Court if he could ask a few more questions. 
Mr. David objected. 
12:30 Sidebar 
12:31 Mr. Dunn re-crossed. 
Mr. Davis has nothing further. 
12:33 Court recesses for lunch 
The Court speaks to counsel regarding the plaintiffs' motion in limine and jury instructions 
and when counsel thought they would be done with their case-in- chief. 
1 :30 Court reconvened outside the presence of the jury. 
Davis submits argument on the brief in the interest of time. 
Mr. Dunn had no objections. 
The Court will allow testimony. 
1 :38 The jury re-entered. 
Mr. Davis called his next witness, Mr. Paul Jenkins, who was sworn and took the stand. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY - 9 
Mr. Dunn began cross-examination. 
Mr. Davis objected - overruled. 
Nothing further. The witness steps down. 
Mr. Davis called his next witness, Mr. Dan Foreink, who was sworn and took the stand. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #15 with the defendant. 
Mr. Davis moved to admit Exhibit #15. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #15 was 
admitted. 
Mr. Dunn began cross-examination. 
Mr. Dunn reviews Exhibit with defendant. 
Mr. Davis objects - sustained. Mr. Dunn withdrew the question. 
Nothing further. The witness stepped down. 
Mr. Davis called his next witness, Mr. Eric Geisler, who was sworn and took the stand. 
Mr. Davis began examination. 
Mr. Dunn began cross-examination. 
Mr. Davis had nothing further. 
Mr. Davis offered Exhibit #49, video deposition of Dave Chapple and moved to have it 
admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #49 was admitted. 
Parties stipulated that the video did not need to be transcribed. 
Mr. Davis played the video to the jury. 
Mr. Davis offered the written transcript as Exhibit #49A. Mr. Dunn had no objection. The 
Exhibit was offered as Exhibit 49A 
2:41 Sidebar 
JURY TRJAL MINUTE ENTRY - 10 
2:43 Recess 
2:59 Court reconvened with counsel, parties and the jury present. 
Mr. Davis called his next witness, Mr. Robert Shippen, who was sworn and took the stand. 
Mr. Davis began examination. 
Mr. Davis reviews Exhibit # 16 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #16 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #16 
was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviews Exhibit #33 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #33 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #33 
was admitted. Mr. Davis reviews Exhibit #33 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #32 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #32 
was admitted. 
Mr. Dunn objected - overruled. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #21 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #21 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #21 
was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit # 19 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #19 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #19 
was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit # 18 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #18 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #18 
was admitted. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY - 11 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #22with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #22 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #22 
was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #24 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #24 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections after the exhibit 
was modified by taking out the second page. Exhibit #24was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #23 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #23 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #23 
was admitted. 
Mr. Davis moved to publish the deposition of Robert Shippen. 
The Court published the deposition. 
Mr. Davis reviewed the deposition with the witness. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #26 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #26 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #26 
was admitted 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #27 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #27 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #27 
was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #28 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #28 admitted. Mr. Dunn objected on relevancy. Objection 
was sustained. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #29 with the witness. 
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Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #29 admitted. Mr. Dunn objected on relevancy. Objection 
was sustained. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #30 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #30 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #30 
was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #20 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #20 admitted. Mr. Dunn objected - overruled. Exhibit #20 
was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed previously admitted Exhibit # 19 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis reviews page 131 of the witness's deposition. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #7 and Exhibit #8 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #7 admitted. Mr. Dunn objected. Mr. Davis responded. 
Mr. Dunn replied. Exhibit #7 was admitted. Mr. Dunn will prepare a proper jury instruction. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #9 with the witness. Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #9 
admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #9 was admitted. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #7 admitted as to Marriott Homes, LLC .. Mr. Dunn 
objected. Objection was sustained. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #39 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #39 admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #39 
was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #34 with the witness. 
JURY TRlAL MINUTE ENTR Y - 13 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #34 admitted. Mr. Dunn had previously objected -
overruled. Exhibit #34 was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #36 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #36 admitted. Mr. Dunn had previously objected -
overruled. Exhibit #36 was admitted. 
5:30 Court recesses for the day. 
Thursday. January 13,2011 
9:05 am Court reconvenes with the jury and all parties present. 
Mr. Dunn stated that there was a stipulation to have a different witness testity at this point, 
instead of the defendant who was testitying when court recessed last night, to accommodate the 
witnesses schedule. 
9:07 Sidebar 
9: 11 Mr. Davis called Ms. Shellee Goodspeed as his next witness who was sworn and took 
the stand. 
Mr. Davis began examination. 
Mr. Davis reviews previously admitted Exhibit #1 with the defendant and the jury. 
Mr. Dunn objected - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #6 with the witness. Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #6 
admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #6 was admitted. 
Mr. Davis published the video to the jury and the witness. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibits #5a - 5fwith the witness. Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibits 
#5a - 5f admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibits #5a - 5f were admitted. 
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Mr. Dunn began cross-examination. 
Mr. Davis objected - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Davis objected - relevance - overruled. 
Mr. Davis objected - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Davis began re-direct. 
Nothing further. The witness steps down. 
Mr. Davis called his next witness, Ms. Jorja Shippen, who was sworn and took the stand. 
Mr. Davis began examination. 
Mr. Dunn will reserve his cross in the interest of time. 
Mr. Davis called his next witness, Mr. Jeffery Stoddard, who was sworn and took the stand. 
Mr. Davis began examination. 
Mr. Dunn began cross-examination. 
Mr. Dunn reviewed Exhibits #41 with the witness. Mr. Dunn moved to have Exhibit 41 
admitted. Mr. Davis had no objections. Exhibit #41 was admitted. 
Mr. Davis began redirect. 
Nothing further. The witness steps down. 
Mr. Davis called his next witness, Mr. Robert Meikle. 
Mr. Davis begins examination. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibits #45 with the witness. Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibits #45 
admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibits #45 were admitted. 
Mr. Dunn began cross examination. 
Mr. Davis has nothing further. The witness steps down. 
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Mr. Davis called his next witness, Mr. Ray Keating, who is sworn and takes the stand. 
Mr. Davis began examination. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #43 with the witness. Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #43 
admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #43 was admitted. 
Mr. Davis reviewed previously admitted Exhibits #19 with the witness. 
Mr. Dunn began cross-examination. 
Mr. Dunn reviewed Exhibit #42 with the witness. Mr. Dunn moved to have Exhibit #42 
admitted. Mr. Davis had no objections. Exhibit #42 was admitted. 
Mr. Davis re-directs. 
Nothing further. The witness steps down. 
10:50 Side bar 
10:52 The Court breaks for a brief recess. 
11 :04 Court reconvenes with the jury, counsel and all parties present. 
Mr. Davis called his next witness, Mr. Mark Leible, who is sworn and takes the stand. 
Mr. Davis began examination. 
Mr. Dunn began cross examination. 
Mr. Davis has no redirect. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit #47 with the witness. Mr. Davis moved to have Exhibit #47 
admitted. Mr. Dunn had no objections. Exhibit #47 was admitted. 
Nothing further. The witness steps down. 
11: 14 Plaintiffs rested. 
11 : 16 Recess 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY - 16 
1 :07 Court reconvened outside the presence of the jury. 
Mr. Dunn moved for a directed verdict. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument in support of a directed verdict to dismiss out of the case 
Marriott Homes and Shippen Construction. 
Mr. Dunn continued and stated that Count I, Breach of Contract has been complied with. 
Mr. Davis responded. 
Mr. Dunn replied. 
The Court DENIED the motion for directed verdict regarding Count I. 
Mr. Dunn skipped Count II. 
Mr. Dunn continued and went on to Count III. 
Mr. Davis responded. 
Mr. Dunn replied 
Mr. Davis addressed the Court. 
The Court DENIED the motion for directed verdict regarding Count III. 
Count IV is moot and should be stricken. 
Mr. Davis agreed. 
The Court GRANTED the motion with regard to Count IV. 
Mr. Dunn continued with Count V. 
Mr. Davis responded. 
The Court DENIED the motion with regard to Count V. 
Mr. Dunn continued argument with regard to Counts VI, VII, VIII. 
Mr. Davis responded. 
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Mr. Dunn replied. 
The Court DENIED the motion with regard to Counts VI, VII & VIII. 
Mr. Dunn continued argument with regard to Count IX. 
Mr. Davis responded. 
Mr. Dunn replied. 
Mr. Dunn commented on the water in 2006. 
Mr. Davis commented on the water in 2006. 
The Court DENIED the motion with regard to Count IX. 
Nothing further. 
1 :52 The jury re-enters. 
The Court informs the jury that the cause of action will only be against Robert and Jorja 
Shippen now. 
Mr. Dunn began to present his case. 
Mr. Dunn called his first witness, Mr. William Roger Warner, who was sworn and took the 
stand. 
Mr. Dunn begins his examination. 
Mr. Davis stipulated that the witness is an expert. 
Mr. Dunn reviewed Defendants Exhibits A-E with the witness. 
Mr. Dunn moved to admit Defendant's Exhibits A-E. Mr. Davis had no objections. Exhibits 
A-E were admitted. 
Mr. Davis objected - sustained. 
Mr. Davis objected - sustained. 
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Mr. Davis began cross examination to the witness. 
Mr. Davis reviewed Exhibit B with the witness. 
Mr. Dunn objects - not his area of expertise -Dverruled. 
Mr. Davis reviews Exhibit 50 with the witness. 
Mr. Davis moved to admit Exhibit 50. No objections. Exhibit 50 was admitted. 
Mr. Davis moved to publish the transcript of the deposition of Roger Warner. 
The Court published the transcript of the deposition of Roger Warner. 
Mr. Dunn began redirect. 
Nothing further. The witness stepped down. 
Mr. Dunn called Jorja Shippen, who was previously sworn and took the stand. 
Mr. Dunn began examination of the witness. 
Mr. Davis had no questions. 
Recess 
3 :03 Court reconvened with the jury, counsel and all parties present. 
Mr. Dunn called his next witness, Mr. Robert Shippen, who was previously sworn and took 
the stand. 
Mr. Davis objected - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Davis asked to strike testimony regarding Mr. Goodspeed's job. 
Mr. Davis objected - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Davis objected - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Davis objected - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Davis objected - foundation - sustained. 
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Mr. Davis objected - foundation - sustained. 
Mr. Davis began cross-examination. 
Mr. Dunn had no further questions. 
The witness stepped down. 
Mr. Dunn called Mr. William Shawn Goodspeed, who was previously sworn and took the 
stand. 
Mr. Davis objected - sustained. 
Mr. Davis objected -sustained. 
Nothing further. The witness stepped down. 
Mr. Dunn and Mr. Davis had not additional witnesses. 
The defense rested. 
Mr. Dunn renewed his motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument. 
Mr. Davis presented argument in objection. 
The Court GRANTED the motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages. 
Mr. Dunn addressed the Court regarding exhibits that no longer apply. 
3 :58 Court recessed for the day. 
Friday. January 14,2011 
1:29 p.m. Court reconvened outside the presence of the jury. 
Mr. Davis objected to the Jury Instruction that relates to punitive damages. As punitive 
damages are no longer before the Court the instruction is prejudicial. Mr. Davis wants the 
instruction to be stricken. 
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Mr. Dunn responded. 
The Court will allow the instruction will be given. 
Mr. Davis objected to the instruction regarding disclaimer of warranty. 
Mr. Dunn responded. 
Mr. Davis replied. 
The Court will not give the instruction. 
Mr. Dunn objected to the instruction regarding the buyer knowing. 
Mr. Davis responded. 
Mr. Dunn submitted. 
The Court will allow the instruction to be given with noted objection. 
Mr. Dunn stated that plaintiff and defendant have agreed that items not offered to the jury be 
held from the jury. Mr. Dunn listed the exhibits that shall be reviewed. 
The Court spoke with counsel regarding acts of nature/god. Acts of nature/god have been 
withdrawn and will not be mentioned. 
Mr. Dunn listed the exhibits that should be withdrawn from the jury: 10, 13, 14,23,24,26, 
27,28,29,30,37,38,25,31,34,35,37,38,41,44,46,48.36, 39 and 17. Exhibit 6 was 
substituted with a disk that does not have sound. 
Nothing further from counsel. 
2:31 p.m. The Jury entered. 
The Court read jury instructions nos. 5 through 37 and explained them to the jury. 
3:03 p.m. 
3:30 p.m. 
Mr. Davis presented closing argument. 
Mr. Dunn presented closing argument. 
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clerk. 
4:00 p.m. Mr. Davis presented rebuttal argument. 
Mr. Dunn objected - sustained. 
4:04 Under the direction of the Court, the bailiffwas administered the oath by the Clerk. 
The jury retired at 4:05 p.m. for deliberation in the charge of the bailiff. 
The Court asked counsel to leave a telephone number where they could be reached with the 
Court recessed at 4:06 p.m. 
January 18, 2011 
Court reconvened at 2:02 p.m. outside the presence ofthe jury to address a question regarding 
the verdict. 
Mr. Davis had no objections. 
Mr. Dunn responded. 
2:06 The jury entered. 
The court asked the jury if they had reached a verdict. 
The foreperson, Ms. Bonnie Wehausen, stated that a verdict had been reached. 
The Court asked the jury if they had any questions regarding the verdict. 
The jury foreman stated that they did have a question regarding the signing of the verdict, as 
there more than one count, do they need a signature on each count. 
The Court informed the jury that a new verdict from had been prepared if they wanted to use the new 
one. 
The jury stated that they would like to use the new one. 
The jury left the courtroom and 2 :09 p.m. 
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Court reconvened at 2:42 p.m. with the jury, counsel and all parties present. 
Counsel stipulated that all jurors were present. 
Upon being asked by the Court, the jury foreperson, Ms. Bonnie Wehausen, stated the jury 
had arrived at a verdict and handed the verdict to the bailiffwho delivered it to the Court. Under the 
direction of the Court, the Clerk read and filed the verdict. 
(see filed Special Verdict) 
The jury was polled by request of the plaintiff. 
No other questions from counsel. 
The Court thanked the jurors and excused them .. 
Mr. Dunn will prepare the judgment. 
Mr. Davis asked for a copy of the verdict. 
DATED this ___ day of January, 2011. 
GREGORY S. ANDERSON 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON. 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ROBERT SHIPPEN and JORJA SIDPPEN, ) 
husband and wife; ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
--------------------------) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. CV -09-15 
As stated in Jury Instruction No. 37, at least nine of you must agree on the answer to each 
question on this verdict form. However, the same nine of you need not agree on the answer to each 
question. Signature blocks have been provided for each question below. If your answer is 
unanimous to a question, your foreperson alone should sign for that question. If nine or more, but 
less than the entire jury, agree on the answer to a question, then those so agreeing will sign for that 
question. 
Most of the questions below have multiple parts. If a different group of you agree on 
different parts to a question, and you therefore need additional signature lines, notify the bailiff, and 
the Court will provide a supplemental signature sheet. 
The questions on this verdictform require you to determine whether either of the 
Defendants are liable to the Plaintiffs. If you determine either of the Defendants are liable, you will 
then be required to assess the damages, if any, to which the Plaintifft are entitled 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 1 
In this case, the Plaintiffs have alleged the Defendants are liable for multiple reasons. You 
will be asked to determine an appropriate remedy for each of the reasons, if any, you find either of 
the Defendants liable. 
In answering questions regarding damages, answer each question independently-without 
regardfor damages associated with other theories ofliability. In other words, do not make offsets 
or take deductions with regard to one theory of liability in an effort to avoid duplicative remedies. 
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 
WE, THE JURY, ANSWER THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS FOLLOWS: 
QUESTION NO.1: Did Robert and/or Jorja Shippen fraudulently induce Shawn and Shellee 
Goodspeed to purchase the subject home by making a material misrepresentation or concealment 
of a known fact or known defect? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.1: 
Robert Shippen 
Jorja Shippen 
YES [ ] 
YES [ 
NO [)<'] 
NO [)(1 
JURORS WHO AGREE ON THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.1: 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 2 
QUESTION NO.2: Did Robert and/or Jorja Shippen breach their express warranty with Shawn 
and Shellee Goodspeed? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.2: 
Robert Shippen: 
JOIja Shippen: 
YES [ ] 
YES [ ] 
NOt)(] 
NOt'XJ 
Jfyou answered this question "Yes" with regard to either defendant, was the breach of 
the express warranty a "material" breach? 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
JURORS WHO AGREE ON THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.2: 
Foreperson 
Je D.rruv ~r oJ 
IvY1. B 
c 
->~~~ .'. 
CJ i )\L~1 L' 
I ; , 
QUESTION NO.3: Did Robert and/or )orj~ Shi~r1'b~~ach th1!-;""'~rl1:!: 
and fair dealing? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.3: 
Robert Shippen 
Jorja Shippen 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 3 
YES [ ] 
YES [ ] 
NO~] 
NO [)(] 
If you answered this question "Yes" with regard to either defendant, was the breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing a "material" breach? 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
JURORS WHO AGREE ON THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.3: 
p (. 2"" 
'\ 
QUESTION NO.4: Did Robert and/or Jorja Shippen breach the implied warranty of 
habitability? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.4: 
Robert Shippen 
Jorja Shippen 
YES [ ] 
YES [ ] 
NO LX] 
NO o(] 
JURORS WHO AGREE ON THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.4: 
Foreperson 
J{i(}/JU)J ~nJ 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 4 
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c. ~1 E.=;!l~ (; / 
QUESTION NO.5: Were Robert and/or Jorja Shippen unjustly enriched by their actions in this 
case? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.5: 
Robert Shippen 
Jorja Shippen 
YES [ ] 
YES [ ] 
NO~] 
NO [\ll 
JURORS WHO AGREE ON THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.5: 
I~ 
QUESTION NO.6: If you answered "Yes" to Question No.1, what remedy or remedies, if any, 
are the Plaintiffs entitled to as a result of Robert and/or Jorja Shippen's fraud? 
A. Direct Damages: 
• Rescission of the contract YES [ ] NO [ ] 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 5 
Purchase price to be restored to Plaintiffs: $ ______ _ 
• Restoration of the difference between the actual value of the house and the fair 
market value of the of the house as ifit had no defect 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
Actual value of house: $ 
Fair market value of house without defect: $ 
B. Consequential and Incidental Damages: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
• Restitution for property improvement expenses: $ 
• Restitution for sub-water clean up expenses: $ 
JURORS WHO AGREE ON THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.6: 
Foreperson 
QUESTION NO.7: If you answered "Yes" to Question No.2 or Question No.3, what remedy 
or remedies, if any, are the Plaintiffs entitled to as a result of Robert and/or Jorja Shippen's 
breach of contract? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.7: 
A. Direct Damages: 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 6 
• Rescission of the contract (only available if breach was material) 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
Purchase price to be repaid: $,-------
• Restoration of the difference between the actual value of the house and the fair 
market value of the of the house as if it had no defect (available whether breach 
was material or immaterial) 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
Actual value of house: $_------
Fair market value of house without defect: $ 
-------
B. Consequential and Incidental Damages (available whether breach was material or 
immaterial) 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
• Restitution for property improvement expenses: $ ______ _ 
• Restitution for sub-water clean up expenses: $ ______ _ 
JURORS WHO AGREE ON THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.7: 
Foreperson 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 7 
' .. 
QUESTION NO.8: If you answered "Yes" to Question No.4, what remedy or remedies are the 
Plaintiffs entitled to recover as a result of Robert and/or Jorja Shippen's breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.8: 
A. Direct Damages: 
• Rescission of the contract YES [ ] NO [ ] 
Purchase price to be restored to Plaintiffs: $ ______ _ 
B. 
• Restoration of the difference between the actual value of the house and the fair 
market value of the of the house as if it had no defect 
YES [ ] NO [ ] 
Actual value of house: $ 
Fair market value of house without defect: $ 
Consequential and Incidental Damages: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
• Restitution for property improvement expenses: $ 
• Restitution for sub-water clean up expenses: $ 
JURORS WHO AGREE ON THE ANSWER TO OUESTION NO.8: 
Foreperson 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 8 
QUESTION NO.9: If you answered "Yes" to Question No.5 and you find the contact should 
be rescinded, what is the remedy which the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover as a result of Robert 
and/or Jorja Shippen's unjust enrichment? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.9: 
• Amount that would be unjust for Defendants to retain and which should be restored to 
the Plaintiffs: $ 
-------
JURORS WHO AGREE ON THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.9: 
Foreperson 
DATED this ~ day of January, 2011. 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 9 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby,ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (t) 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
Case No. CV-09-015 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
RE: ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS 
COME NOW, the defendants, Robert and Jorja Shippen, by and through the 
undersigned attorney, Robin D. Dunn, and move the above-entitled court for an 
award of attorney fees and costs in defending the above-entitled action. The request 
for attorney fees and costs is based upon the underlying contract, upon statute that 
provides for awards of fees and costs in commercial transactions (I.C. 12-120), upon 
rule (I.R.C.P. 54); and, upon case law consistent with the foregoing principles 
pertaining to the award of fees and costs . 
.f. 
Dated this ;I.i::, day of January, 2011. 
Motion for Fees -1-
,/ / 
/ 
Robin D. Dunn 
Attorney for the Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2.,,"'~ day of January, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons( s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
A- Postage-prepaid mail 
~ Facsimile Transmission 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
208.523-7254 (Facsimile) 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy To: Honorable Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby,ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (1) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------) 
Case No. CV-09-015 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
RE: ATTORNEYFEES 
AND COSTS 
COME NOW, the defendants, Robert and Jorja Shippen, by and through the 
undersigned attorney, Robin D. Dunn, and submit this brief in support of an award 
for fees and costs as follows: 
1. The underlying contract (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3) provides for an award 
of fees and costs to the prevailing party in any litigation concerning 
the purchase and sale of the real estate which was the subject of the 
litigation. 
2. Idaho Code Section 12,..120 provides for fees and costs in commercial 
Brief on AHorney Fees and Costs -1-
transactions. I.R.C.P. 54 provides for a reasonable award of fees 
when based upon contract or upon statute. 
3. The plaintiffs acknowledge an award of fees and costs should be 
granted via their verified complaint. Likewise, the defendants 
acknowledge that an award of fees and costs was a risk of trial via 
their answer to plaintiffs' complaint. 
CONTRACT: 
Paragraph 27 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between the parties 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit #3) states: 
"If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or proceeding 
which are in any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and attorney's fees, 
including such costs and fees on appeaL" 
The defendants were the prevailing party, on all issues, and a jury rendered a 
verdict in favor of the defendants. 
STATUTE 
The attorney fee statute relied upon states as follows: 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shaD be aDowed a reasonable 
attomey's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction It is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to 
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
ID ST Sec. 12-120, Attorneyts fees in civil actions 
------------ Excerpt from page 6224. 
Commercial transaction has been defined in case law as follows: 
Browerestablishes that there are two stages to the analysis. First, there must be a 
commercial transaction that is integral to the claim. Second, the commercial 
Brief on Attorney Fees and Costs -2-
transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought. 
Brooks v. Gig-ray Ranches, Inc., 910 P.2d 744,128 Idaho 72, (Idaho 1996) 
------------ Excerpt from page 910 P.2d 750. 
This case was based upon the purchase and sale agreement which is a 
commercial transaction. 
COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS' ANSWER 
The plaintiffs recognize that an award of fees was to be given to the prevailing 
party and asked for fees in their complaint. Likewise, the defendants asked for 
attorney fees in their Answer to the Complaint. It cannot be disputed that fees were 
sought by both parties. Nor can it be disputed that both parties knew the risk of trial 
carried the attorney fee and cost award based upon both the underlying contract and 
upon the statutory scheme in Idaho on commercial transactions. 
RULE 
The rule for an award of attorney fees is as follows: 
(e)(1) Attorney Fees. In any civil action the court may award reasonable 
attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the 
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any 
statute or contract. 
Rep Rule 54, Judgments 
------------ Excerpt from page 167. 
CONCLUSION 
Attorney fees are mandatory in this case and an appropriate award to the 
defendants is required. The memorandum of fees will indicate a reasonable amount 
for fees and will document the mandatory costs. Based upon discovery and knowing 
of the plaintiffs fees incurred, the defendants' request for fees is reasonable and far 
less than those incurred by the plaintiffs. 
t· Dated this ~Jday of January, 2011. 
Brief on Attorney Fees and Costs -3-
Robin D. Dunn 
Attorney for the Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2i.'t''-day of January, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons( s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
1L- Postage-prepaid mail 
~ Facsimile Transmission 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
208.523-7254 (Facsimile) 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy To: Honorable Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Brief on AHorney Fees and Costs -4-
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby,ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------- ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON ) 
Case No. CV-09-015 
DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM ON 
ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS 
ROBIN D. DUNN, being first duly sworn upon oath, states as follows: 
1. That he is the attorney for the defendants in the above-captioned matter; 
2. That he makes this sworn statement under oath and in support of an 
award of fees and costs; that he is over the age of 18, competent to enter 
into this sworn statement and does so freely and voluntarily; 
AnORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM -1-
/) 
3. That he has defended the actions pursued by the plaintiffs against his 
clients, the defendants; 
4. That he has practiced law in the State of Idaho since the year 1982; 
5. That the issues presented in this case were multiple and presented 
extensive research, time, hearings and the like. The issues were often 
complex and required extensive reference to case law as promulgated in 
the state of Idaho. For example, the jury instructions, in particular, 
required extensive effort by the court, by counsel for both parties and were 
based upon various and multiple sources not contained in the standard 
ID]I instructions. 
6. That this case required extensive time and the charges herein for both fees 
and costs are reasonable. That the undersigned charges $200.00 per hour 
for non-trial time; and, that for trial time the rate is adjusted according to 
length of trial and type of trial. No adjustments were made in this case to 
fees or costs and were based upon the per hour rate. 
7. That the undersigned prepares this sworn statement pursuant to IRCP, 
Rule 54, to enable the court to award a fair and reasonable fee to the 
defendants. To the best of the undersigned's knowledge and belief the 
items are correct and that the fees and costs claimed are in compliance 
with said rule. 
8. Attached to this sworn statement is Exhibit A, which is incorporated 
herein by reference as though fully set forth, to enable the court to 
examine the fees and costs incurred in this case. 
9. Further, the undersigned sayeth naught. 
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Dated this J.~:TIt-day of January, 2011. 
Robin D. Dunn 
Attorney for the Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ay of January, 2011. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing: Rigb¥, Idaho 
Commission: l t ~ ( ( I t.f 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
7t6 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J..{. day of January, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons( s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
X- Postage-prepaid mail 
--X- Facsimile Transmission 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
208.523-7254 (Facsimile) 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy To: Honorable Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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(208) 745-9202 
Robert Shippen 
LA W OFFICES, 
Attorneys at Law 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
_____ • A---.· _ 
(208) 745-8160 
518 North 3950 East 
Rigby,ID 83442 
Matter: Goodspeed 
Statement Date: 112612011 
AMOUNT DUE: $35,176.82 
FEES 
D ate 
11/19/2008 
11/19/2008 
1113/2009 
1/13/2009 
2/512009 
2/6/2009 
5/13/2009 
5/14/2009 
7115/2009 
7116/2009 
7/1612009 
7/27/2009 
7/29/2009 
9116/2009 
9/25/2009 
9/28/2009 
11/4/2009 
11/5/2009 
11/6/2009 
115/2010 
1/5/2010 
\/22/2010 
2/10/2010 
2/22/2010 
2/25/2010 
3/2/2010 
3/4/2010 
3110/2010 
3/11/2010 
3115/2010 
3/29/2010 
4/2112010 
4/2112010 
6/9/2010 
6/9/2010 
6/21/2010 
6124/2010 
01126/11 
B'll 1 er 
RDD 
IN 
RDD 
IN 
IN 
RDD 
RDD 
RDD 
RDD 
RDO 
1M 
RDD 
IN 
RDO 
RDD 
RDD 
RDD 
ROD 
RDD 
RDD 
IN 
RDO 
RDD 
RDO 
RDD 
RDO 
RDD 
RDO 
ROD 
RDD 
IN 
RDD 
IN 
RDD 
IN 
IN 
RDD 
D escnptlon 
Dictate letter to Weston Davis 
Preparation of letter to Weston Davis 
Dictate letter to Davis;Miscellaneous 
Preparation of letter to Davis 
Preparation of answer to complaint 
Legal research;Dictate answer 
Review & revise discovery answers 
Preparation of discovery documents 
Preparation, review & revise discovery 
Dictate motion to dismiss & affidavit 
Preparation of affidavit & hearing notice 
Dictate motion, affidavit & notice of hearing 
Preparation ofmotoin, affidavit & notice of hearing 
Office visit with client;Preparation of documents;Review & revise 
Phone Conference with client 
Court hearing-summary judgment 
Miscellaneous 
Preparation of amended complaint 
Miscellaneous;Phone Conference with client 
Dictate letter to Davis 
Preparation of letter to Davis 
Office visit with c1ient;Preparation, review & revise discovery 
Preparation, review & revise motion to protect 
Preparation for depositions;Oepositions;Miscellaneous 
Preparation for deposition;Deposition of Fullmer;Review documents 
re: orders 
Phone Conference with Chapple 
Depositions Chapple; Jenkins;Shippen 
Legal research;Preparation of discovery 
Preparation of discovery 
Legal research;Preparation of discovery 
Letter to Davis 
Dictate letter to Davis 
Preparation ofletter to Davis 
Preparation of discovery;Dictate letter to Davis 
Preparation ofletter to Davis 
Letter to client w/enclosure 
Office visit with client;Preparation of discovery 
Hours Am ount 
0.50 $100.00 
0.30 $9.00 
0.50 $100.00 
0.20 $6.00 
0.40 $12.00 
3.50 $700.00 
2.00 $400.00 
2.00 $400.00 
1.80 $360.00 
1.50 $300.00 
0.90 $27.00 
0.50 $100.00 
0.40 $12.00 
3.10 $620.00 
0.20 $40.00 
1.00 $200.00 
0.20 $40.00 
1.20 $240.00 
1.20 $240.00 
0.30 $60.00 
0.30 $9.00 
1.50 $300.00 
1.20 $240.00 
8.60 $1,720.00 
1.60 $320.00 
0.50 $100.00 
3.00 $600.00 
2.70 $540.00 
1.20 $240.00 
1.50 $300.00 
0.10 $3.00 
0.30 $60.00 
0.20 $6.00 
1.30 $260.00 
0.20 $6.00 
0.10 $3.00 
1.50 $300.00 
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Robert ShippeD 
FEES (continued) 
D B'll ate I er 
6/24/2010 
7/3012010 
8/3/2010 
8/4/2010 
8112/2010 
8/17/2010 
8/17/20 I 0 
8/20/2010 
8/30/2010 
9/9/2010 
9/9/2010 
9/20/2010 
9/20/2010 
101712010 
101712010 
10118/2010 
1012112010 
10125/2010 
11/1012010 
11/20/2010 
11129/2010 
12/112010 
12/1/2010 
12/S/201O 
12/14/2010 
12/20/2010 
12/20/2010 
12/23/2010 
12/27/2010 
12/2S12010 
1212912010 
11712011 
lIS/2011 
1/9/2011 
111012011 
1111/2011 
1112/2011 
111 3/2011 
1114/2011 
1117/2011 
II1S/2011 
1119/2011 
1122/2011 
EXPENSES 
Date 
2/9/2009 
3/15/2010 
3115/2010 
01126111 
IN 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
IN 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
IN 
IN 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
IN 
ROD 
ROD 
RDD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
RDD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
RDD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
ROD 
Biller 
ROD 
ROD 
RDD 
D escrIotlOn 
Preparation of answer to admissions and Notice of depositions 
Preparation for depositions;Depositions 
Review & revise discovery 
Preparation of discovery;Review & revise discovery 
Review of deposition 
Dictate response to motions 
Preparation of response to motions 
Review & revise objection & memorandum to amend 
Preparation for court hearing;Court hearing 
Miscellaneous-discovery 
Letter to Davis 
Preparation of discoverylanswer 
Preparation of reponse to discovery;Review & revise discovery 
Legal reserach;Review documents 
Legal research;Preparation of memorandum/punitive 
damages;Review & revise documents 
Preparation of motion/punitive damages;Court hearing 
Preparation of brief/punitive damages 
Review & revise brief/punitive damages 
Preparation of answer to amend complaint 
Legal research;Preparation of objection to exclude witnesses, review 
&revise objection 
Court hearing 
Dictate order;Revise order 
Preparation of order on motion exclude witnesses 
MiscelJaneous (Storer/Bob);Office visit with Roger Warner 
Preparation for deposition;Wamer deposition 
Phone Conference with Davis;Reorganize file for trial 
Preparation of video deposition 
Chapple video deposition 
Legal research;Preparation/review/revise of pre-trial brief/jury 
instructions 
Preparation for trial 
Trial preparation wlclients 
Preparation for jury trial 
Preparation for jury trial 
Preparation for jury trial 
Jury trial 
Jury trial 
Preparation for jury trial;Jury trial 
Preparation for jury trial;Jury trial 
MiscelJaneous;Preparation for jury trial;Jury trial 
Miscellaneous 
MisceUaneous;Jury trial 
Preparation of documents 
Legal research;Preparation, review & revise fees & costs 
Descri tion 
Jefferson County Clerk (Chk #6474) 
T&T Reporting (Chk #7027) 
T&T Reporting (Chk #7027) 
SUBTOTAL FEES: 
........ ". 
H ours 
1.00 
4.10 
1.50 
2.00 
0.20 
1.00 
0040 
2.00 
1.00 
0.20 
0.10 
0.30 
1.50 
1.00 
4.00 
0.90 
1.70 
0.50 
1.50 
2.30 
1.10 
0.50 
0.20 
1.60 
3.20 
0.70 
I.S0 
1.00 
7.00 
4.00 
2.00 
6.00 
5.00 
8.00 
3.00 
7.00 
9.00 
S.50 
7.50 
1.00 
4.00 
2.00 
2.30 
161.10 
Re: Goodspeed 
A mount 
$30.00 
$820.00 
$300.00 
$400.00 
$40.00 
$200.00 
$12.00 
$400.00 
$200.00 
$40.00 
$3.00 
$9.00 
$300.00 
$200.00 
$800.00 
$IS0.00 
$340.00 
$100.00 
$300.00 
$460.00 
$220.00 
$100.00 
$6.00 
$320.00 
$640.00 
$140.00 
$360.00 
$200.00 
$1,400.00 
$800.00 
$400.00 
$1,200.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,600.00 
$600.00 
$1,400.00 
$1,800.00 
$1,700.00 
$1,500.00 
$200.00 
$800.00 
$400.00 
$460.00 
$31,353.00 
Amount 
$5S.00 
$484.33 
$128.90 
Robert Shippen 
EXPENSES (continued) 
Date Biller Description 
3/26/2010 ROD T&T Reporting (Chk #7037) 
10112/2010 ROD T&T Reporting (Chk #7272) 
1/22/2011 ROD Exhibits for trial 
1/2212011 ROD Rocky Mountain Environmental· Roger Warner expert witness 
We Now Accept Credit Card Payments 
(3% added fee) 
01/26111 
SUBTOTAL EXPENSES: 
BILL SUMMARY 
Previous Balance: 
Current Fees: 
Current Expenses: 
Current Other Charges: 
New Interest: 
Payment: 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE: 
Re:Good~ 
Amount 
$268.29 
$723.30 
$161.00 
$2,000.00 
$3,823.82 
$0.00 
$31,353.00 
$3,823.82 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$35,176.82 
INVOICE ~~~ E NTAr 
PROJECT NUMBER: 10-0136-1, ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Bob Shippen ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL 
482 CONSTITUTION, SUITE 303 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83402-3537 i 
C:\Roger_2011\Bob Shippen\project management\INVOICE1.wpd (208) 524-2353 FAX (208) 524-1795 
To: Bob Shippen Reference: 
518 N 3950 E Various visits Bob and Robin Dunn. 
Rigby, ID 83442 
CLIENT CLIENT P.O. NO. INVOICE DATE TERMS 
CONTACT 
Roger December 28, 2010 BALANCE DUE UPON RECEIPT. ACCOUNTS 
Warner 30 DAYS PAST DUE ACCRUE INTEREST AT 
1.5% PER MONTH 
QTY. DESCRIPTION UNIT TOTAL 
PRICE 
Progress billing for expert witness testimony for Goodspeed v Shippen, Case No.: CV-09-015. 
3 Rocky Mountain EnvironmentalSM Professional Labor: $125.00 $375.00 i 
Senior Professional Hydrologist - Expert Testimony rate I 
per hour 
--
18 Rocky Mountain EnvironmentalSM Professional Labor: $85.00 $1,530.00 
Senior Professional Hydrologist - normal rate 
per hour 
,-'.-
Interest at 1.5% per month 1.50% 
Due from Date Shipped when 30 past due 
INVOICED AMOUNT $1,905.00 
INVOICE ~~~ I E NTAr I 
PROJECT NUMBER: 10-0136-1, ASSOOATES, INC. 
Bob Shippen ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL 
482 CONSTITUTION, SUITE 303 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83402·3537 I C:\Roger_ZOll\Bob Shippen\project management\lNVOICEl.l.wpd (208) 524·2353 FAX (208) 524-1795 I 
To: Bob Shippen Reference: 
518 N 3950 E Various visits Bob and Robin Dunn. 
Rigby, ID 83442 
CLIENT CLIENT P.O. NO. INVOICE DATE TERMS 
CONTACT 
Roger January 24, 2011 BALANCE DUE UPON RECEIPT. ACCOUNTS 
Warner 30 DAYS PAST DUE ACCRUE INTEREST AT 
1.5% PER MONTH 
QTY. DESCRIPTION UNIT TOTAL 
PRICE 
Final billing for expert witness testimony for Goodspeed v Shippen, Case No.: CV-09-0 15. 
3 Rocky Mountain EnvironmentalSM Professional Labor: $125.00 $375.00 
Senior Professional Hydrologist - Expert Testimony rate 
per hour 
2 Rocky Mountain EnvironmentalSM Professional Labor: $85.00 $170.00 
Senior Professional Hydrologist - normal rate 
per hour 
-
Interest at 1.5% per month 1.50% 
Due from Date Shipped when 30 past due 
INVOICED AMOUNT $545.00 
II. 
'. 
'i~ll 1)'.~128 P;'l I: 35 FILED IN CHAMBERS DUNN LAW OFFICES, PL.I..C I " ." " 
at Idaho Falls 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 .::, ',J i :", I '. \ - i, \ Bonneville County 
Amelia A Sheets, Esq.,ISB #5899,UFERSU'i ~:u~..!!.r'i.I[)""HO SAnd n 
Bono Ie Gre~~ry. erso·x,""- I \ P.O. Box 277 '- - cA.) \ 
477 Pleasant Country Lane Date . l '. -
Rigby,ID 83442 Time ___ ::'y i -
(208) 745-9202 (t) Deputy CLerk ~~r+--
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dunnlawoflices.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
VB. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------) 
Case No. CV-09-015 
JUDGMENT 
This matter came on for jury trial on the 11th day of J anwuy, 2011; the evidence was 
presented on the 11th, 12th 13th and 14th days ofJanwuy 2011; the case was submitted to the 
jury late in the afternoon of Janwuy 14, 2011; and, the jury returned for deliberation, after the 
weekend and holiday, on the 18th day ofJanualY, 2011. 
The jury concluded its deliberation and rendered a special verdict in favor of the 
defendants on all causes of action. No damages were awarded since the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Paget 
ORIGINAL 
JAN/l:JAN, 21, 2011J: 4:21PM N PARRY r J\A !~ O. 
II 
NOW, THEnFOllE, the court does hereby msdet j1idgDlent in .... or of the 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE, mAHO RULES OF CJVIL PltOCEDURE 
With respect to the issues determintd by the above judgment 01 Older it :is hereby 
CERTIPIIID, i1l aa:ordance with Rlde 54 (b), Lll.c.p .. , that the ccmtt baa detesmiDCd that 
I 
there: is 110 just leaBOD for delay ,of the enuy ot a fi11a1 judgmelit aDd that the court bas and 
does heteby ditect that the above judpl.eat Of Otdcr shall be a 6u1 judgm.eat upon which 
e:xecutiou may issue and 'ari apPe.l may be taken ~'ptO'ri.dcd'by the Idaho Appdlatc ltule:s. 
DATED tbis~1 day of}anuaq, 2011 
--
. " 
, ' 
DATED ~day ofl-Wlt.yJ 
. , 
. ~ '. 
• 
NOTICE OF ENTRY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the QlDday ofJanuaty, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
~ Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 
JUDGMENT 
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(U.S. Mail) 
(Courthouse box) 
FEB. 9.2011 5:02PM NEL PARRY 
WESTON S. DAVIS (l.S.B. # 7449) 
NELSON HALL P ARRY TUCKER~ P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax. (208) 523-7254 
A ttomeys for Plaintiff 
NO. 140 
--
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ,i;DICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO~TY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and : 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and i 
~~ I 
Plaintiffs, 
vs_ 
ROBERT and JORJA SillPPEN, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 
I 
I 
Case lio-: CV-09-015 
I 
I 
I 
I 
MOT~ON FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERdICT 
I 
I 
, 
I 
P. 1 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, William Goodspeed and Sh~llee Goodspeed, by and through 
I , 
counsel of record, and hereby moves the Court pursuant to 1.R. OW. 50(b) for an order and judgment 
, 
I 
from this Court notwithstanding the verdict. Alternatively, Pl~ntiffs request a new trial. 
Tins motion is supported by the memorandum in suppprt and affidavits filed herewith as 
, 
well as all of the files and pleadings in this case including but n?t limited to Plaintiffs Trial Brief. 
Oral argument is requested on this motion_ 
! 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWlTHST ANDING THE VERDICT· 1 ! 
FEB. 9.2011 5:02PM NE PARRY NO. 140 P. 2 
DATED this -+-day of February, 2011. 
~:s;;..----=-~ -___ 
, 
• I 
CERTIFICATE OF SE~VI¢E 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the for~goi~ document upon the following 
this ~ day of February, 2011, by hand delivery, mailing wit:p. the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. ~ , 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby.ID 83442-0277 
Hon. Dane Watkins 
Hon. Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls,.ID 83402 
I.;\wsd\- ClientS\ 74! I.t Ooodspeed\JNOY Motion. wpd 
[ J MaPIin~ 
[ ) H~d nblivery 
~~ 2~8.145.8160 
[ ] E-¥ail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
r ] CO~Ciuse Box 
[ ] Mailing: 
-f<fH1U\ld Oblivery 
l ] Frod : 
[ ] E-1-fIail: 
[ J Ov~mi~11t Mail 
[ ] Col\trtll~use Box 
- ~ ...... ----:=;-;;.. .......... ----- "-. ~NS.DAVIS 
, 
, 
; 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
! 
, 
t 
! 
MOTION FOR:JUDGMBNT NOTWiTHSTANDING THE VERDIct - 2, 
~ , 
! 
I , 
FEB, 9,2011 5:03PM NEL PARRY 
WESTON S. DAVIS (I.S.B. # 7449) 
~LSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
,NO, 140 'P,5 
,-
,. I Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 8~405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523·7254: 
\"'. ":'I~I'I,ID::.I\O : l ;. \' L " :; 'v i. _, '" c [ I 
Attorneys for Plainti;ff 
, I 
IN Tlm DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTIl hIDrcIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CdUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
• 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and 1 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and i 
wife, 
PlaintifIs, 
vs. 
ROBERT and JORlA SmPPEN. husband and 
wife, 
" Defendants. 
~se :N"o.: CV-09-01S 
i 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MO~ION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
V:E~ICT AND MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW Plajl\tiffs, William Goodspeed ~d Sllellee Goodspeed, by and throu.gh 
I 
counsel of record, and hereby offer the following memC?ran~wn in support of their Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdiet and Motion for Recon$lderation on the following grounds: 
I 
, 
, I 
I. CLEAA AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE EXlST~ 'to SHOW THAT NOT ONLY 
DID THE SHIPPENS COMMIT FRAUD, B~ A~SO THAT THE GOODS:PEEDS 
REASONABLY RELIED ON THE StHIPPENS FRAUDULENT 
NfiSREPRESENTATIONS. : 
In this case,':Plaintiffs have the burden of showitig fraU~ by clear and convincing evidence. 
Fraud requires a showing that: 
MEMOR.A1'IDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JtJDGMBNT NOri,;rm:sT ANDING 
THE VERDICT AND MOTION FORRECONSIDERATlON - 1 . 
FEB. 9.2011 5:03PM NEL PARRY NO. 140 . P. 6 
1. A representation was made to the plaintiff; 
2. The representation was false; 
3. The representation was material; i 
4. The defendant either knew the representation ~as fal$e or was unaware of 
whether the representation was true; : . 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the represe~tati~n was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiffs to I rely iupon the representation and 
act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplate:d; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the representation; 
8. The plaintiff s reliance was reasonable under ail the circUlD$tances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damageS proximately catised by reliance on the false 
representation. I 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the\plai'ntiffs, and the amount 
thereof. : 
Aspiazu v. MOrlil1'u!l". 139 Idaho 548, 550, (2003) (Jury Instruction No.5) 
In support of the foregoing burden., the following llndi~uted evidence was presented: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
, 
. Mr. and Mrs. Shippen are long time n~tives of the area and have 
known about sub-water essentially the#, entire lives. 
. I 
Mr. Shippen has been in the con$tmction industry since the mid 
1970's and has been independentlybuil~g homes since about 198K 
In 2006, the Shippens only had twQ hoxiJe$ under col\Struetion. 
At the time the Shipp ens purchas~d'the ~ubjeet property, the seller of 
the parcel, Paul Jenkins, told the Shippipns about high sub-water on 
the property and that Robert Shippbn said he knew about it. 
Ray Keating testified that the plat map f~r Woodhaven Creek Estates 
put the public on notice that ~ enhanced septic system was required 
on each lot and than an experienced bui~er would know the purpose 
was for high sub-water and that j:he enhanced systems are more 
expensive. (Exhibit 43) . 
I 
Mr. Shippen testified thathe looked for sub-water in the foundational 
hole shortly after the hole was dug: 
• Mr- Shippen testified that he dug a holel~ext to the concrete porch in 
the back Of the house that he used to watch sub-water rise during 
constrUction. of the house. 
. i 
• Dan Fohnm,ck testified thatduring~e c~nstruction in mid July2006; 
, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOrWITHSTANDING 
THE VERl:>ICT AND MonON .'PaR RECONSIDERATION - 2 
FEB. 9.2011 5:03PM NE ARRY NO, 140 : p, 7 
, 
, 
he saw standing sub-water outside of the property and that he 
approached Mr. Shippen about it arid Mr. Shippen claimed he knew 
about it. ' 
• Mr. Shippen testified he personally obsred water come out of the 
test hole and flood the basement on. La~or-Day weekend 2006. He 
cleaned it up and told his wife abollt it. : 
• Mr. Shippen. testified he has cons~e4 over 20 homes, listing over 
19 of those homes with realtors wqo all! used the MIS system. 
, 
• The Sbippens were both familiar with! the MLS system and were 
aware that realtors used the MLS systexh to find potential buyers. 
The Shippens knew this subject r~al ptoperty was listed by Dave 
Chapple through the MLS listing. , 
• In fact, five months after the Sbippeins listed the property and leamed 
,I 
about the sub-water flood of2006, Mr. Shippen even signed a MLS 
change form to extend the date of t;he ~ listing. (See Exhibit 2) 
• No evidence was ever presented ~ Daye Chapple acted outside the 
, scope of his represelltation in the MLS llisting. 
• In fact, Dave Chapple specifically stated he obtained his iilformatiOI1 
in the MLS listing directly from Robbrt Shippen and that Dave 
Chapple was not a home inspector: 
• This MLS listing stated (Exhibit 1): 
"PUBllCINFO: **THERBHA~ BEEN CONCERN 
ABOUT SUB WATER IN JEFFERSON COUNTY, 
HOWEVER, THIS HOME H4S NOT HAD SUB 
ISSUES AND TO GIVE THE BUYERpmCE [s.i.c.] 
OF MIND BUILDER: WJtL INSTALL A 
LEACHING SYSTEM AROlJlND HOME AND 
PROVIDE A 1 YE~ WARRANTY ON 
CONSTRUCTION** ' 
"PRN ATE INFO: There ~as ;~een some concern 
about sub water in Jefferson C01Jnty. This particular 
home bas never had sub issues but to give the puyer 
peace of min the builder is toing to install a leaching 
system with a drainage fiel~ fro'tn the east side to the 
I 
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west side of the home to p~eveht the possibility of 
there every [s.i.c.] being an~ su.b/issues." 
• 'Both Dave Chapple and Randy StoOl' t~ti:tied the MLS public and 
private information can be shared with potential buyers. 
• . On the one issue that was disputed, namely disclosure of the actual 
• 
• 
• 
status of the property, five witnesses arid the 'Writings all point to a 
non-disclosure of the 2006 flooding: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
i 
Shawn and Shellee ~esti~ed there was no disclosure 
by Mr. Shippen abo~t su\>-water at any time. 
! , 
Dave Chapple testified ~, Shippen never contacted 
him to tell him to remov,e the language in the MLS 
listing or that the prop~ had flooded. As a result, 
Mr. Chapple stated that tJite MLS statement regarding 
subMwater was never, removed. 
Randy Stoor m~tiQn~d he never heard any 
communication froxp Mf. Shippen or Mr. Chapple 
regarding sub-water·o the property. 
J oIja admitted Robert told her about the 2006 flooding 
but she never said anYthizi.g to the Goodspeeds or their 
realtor about the sub-waner. 
None of Mr. Shippen'~ alleged witnesses to his 
alleged disclosure ~on'll1ersati.on with Shawn ever 
testified. 
: . 
All writings point to no rusclosure of the flooding. ! . 
The Shippens accepted the Goods~eMis first offer the same day of 
the offer without counter-offering,: 
, 
Mr. Shippen testified he did not tal¢ into account any special 
considerations with regard to the sub-Jater at this house until aftet 
'the fact of constniction. ' 
Mr- Shippen admitted he did not knoW-!for sure whether the system. 
would stop the sub·water. ': 
! 
Shawn Goodspeed told Randy St09f he.iwas not interested in houses 
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that had subwater issues and that he did! not want to look at any. 
Shawn Goodspeed testified would ~ot ~ve made a near full-asking 
price offer ifhe knew about sub·water .. 
I : 
Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed botll testified they relied on the MLS 
listing because who better than the bui14er to make a repre$entation 
about the past and future status of the house. 
: . 
: I 
The Goodspeeds and the Shippens both testified they understood the 
Goodspeeds intended to reside ip. tli~s house as their primary 
residence. 
Shawn Goodspeed and Randy Stoor bo~ testified that the reason the. 
Goodspeeds took the Shipp ens up qn th~ sump-pump was to protect 
against snoW melt and rainwater due tq the landscaping sloping in 
toward the house, which Mr. ShipPeJil claimed it would protect 
against. 
I 
After closing on the property, the ,poodspeeds testified they 
imItlediately began finishing their ~asement and yard. 
When the Goodspeeds leamed feoni Erid Geisler about the sub-water 
of 2006 after they purchased the property, they testified they were 
shocked. In fact, Shellee was so sh~cked that she immediately went 
and looked at the MLS listing which confirmed the Goodspeeds' 
only understanding-that the house ha.Id not and would not have 
sub-issues. 
I 
Shawn Goodspeed called Mr. Shippen ~2007 who claimed the 2006 
flood was a freak canal rupture and notlto worry about it. 
, ' 
The premises flooded in 2007. 
• The premises flooded in 2008 with ~ater pooling in the house 
through the crack in the basement concrete pad. 
• The premises and the house flooded in 12009. (Exhibits 5 and 6) 
• Shawn Goodspeed was not fired ~om ~is employment. He quit to 
find a hlgher paying job to fund thp litigation. 
Shellee testified she quit her job t'1live with her husband only after 
months of Shawn being away trying to·;fund the litigation. 
. , 
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. ! 
• Both Shawn and Shellee testified they iptend to remain in Rigby. 
I 
The forego~g shows not only that (1) a misrepresentati~n was made to the Goodspe~ds, but 
i 
• I 
also that (2) the tep~esentation was false, (3) that it was mat~al, (4) that the Shipp ens knew the 
I 
, i 
representation about.the house not having had sub-water iS$ues was false and that they did not know 
whether the repres~tati.on that the house would not hav~ sul)~water issues was txue, (5) that the 
. : 
Goodspeeds did not know the representation was false, (6) that the Sbippens intended for the 
Goodspeeds to rely Oil the representations, and that :the (7) Goodspeeds did rely on the 
representations ofth~ Shippens when they purchased the h~use:lat almost full asking price. Further, 
the foregoing sho~ that the Goodspeeds (8) reasonably relie4 on the representations and that (9) 
I 
their damages were proximately caUSe by this reliance. T~e is~ue of (10) damages, which will be 
disoussed below w~ never disputed by Defendants and t~eretore shown by clear and con-vincing 
evidence. 
Clear and c?nvincing evidenee is the burden of ~how~g that it is highly probable that a 
, ; 
proposition is true. ron 1.20.02. This is not a "beyond ar~aso~le doubt" standard. Above, there 
is only one disputed fact, namely whether the 2006 floodin~ was disclosed to the Goodspeeds. 
I 
However, in light of the sheer number of people testifying, ag~t Mr. Shippen's testimony that he 
. . 
I 
made the disclosure (namely Shawn Goodspeed, Shellee Oood,speed, Dave Chapple, Randy Stoor, 
: i 
J orja Shippen. and the written documents themselves) and ~he r4ct that Mr. Shippen' s deposition had 
: ; i 
to be pulled out on numerous occasions to correct his te~9nY on several issues, no reasonable 
I 
I 
juror could have found that there waS not a high probability Ut.at the ~vidence Plaintiffs submitted 
was true. The burden. of fraud was inet. 
I 
I 
Meeting this burden becomes even more clear throu!h Jury Instruction No.9, which, if 
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I 
applied correctly, solidifies a finding in favor of Plaintiffs !on t~le issue of fraud: 
• I 
An owner of real estate has superior knowledge regarding hislher property 
,I 
and is presumed to know about his property. The o'wne! is therefore under a duty to 
disclose known defects to the buyer because of thi~ sup~erior knowledge, 
If the owner does not know the conect infonnation, he/she must find it out 
or refrain from makin.g representations to unsuspeCting: strangers. Even honesty in 
ma.king a mistake is no defense as it is incumbent upon the owner to know the facts. 
The '\;>uyer is able to rely on the representatio~ or lack thereof, from the 
owner~ even: when the buyer inspected or could, have inspected the real estate 
independently. 
p, 11 
See BethZahmy \I. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 57, 60, 62 (1966); :Tus~h Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 IdallO 
I 
, I 
37,47 (1987); Sorensen v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 715 (19~7); ~d Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 
621 (1998). In this case, Mr. Shippen himself testified th~t he ~id not know whether or not,the 
I 
, 1 
leaching system he ip,stalled would handle the sub-water and tlilat any considerations he took into 
I 
effect regarding the sub-water were done after the fact of ~on.s~ction. So the defendants do not 
, 
dispute that they did not know whether or not the staten1eI1t in!the MLS listing was true about a 
leaching preventing the possibility of there ever beiI1g any sub~water issues. The possibility of 
1 
the Goodspeeds obtaining their own experts to evaluate the pr~perty is irrelevant as the Idaho 
Supreme Court has ~ecognized that buyer h~ve the right ~ relt on the skill of the builder. In fact, 
, , 
th~ Goodspeeds testified they never asked the home inspector i~O look at the sub-water issue 
1 
beca.u.se they had been assured by the MLS listing that sub-w~er was not an issue. 
Indeed, the facts of this case fall in line with a nurtlber !of other Supreme Court decisions 
previously cited an~ explained at length to this Court in ~ain*ffs' Trial Brief including the 
Tusch, Bethlahmy, Sorensen, and Watts decisions. In tho$e c$es, the fact a home inspection was 
done or could have ~een done had no bearing. 
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ll. IN THE EVENT TlilS COURT FINDS THAT ,FR4.UD WAS COMMITTED, TillS 
COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS FINDING OIN SUBMISSION OFTBE ISSUE 
I 
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE FINDER OF FACT . 
. 
In the event this Court grants a judgment notwitbstand~g the verdict on· fraud.. 
, ' 
consideration of punitive damages is a pennissible fonn of darltages, 
~ . 
"It is well established in [the State of Idaho] th.a.t ptnutive damages may be awarded when 
: . 
, 
the Defendant has c~mm.itted fraud." Umphrey v. Spri71kel~ ld~ Idaho 700, 710 (1983). The 
disjunctive language ("or") ofI.C. § 6-1604(1) states that fraud. alone may be used to justify an 
, . 
. . , 
I 
award of punitive damages. When a statute is clear, courts mu':st presume the legidatute meant 
what it said and apply the cleat language of the statute. McNe~1 v. Idaho Public Utilities Com 'n, 
142 Idaho 685 (2006) Citing State Dept. O/Law Enforcement~. One 1955 Willy Jeep, 100 Idaho 
I : 
150,153 (1979). Therefore, oppresaive, malicious, or OU~ll.g~ous conduct are other 
. . 
• • I 
circumstances where punitive damages are allowed but the statute does not call for an 
, : : 
interdependent consideration of all of the grounds for whi,ch pUnitive damages may be applied for 
fraud to be grounds for punitive damages. 
, . 
Additionally, as the jury was instructed, actual intent t6 deceive is not an element of fraud 
, . , 
or misrepresentation when a seHer knows of facts that would ~ave infonned a per$on acting with 
, 
care of the truth. See Jury Instruction No. 10. See also Tusch,!Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 
, 
37,42 .. 43 (1987); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 60. (1966); Kaze v. Compton, 383 S.W.2d 
. 
, I i 
204,207 (1955). This proposition and a summary of the cases was briefed at length in Plaintiffs 
" ' 
Trial Brief. In sho~ if a builder knows something about a pr~perty and fails to disclose it, intent 
. . 
I 
does not become an element of fraud. As a result, an analysis.jof malice or other intent for 
. , , 
assessing punitive damages relating to fraud is inappropriate. , 
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I 
In evaluating the issue of punitive damages~ this Court had some concem whether or not 
I ! ' 
the parties) realtor was acting outside the Scope of his authorio/" and accordingly whether the 
Shippens would have acted with malice. Whilemaliciou.sness'~s one ofth~ grounds for which 
, 
punitive damages may be granted, fraud alone is a ground for p,unitive damages. Furthennore~ 
J 
there was never any testimony that the realtor was acting Qutsi<;ie the scope ofrus authority. 
However, there was testimony that the Shippens ~ve J,sed realtors in the past and are 
, ; 
familiar with the pUIpose and use ofreal1ors and the MLS·lis~g. Th~ testimony was that with 
the exception of the~r first house or two they built, all of their ~omes have been sold using a 
realtor. In fact> Mr. Shippen signed an MLS change form; slgxillying he was in fact aware of the 
, : 
MLS listing and that it needed to be changed. Mr. Chappie dehled ever receiving instruction for 
the Shipp ens to change the language regarding sub-water in th~ MLS listing and that all 
information in the MLS listing came from Mr. ShippeIl in; dete;r.m.nnng how to market the 
property. Also, a fmding of fraud is supported by the bu11~t pqints above showing ]'tot only a 
, 
nondisclosure of a known defect but also that the Shipp~n8 did. not know whether the installation 
! 
of a sump-pump would take care of future sub-water issu~s. ; 
III. 
· " 
NO REASONABLE JUROR COULl) HAVE FOUND THAT A BREACH OF 
CONTRACT DID NOT OCCUR WlIEN; TIjIE EVIDENCE SHOWED A 
REPRESENTATION THAT THE HOUSE HAD .\SOT FLOODED AND WOULD 
NOT FLOOD. ' 
I 
Once the Court instructM the jury that the term "Stan&'ard Builder'S Warranty" was 
ambiguous, the jury should have found the MLS listing (draft~d by the Shippen's agent with 
, I 
information obtained from Robert Shippen) which guaranteed!the property had not had sub-water 
, 
· i 
issues and would never have sub-water issues acted as a ';Varr'¥lty. This is the only document in . 
" , 
writing explaining any coverage as to what was included ~fi th,b builder's warranty. 
· i 
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An express warranty is an assurance by overt: wotds or actions of a seller 
guaranteeing a condition of an agreement upon whiCh a ~uyermayrely-for example, 
a seller'S protnise that the thing being sold is as repres~ted or promised. 
, 
P. 14 
See 17A Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 410 "Warranties"; Black~s Ld,w Dictionary, 2nd Pocket Ed, 
, 
, 
Bryan A. Gamer (2001) "Warranty: Express Warranty"; S~e aLsoJuty Instruction No. 18. 
1 
In this case, the MLS listing said the property had not Had any sub-water issues and would 
I 
not. This written as~urance created a warranty. Further, five 'titnesses all testified that tbeywere 
not aware ofWheth~ a disclosure of the 2006 sub-water ~as e~~r made to the Goodspeeds, 
, . 
i • 
including Mr. Shippen's O'WIl wife and realtor. Mr. Shipp~, *hose testimony had to be 
, 
corrected on several' occasions by use of his deposition, w~s ~e only individual who testified 
, 
differently. Therero~e, based upon the sheer number of~tne~es against Mr. Shippen's 
testimony and the fact Mr. Shippen's own credibilitywas:comPromised during his testimony, no 
, 
reasonable juror could ba-ve belie-ved the Goodspeeds did ~ot *,eet their burden of proving that 
the MLS listing created a warranty and that it was breacb~d. ' 
. ' 
" 
I 
The warranty was breached when the Goodspeeds, sigqed the Purchase and Sale 
. , 
Agreement :md subsequently closed on the house, becaus~ thelProperty had in fact had sub-water 
issues by way otthe 2006 flooding even when the MLS listin~ asserted the property had not. 
, 
Further, the warranty created by the MLS listing was agam br~ached when the premises flooded 
: ' 
in 2007, and the premises and the house sustained fioodhig in12008 and 2009. 
, , 
: ' 
At a bare minimum, even ~fthis Court were to de~etIn:fue that the warranty was only 
I 
, 
extended for a period of one year, which Plaintiffs assert ~iffe!ently, then when the landscaping 
, , , 
flooded in 2007, th~ warranty was breached because the ~rop~rty had sub-water issues contrary to 
, 
I 
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:MLS listing that this' property would not have any sub-wa~er i~ues. Plaintiffs damages in 2007 
• • I 
were testified to be $150.00 for the additional sump pump\hatiShawn Goodspeed had to install 
to keep water out of.the house. 
. 
IV. 
· .1 
NO REASONABLE JUROR COULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE WARRANTY OF 
HABITABILITY WAS NOT BREACHED. ; 1 
. 
The jury erred in concluding that the warranty ofbabi~bi1ity W3$ not breached, as both 
the MIS listing and the Purchase and Sale Agreement sought ~ protect the buyer for a 
• I 
MINIMUM of One year under the standard builder'g warranty.; 
· . 
Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed both testified at tb~ time they purchased the property they 
understood that the home would be habitable and that it woUl~ continue to be habitable 
indefinitely. The Shipp ens both stated they intended for the heme to be habitable, and Mr. 
. . 
I 
I • 
Shippen also a.dmitted that sub-water impedes the liability of the home. All parties testified they 
• I 
understood the Goodspeeds would be inhabiting the resid.enee~as their primary residence. 
. ' 
. 
Further, the jury was shown the 2009 DVD (plain#ffs'IExhibit 6) and the 2009 flooding 
I 
pictures (Plaintiffs' Ex1ubits 5(a- f)) showing sub-water iritruslon into the basement from 
I 
approximately Sept~n1ber 8, 2009 through September 17, :200~. These exhibits and the 
testimony of the Goodspeeds showed at times this water r.eacItd a depth of approximately 2" and 
absorbed into the sheet rock approximately 6"-8" high on:th.e ,;valls of the basement. They further 
. 
showed loss of the ~arpet pad and the fact that all oftheir:persbnal property is up on blocks to 
I 
protect it from sub-water. They showed the mechanical room·twas in the basement as well as half 
of the square footage of the home that the Goodspeeds te$tifie~ they intended to USe to have 
I 
family members inhabit 
Considering the 2009 flood in light of the foregoi~g ~b-water history and in light of 
. .' I 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT ot: MOnON FOR JUDGMENT NO'f'WITHSTANDING 
THE YBRDICT AND MOTION FOR RECONSIbBRATION - 11 ; 
FEB. 9.2011 5:05PM' NE PARRY NO. 140 P. 16 
expert testimony that the house would likely continue to s~fferjsub-water issues, no reasonable 
juror can find under these conditions that the residence is ~abi~le and therefore the jury's 
decision on this issue should be reversed. 
v. 
• ,I 
ERROR OCCURRED BY NOT INSTRUCTIN~ T~ JURY ON THE LANGUAGE 
REGARDING A DISCLAIMER OF W ARRANTmS. 
, . 
I ' 
Plaintiff' s ~roposed jury instruction relating to dis*l~er of warranties on the property 
was not given over Plaintiffs~ objection on the theory that :Mr. :~toor Wnitted he explained the 
i 
provisions of Section 32 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement tp the Goodspeeds. However, a 
, , 
disclaimer of an implied warranty should only be obtaine~ with difficulty, which requires not 
only (1) that the disclaimer be understood by the buyer (in this/case through explanation of the 
I 
, , ' 
seller) but also that '(2) the disclaimer be clear and conspicuJus. In the case of Tisch, a case 
I 
nearly identical to the facts of this case, the Supreme Couit exblained this two part test: 
[One seeking the benefit of such a [warranty] disclaim~ must not only show [(1)] a 
conspicuous provision which fully discloses the consequences of its inclusion but 
also [(2)] tha.t such was in fact the agreement reached. 't~e heavy burden thus placed 
on the bui1d~ is completely justified, for by his jlssertion of the disclaimer he is 
seeking to show that the buyer has relinquished p~teQition afforded him by public 
policy. A knowing waiver of this protection will 40t b~ readily implied. 
Tisch, 113 Idaho at 46. For that reason, boilerplate claus~s ar~ not sufficient to disclaim. an 
implied warranty. Id. 
, , 
Shawn Goodspeed admitted tha.t the contract was gen~allY explained to him, but also 
, 
,I 
stated he fully expected to be covered. against past and fu1jure sub-water issues. ill fact, the 
. , ' 
, 
custom provisions ~f the contr~ct stated that the buyer wa;nted! a warranty for a minimum of one 
, I 
year, which tends to show that the warranty of habitability wa~ not disclaimed. (Plaintiff's 
i 
Exhibit 3). Therefox:e, the intent of the parties regarding ~he~er an implied wart:mty was 
" ' 'I 
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I , 
effectively djsclaim~d was not clear. For this reason, and peca~se a disclaimer should only be 
I ' 
obtained with diffic~1ty, for the sellers to protect themselves ~d render effectiveness to the 
disclaimer, the disclaimer must be in clear and conspicuous la4guage as stated in Tusch. Randy 
. , 
, , 
Stoortestified that the Purchase and Sale Agreement was ~oil~late language and that Section 
I 
32 was boilerplate language. Furthermore, observation of the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
, , 
, 
itself shows the text :and heading for Section 32 looks exactly ~e the other provisions in the 
contract and is not in any sort of bold, italics, capitalletter,s, o~larger font. Indeed the language 
is not conspicuous and fails the first prong of a disclaimer: of ap implied warranty. 
For this reason, in Plaintiffs' objection to the disaliowa:nce of their proposed disclaimer 
insttuction, Plaintif(s' counsel read the following propose~ i.nS~ction into the record as orte that 
I 
should have been given to the jury: 
Disclaiming:a warranty reqUires a conspicuous Provi~ion (text in large, bold, or 
capital letters ) which is clear and unambiguous, fully di~closing the consequences of 
its inclusion: This places a heavy burden on the bUl)der to show the buyer has 
relinquished the protection afforded to the buyer by pu~~ic policy and that the buyer 
has done so knowingly. By this approach, boilerplate Glauses (ready made or form 
language), however worded, are rendered ineffective thereby affording the consumer 
the desired protection without denying enforcem~t of'lIlVhat is in fact the intention 
of both parties. A knowing waiver of this protection wiI11 not be readily implied and 
should be obtained with difficulty. 
i 
Referencing Tusch. 113 Idaho at 45 - 47; Black's Law Dictionf(lry. 2nd Pocket Ed., BxyanA. 
, , 
I 
Gamer (2001) "Boilerplate", and Myers, 114 Idaho 432, 4;37 (~988). Because both 
, 'I 
conspicuousness and intent are required elements in cons~dering a disclaimer of warranty, this 
instruction should have been given. Such would have notified the jury that the implied wananty 
of habitability was not effeetively disclaimed, allowing them t~ find in favor of Plaintiffs on ~e 
issue of the warranty ofhabitability. 
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. , . 
VI. 
• • .1 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES WERE UNDISPUTEp BY DEFENDANTS AND A 
1 
JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGES liS APPROPRIATE UNDER EITHER 
. TORT THE~RIES OR CONtRACT THEO~S.: 
, 
, 
Plaintiffs set'forth the following damages with. sp~ifi4ty: 
. . 
DAMAGE .6fOUNT 
PURCHASE PRICE $!271,000.00 
I 
FINISHING HOUSE PRIOR TO FIRST FLOODlNG S! 9,280.31 
Basement carpet and Pad ($1,500.00) 
Blinds for Entire House ($2.785.68) 
Eaton Quality Gutters ($875.00) 
Basement sheetrock, trinl, electrica.l equipment, tape,' 
texture, paint (Home Depot and Lowe's) 
($4.119.63) 
: 
IMPROVEMENTS TO YARD PRIOR TO FIRST $ 8,071.05 
FLOOJ)ING 
Just Ask Rental ($1,295.92) 
A~l Rental ($300.72) 
UAP ($1,311.44) 
Wholesale Yard (Sprink1ers) ($2,083.40) 
Falls Plumbing (Sprinklers) ($2,784.57) 
Custom Curb ($295.00) 
i 
INSTALLATION OF DRIVEWAY $ 1O~631.85 
Driveway dirt/fill ($201.40) 
Spaletta Concrete ($10,430.45) 
SUB.TOTAL OUT-Or-POCKET $ 299,983.21 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF RESIDENCE S 290,000.00-
S. 295,000.00 
, 
SECOND SUB-PUMP TO PROTECT AGAINST SUB- S 1S0.00 
WATER 
PRO-RENTAL (20~9 Flood elean up) $ 495.60 
I 
. ,I 
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WITNESS 
Goodspeeds, 
Shippens, 
(Exhibit 3) 
Shawn 
Goodspeed 
(Exhibit 11) 
Shawn 
Goodspeeed 
(Exhibit 11) 
Shawn 
Goodspeed 
(Exhibit 11) 
Shawn and 
Shellee 
Goodspeed, 
Mark Leible 
Shawn and 
Shellee 
Goodspeed 
Shawn 
Goodspeed 
(Exhibit 11) " 
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DAMAGES FOR FRAUD 
l>AMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
51 300,568.81 
$I 290.645.60 
NO. 140 P. 19 
Plaintiffs proved their damages with specificity an~ byjciear and convincing evidence 
such that ajudgment js appropriate from this Court. Defendants failed to present evidence 
objecting to the amount of Defendant' s damages. Therefdre, $ere is no issue of fact as to the 
amount of damages, only as to whether Defendants are liable. lIn the event that this Court find 
• I 
I 
liability above, a. judgment for damages should be entered as rt,llows: 
, 
A. FraUd 
. , 
Rescission and restitution of ditect and conseque~al *amages are appropriate remedies 
I 
, 
in cases of fraud. IDJ1901 (Modified); Moon v. Brewer, ~9 r4aho 59, 62 - 63 (1965); Layh v. 
· I Jonas, 96 Idaho 6Sg, 690 - 691 (1975),' Addy v. Stewart, 69 I~o 357, 357 (1949); Walston v. 
Monumental Life 1m. Co, 129 Idaho 211,217 (1996); M~rr.J. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 777 
(App, 1987). See also Jury Instruction No. 12. 
· , 
Therefore, under rescission of the contract, the Pl~ti*s would be restored their, purchase 
· . 
· , 
price of$272,OOO.00. Also, the Goodspeeds would be entitle~ to restitutioi1 of their damages 
, improving the residence, as the residence was intended to: be ~ fully habitable house and it was 
foreseeable that the Goodsp~s would landscape the yard mol finish the basement, Further, the 
Goodspeedfl should be restored their expenses in attemptmg t~ keep sub-water out of their house. 
, : 
Under fraud, a judgment should be issued that the, contract should be rescinded and the 
I 
Goodspeeds be restored in the amount of $300,568.81. ; 
B. Breach of Emress or Implied Warranty. 
The appropriate remedy for a bre~ch of contract/",:,arr~ty is (1) rescission and (2) 
, 
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restitution. Ervin Construction Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 6~6, 699 (1993). See also Jury 
Instruction No. 20. 
When the breach is material, rescissjon is appropriate. [Primary Health, Network Inc. v. 
State Dept. of A.dmin, 137 Idaho 663 (2002). In this case, a w~anty was extended either 
, 
expressly and/or by public policy that the house had not h3d s~b~watet issues and would not. 
The breach of the warranty Was material because the Goodsp~ds testified they did not want a 
house with sub-water i~sues and they intended to inhabit the r~sidence as their primary residence 
, ' 
I 
full time, The Shippens also testified they knew the Goo4speeds intended to occupy the 
residence as their primary residence, Therefore, the warranty.was breached at the time of closing 
, 
, 
because the house had in fact had sub-water issues when the S~ppens said it had not. 
Additionally, the warranty was again breached in 2007 w~en the landscaping had sub-water 
issues. Because the,warranty extended beyond a year r'niininkm of one year; and "prevent the . 
, , 
possibility of there ~ver being any sub issues), the further ;sub .. water intrusion into the house and 
landscaping of2008 constituted a breach as well as the s~-w~ter flooding ofthe residence U1 
I 
2009. 
, i 
, I 
Therefore, the contract should be rescinded. Further, ~e Goodspeeds are entitled to 
, 
incidental and consequential damages for the improvements clade to the property and for 
I • 
expenses incurred nl attempting to prevent sub·water from intl:uding into their house and 
, . 
I 
, 
damaging their persona] property. These damages foreseeabl~ arose as a result of the breach 
. : . 
because the Gooaspeeds intended to reside at their house and ~prove it for the use for which it 
: i 
was intended including the used of the yard and basement. Se~ U.S. v, Silver, 245 F.3d 1075 (91h 
, 
Cir 2001) (Consequential damages are those losses and e~p~es which have OCCUlTed and which 
I ; 
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, 
foreseeably arise as a result of the breach of contract over ~d ~bove expectation damages). 
I 
Therefore, as illustrated above, the Goodspeeds total damages ~ $300,568.81. 
However, I.C. ~6-2504(4) limits damages in a con~act~ction to the greater of the 
purchase price or th~ fair market value of the home without th6 defect. In light of the 
improvements made: to the house and considering the exp~ te~timony of Mark Leible regarding 
, 
his evaluation of the house and the state of the econom.y, both he, Shawn, and Shellee all testfied 
the fair market value offhe home without the defect waS betw~en $290)000.00 - 295,000.00. 
, : : 
Defendants did not present any testimony regarding the present value of the home. Taking then, 
, . 
the lower of the testifi~d range of value ($290,000), plus the iJcidentaJ. damages of$645.60 for 
I 
cleaning up and pr~ertting sub-water in 2007 and 2009, the a~propriate contract damages are 
. , , 
$290,645.60. A judgment should be entered for this amoUnt ~d should further rescind the 
i 
contract. 
, • I 
Only in the event this Court finds the breach was 40t rrl,aterial, and only in the event the 
Court finds the warranty extended for only one year, at th~ v~ least the Goodspeeds should be 
awarded their damages for the 2007 breach. Shawn Goo~pecil incurred the expense of $150.00 
to install a second sump pump to keep sub-water off of t~ pr~erty and out of the house. At the 
i ! 
very lesst, this amount should be restored fOT a judgment Of $~50.00. 
Additionally, in the event this Court finds the warra.n~ did in fact extend beyond one year 
i ; 
. . I (as it states in the custom language ofth.~ contract and the ~ listing) but still finds the breach 
, .I 
was not material, Defendants should be restored the $150;00 ~rthe 2007 sub-water and the 
, 
I : 
, ' 
$495.60 incurred to 'clean up the sub-water in 2009. This:resUllts in ajudgment against 
Defendants in the amount of $645.60. 
I 
I 
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Defendants attempted to proffer through speculative te~ony that the Goodspeeds were 
, ' 
the cause of their own damages in 2009 because the Ga?d~e~s moved the second sump-pump 
(installed by the Good$peeds in 2007) into their house t6 prev~nt property damage io carpet, 
sheetrock, and other personal property. Defendants wholly i~ored the fact that the pump Mr. 
, 
, Shippen installed was not keeping up with the sub-water ~y its~lf as Mr. Shippen asserted it 
would. 
I 
Further, Defendants attempted to proffer speculative e'(idence that the pump Mr. Shippen 
installed was not w~rking in 2008 and 2009 because the rloo~eeds did not winterize the pump. 
i I 
Mr. Shippen never testified that the pump he installed w~ no~working properly in 2007,2008. 
or 2009. Mr. Shippen did admit however that he never hired ~ engineer to diagnose whether the 
, 
original pump he installed would keep up with the volume of ~ub-wa.tet and that he did not know 
, , 
whether it would keep up or not. Further, Mr. Goodspee~ testified that he personally observed 
. , 
the pump working to pump out sub-water in 2007 and tha~ th~pump was working in the same 
. , 
manner in 2008 and 2009 as it was functioning in 2007. 
C. Puniti~e Damages. 
) 
In the event ~ Court determines a consideration' of p~tive damages is appropriate: 
''The Jaw provides no mathematical fonnula by which pu~tiv~ damages are calculated, other 
! ! 
than any award of p~itive damages must bear a reasonab;le reiationsbip to the actual harm done, 
to the cause thereof. to the conduct of the defendant, and the ~ary objective of deterrence." 
IDIT 2d 9.20.5; See also Walston v. Monumental Insuranqe Cdr., 129 Idaho 211. 222 - 223 (1996). 
Courts have 'sustained punitive damage awards t~t are four and six times the amount of 
. . ' 
compensatory damages. Walston, 129 Idaho at 222 - 223~ I~o Statute has capped punitive 
, , 
I 
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,. 
damages to $250,000.00 or three times the amount of compen~atory damages, whichever is 
greater. I.C. § 6-1604(3). However, no instruction is to b~ giv~n to thejuryregardin.g a cap on 
punitive damages. ld. 
i 
In this case, the facts show compensatory damages in Je amount of $300,568.81. 
, , 
, . 
Therefore the cap on punitive damages should be $901,70~.43i which is awardable in addition to 
I 
compensatory damages. 
, 
Plaintiffs request this COUli exercise its discretion:in ~anting an award of punitive 
damages. 
CONCLUSION; 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request that this:Co~ grant its motion for judgment 
, 
notwithstanding the .verdict and enter a judgment for da.t.n.8.ges.~ accordance with the damages 
. . , 
set forth above. Only in the alternative, this Court should: grant a new tria.l. 
• I 
DATED thi~. -$-day of February, 2011. , . 
WE~;~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIeE 
, ., 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoin~ document upon the following 
this ~ day of February. 2011, by hand delivery, mailing wit~) the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. I 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442-0277 
HOn. Dane Watkins 
Hon. Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. , 
Idaho Falls. rn 83402 
L:\wsd\-Clkms\74 I 1.1 Ooodspeed\JNOV Modon (Mcmo).Wpd 
[ ] Mailing! . 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~ 2Ors.745.8160 
[ ] E-Mail : 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Co~o:use Box 
[ ] Mailing: 
~and ~livery 
[ ] Pax ' 
[ ] E-Mail: 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[l~OX 
:~> 
J;i;~VIS 
, 
, I 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT AND MOTION POR RECONSTOERA TION ·20 ' 
FEB. 9.2011 5:02PM NEL PARRY 
WESTON S. DAVIS. ESQ (ISB No. 7449) 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
• I 490 Mtmonal Drive· 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83,405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522:-3001 
Fax (20&) 523-7254 : 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
i 
! ~ 
NO. 140 . P. 3 
IN THE DISTk.JCT COURT OF THE SEVENTHh mJ!cIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COONTY OF JEFFERSON 
I 
· . 
WILLIAM SHA WN:GOODSPEED and I 
I SHELLEE BETH G<;:>ODSPEED, husband and i 
wifu, . . I 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT and JORJA SHIPPEN, husband and 
wife, 
· Defendants. 
Ctse No.: CV-09-01S 
PLEASE TA~ NOTICE that on the 28th day ofF bru~, 2011, at 1:35 p.m., of said day, 
! 
or as soon thereafter ~s counsel can be heard in the above c urt;lin Rigby, Jefferson County, Idaho, 
I 
· ~ . 
Plaintiffs will call up:for hearing Plaintiffs' MOTION FORl JU:ri>GMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
TIlE VERDICT befqre the Honorable Gregozy Anderson ~an~ Watkins), Dilrtricr Judge. 
DArED this "4- day of February, 2010. • 
W TON S. DAYIS, ESQ. 
NOTICE OF HEARING. 1 
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I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SE~VI(cE 
I hereby certity that I served a true copy of the foreJoini document upon the following this 
~ day of FebruarY, 2010, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed thereto, 
facsimile, ot overnight mail. ! 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby,ID 83442-0277 
I 
I 
Hon. Dane Watkins: 
Han. Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave; 
Idal10 Falls, ID 83492 
L:\wsd\- ClicnlS\7411.l Gopdspced\1NOV Motion (NoH).wpd 
I 
I 
NOTICE OF HEARING, 2 
I 
[ ] MJling: 
[ ] H,,*d Delivery 
/E<t"Faxi 208.745.8160 
[ ] E-*ail : 
[ ] Ov~migbt Mail 
[ ] cothouse Box 
[ ] Mal!ingj 
~~d D~livery 
--[ PFa~ . 
[ ] E-Mail 
[ ] Ov+mi~t Mail 
[ ] Co~oluse Box 
I 
I 
I 
I 
• ESQ. 
WESTON S. DAVIS (I.S.B. # 7449) 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Bqx 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and I 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and ~ 
.• I wll~ I 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT and JORJA SIDPPEN, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-015 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
FEES AND COSTS 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs in response to Defendants' Motion RE: Attorneys Fees and 
Costs and object and respond as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs have .filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, and 
therefore a determination on an award of fees is premature. In the event the Court were to 
reverse the jury verdict, Defendants will no longer be the prevailing party and an award of fees to 
Defendants would not be appropriate either by contract, statute,or other means. 
OBJECTIONS TO COSTS 
2. I.R.C.P.54(d)(1)(C) allows this Court to "disallow any of the above described 
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costs upon finding that said costs were not reasonably incun-~." In this case, Defendants called 
, 
Roger Warner as an expert wi1ness hydrologist Mr. Warner testified he had not personally 
inspected the property in question more than driving past the ~roperty. He testified he had. no 
conclusions r~garding the sUbject property or the case in gen~l, only that he could explain the 
, 
phenomena of the sub-water in Jefferson County. He testifie4 sub-water has always been a 
" 
problem in Jefferson County north of the Burgess Canal. Ho~ever1 this phenomena was testified 
,; 
to by almost every other lay and expert witness put on the sta4d~ including the Shippens 
" 
., 
themselves. In fact, Mr. Warner essentially again affinned ca~sation of the sub-water on behalf 
ii 
of the Plaintiffs. Therefore the Rocky Mountain Environme~al Expert Witness Fee ($2,000.00) 
. " 
should be disallowed. 
i: 
j! 
i! 
OBJECTION TO FEES~; 
3. Attorneys fees are not permitted in tort actions [related to fraud: ''There is no 
sound reason apparent in our mind why [attorneys fees 1 shoula be allowed in [fraud] actions 
rather than, in any ~ther kind oftort ~on. We believe the co~ect rule is to disallow them 
entirely." Bairdv. Gibberd et. al., 32 Idaho 796.188 P.56) 5~:(1920). Because the gravamen of 
this lawsuit involves fraud. Defendants are not entitled to awJd of fees related to frand unleSs 
ii ' 
I~ 
,I 
I: 
Plaintiffs pursued this case fii'vol¢usly. 
4. " Based upon the evidence submitted in PlaintiffJls Motion for Judgment 
II 
Notwithstanding the Ver(ijct, it is apparent that based on the s~eefvolume of supporting 
. ! 
~ 
evidence, plaintiff'S motion was not brought forth frivolously and an aw:ard offe~s is 
I . . 
inapprOpriate. See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) andSorja v. Sierra PacJ.Aitlines, Inc., 111 Idalfo 596,615 
Ii 
" ;, (1986). 
II 
5. Furthermore. based upon Defendants' failure td! bifurcate their damages into work 
I< 
done for claims of fraud versus claims on contract, DefendantJ have failed to set forth with 
'I 
specificity their damages as required by 1.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and it is impossible what if any fees are 
Q 
awardable to Defendants. See Hackett Y. Streeter, 109 Idaho ~l, 264 (Ct. App. 1985). 
II 
Ii 
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6. Even wh~ I.R.C.P.54(e)(1) allows an award ~freasonable attorneys fees to the 
prevailing party when provided for by statute or contract. suc~ a detennination is still within the 
s 
sound discretion of the Court. Id. See also Golder v. Golderj 110 Idaho 57, 61 (1986). 
'I I: 
7. Because there is a genuine issue as to what fe~ were incurred in defending the 
II 
II 
fraud action versus the contract action and other causes of ac~on, it would be wholly 
inappropriate to make an award of fees as they are presented ~ this Court because it is 
,I 
impossible to bifurcate the work. No description is available ~r the type of research done, the 
purpose of each motion. hearing, client conference. and the Jount of time dedicated in each 
hearing or deposition to the fraud claim versus other claim. Ii 
I: 
8. The requesting party has a duty to supply the <"furt with infonnation regarding the 
... reasonableness of the fee. See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A). Even if~es were available in a fraud case; 
" 
Oefendants provide no description in their memorandum of f+S to define the scope ~f'r.esew;ch 
perfunned, the scope of the hearings attended, the basis of co*-espondence, or conferences ~th: 
'I 
clients so that Plaintiffs would be able to ascertain whether th~ fee ineuned is reasonable, 
Therefore the attorney fees should be denied. 
I, 
,! 
I: 
II :~ 
9. A large number of fees on both Plaintiffand D~fendant's sides were incurred in . 
the discovery of Defendants' assertion that Robert and JoIja Shlppen bote no persona.lliability on . 
1 
. this action and that Marriott Homes, LLC was the only proper~arty to the action as the bUilder. ' 
In fact Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the action ofPl~tiff'S alleged failUre to name 
I, 
Marriott Homes and for Plaint:i..ffs inclusion of Robert and Jo~a Shippen as individuals. In the 
" 
end, the Court determined the only parties that should be nam~d in the complaint were Robert 
l 
and Jmja Shippen, the sellers of the subject real property. Th¢efote, Plaintiffs should not be , 
I . 
~ 
liable for those fees Defendants incurred on matters of veil pittcing, especially in light of 
Plaintiff's resources spent pursuing Defendant's assertion. sJ I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A and B). 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs shOUld not b~ granted those fees inClllT~d on July 16, 2009 through 
September 28,2009. as such fees were all related to Defelldan~'S Motion to Dismiss whic~ was 
I' 
PLAlNTIFF'S OIlJEcnONTO DEPENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINI4- l 
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~ 
converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment. J 
10. The time in Defendant's attorneys fees is lumJ:oo together and Plaintiffs cannot 
i' 
ascertain the amount of time spent on any given individual t~k when that task is lumped With a 
p 
group of tasks. Therefore Plaintiff cannot ascertain whether ~ time spent on the project listed 
!i 
was commensurate with the scope and difficulty of e3Gh task. Ii 
11. DefeI1dants have listed fees for work done by ~eal Nield ''IN'. These expenses 
" are merely administrative expenses, as it is apparent that Mr. runn dictated letter$ that Ms. Nield 
typed. Both charged a fee for this work. Such represents duplicative biUing which is not 
3 
reasonable and all fees incurred by Janea! Nield should be distUowed. 
,I - ,_" 
12. Defendants present in justification of their fee~lthat the issues in formwatingjury-: -
" ' 
instructions were complex requiring extensive work beyond tije scope ofLD.I.!. Defendants fail - . -
Ii 
to recognize, however. that the majori.ty of the jury instruetio~ used were formulated by 
I' 
Plaintiffs with citations to the applicable case law supporting Aaid instructions. Defendants only 
II 
supplied the Court with stock IOJI instructions, a number of,ruch were never fonnatte({forthis- - ,: _ ; 
particular case. Further. Defendants fail to mention that Def~dants' objections to said " 
'I 
instructions were not found to be supported by the law. Therefore. Plaintiffs object to the 
~ , 
amount of time Defendants spent on the jury instructiOns as b~ing overly excessive. 
13. Plaintiffs assert that billing rate of $200.00 per ~ur is excessive for the subj~t 
matter of this case and that said request is further an excessiv~billing rate for the region., See 
:\ . " 
" t.RC.P. 54(e)(3)(B - D). :j 
ii 
14. On November 5, 2009, Defendants billed fort»fparing an a1llended complaint. 
! Defen~ never filed an amended complaint. 
u 
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiffs object to Defen~'s request for fees and costs and 
I 
I' 
request that this Court deJly Defendants their request for said fees and costs. 
" " 'I 
!I 
:' 
" i, 
Ii 
Ii 
I 
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DatedthiS..!-daYOfFebnwy~~ ..... 
~ONS.~ESQ. 
\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVI~E !! 
'j 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoi*g document upon the following 
this tI day of February, 2011, by hand delivery, mailing wi~ the necessary postage affixed 
thet~csimile, or overnight mail. :1 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, IT> 83442-0277 
Hon. Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Countty Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
'" 
t. '! ,. .. ,. ..... 
I l't I 
- 1-/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
VB. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------) 
Case No. CV-09-015 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 28th day of Februaty, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. of said 
day, or soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the above-named in Jefferson County at 
the Jefferson County Courthouse, Rigby, Idaho, defendants will call up for hearing their 
"Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs» before the above-entided Court, Honorable Gregory 
Anderson, District Judge, presiding. 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Paget 
-DATED this.n day of February, 2011. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PU.C 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNG 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of February, 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
X Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICE, PU.C 
Courtesy Copy To: Honorable Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
Case No. CV-09-015 
RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANTS' 
REQUEST FOR FEES AND 
COSTS 
COME NOW, defendants, by and through the undersigned attorney and 
respond to the Plaintiffs' Objection to the Fees and Costs which have been requested 
by the defendants. 
DISCUSSION 
No question exists that if the plaintiffs had been the prevailing party in this 
action that a request for fees and costs would have been made to this court. The 
plaintiffs incurred significandy greater fees and costs in this action than the 
defendants. Thus, the reasonableness of defendants' fee and cost memorandum, 
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including updates, should not be questioned. 
Previously, the defendants submitted a brief on the discussion of fees and 
costs to this court. The defendants have relied upon the attorney fee provision in the 
subject real estate and sale purchase agreement, signed by both parties, and was 
included as Exhibit 3 to the jury as one important basis for the award of fees. 
That document which included the fee and cost provision is very clear and uses the 
additional words "in any way connected with this agreement". 
"If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or proceeding 
which are in any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and attorney's fees, 
including such costs and fees on appeal." 
Certainly, no litigation would have been brought if the plaintiffs did not 
purchase the home in question. Further, in cannot be rationally argued that the 
contract formed the basis of the entire litigation. "But for" the real estate purchase 
via the contract, nothing would have been before the court. 
Notably, the gravamen of this lawsuit is a commercial transaction arising 
from the contract. The contract is clear when it states "in any way connected with 
this lawsuit". Gravamen is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as: "the material part 
of a grievance." Case law indicates as follows: 
I.C. § 12-120(3) makes mandatory the award of attorney fees in any civil action to 
recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise or 
services and in any commercial transaction ... 
With respect to the provision allowing attorney fees in a commercial transaction, the 
statute defines a commercial transaction as all transactions except transactions for 
personal and household purposes. This Court has held that the test is whether the 
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Spence v. HoweD, 
126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995); Browerv. [126 Idaho 900] E.L DuPont De 
Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990) 
The gravamen of the lawsuit refers to whether the commercial transaction is integral 
to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. 
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Brower,117 Idaho at 784, 792 P.2d at 349. 
Property Management West; Inc. v. Hunt, 894 P.2d 130, 126 Idaho 897, (Idaho 1995) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 894 P .2d 132-894 P .2d 133. 
The plaintiffs attempt to argue that the gravamen of the lawsuit is tort. No 
tort would have been applicable but for the commercial transaction involved with the 
contract. The contract controlled the lawsuit. The plaintiffs filed an initial 
complaint based upon the contract. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed three (3) amended 
complaints. The court allowed the plaintiffs to continually amend. Thus, fees 
continually increased for the defendants. 
The court should be cognizant that the plaintiffs "controlled" the litigation 
and the defendants had to respond to the various amendments and theories of the 
plaintiffs. Veil piercing was propounded by the plaintiffs not the defendants. The 
determination of which parties to sue were determined by the plaintiffs not the 
defendants. The request for punitive damages was requested by the plaintiffs and 
not the defendants. In each instance, the defendants were compelled to respond 
through no fault of their own. The jury agreed. 
The main question before the court is the reasonableness of the fees charged 
by defense counsel to his clients. Those fees are extremely reasonable if the court 
examines the billing sheet. If anything, the fees of the undersigned did not include 
time waiting for other hearings, travel, discussions in the hallways, discussions with 
the attorney at courtroom appearances and other considerations that the undersigned 
has not traditionally billed clients. It is alleged that the undersigned has never been 
questioned on reasonableness of fees; of fees in the like kind of case; or, of fees for 
similar types of work or experience in such work. The hourly rate of the undersigned 
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is less than most practitioners of similar experience in the surrounding area. It is 
believed that such fees are less than most attorneys in the field of trial litigation. 
The undersigned knows of few attorneys with over 28 years of experience with 
a lesser rate than the undersigned. 
Janeal Nield has performed legal services in a paralegal capacity over 30 years 
for Steven Blazer, Blair Grover and the undersigned. Her fee, as set by the office, is 
$30.00, per hour, and is extremely reasonable and less than any other 
paraprofessional that the undersigned is aware of in southeastern Idaho. She is 
expected to perform services above and beyond the mere typing of dictation. 
Plaintiff counsel refers to jury instructions, theories and other matters that his 
clients asserted throughout the action. Because those various theories and matters 
are presented to the court, the undersigned was obligated to research and respond to 
such issues. 
The fees and costs requested are fair and reasonable and in accordance with 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the reasonableness of the fees, the contract, statutes and rules 
relied upon, the court should grant the same. Counsel will answer any questions that 
may be propounded by the court on the reasonableness and time spent in this 
matter. 
Dated this I L/ day of February, 2011. 
/ .. ) /'" ..... ···r ........ . ~~J 
# ~ • ",:::;;-" 
Robin D. Dunn 
Attorney for the Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ILl day of February, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons (s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
~ Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
208.523-7254 (Facsimile) 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy To: Honorable Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) Case No. CV-09-015 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT: 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
-------------------------) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON ) 
ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS 
ROBIN D. DUNN, being first duly sworn upon oath, states as follows: 
1. That he is the attorney for the defendants in the above-captioned matter; 
2. That he makes this sworn statement under oath and in support of a 
supplemental award of fees and costs; that he is over the age of 18, 
competent to enter into this sworn statement and does so freely and 
voluntarily; 
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3. That he has defended the actions pursued by the plaintiffs against his 
clients, the defendants; 
4. That he has practiced law in the State of Idaho since the year 1982; 
5. That this affidavit supplements the prior affidavit of counsel in support of 
fees. 
6. That the undersigned prepares this sworn statement pursuant to IRCP, 
Rule 54, to enable the court to award a fair and reasonable fee to the 
defendants. 
7. The fees and costs of the defendant are significantly lower than those 
incurred by plaintiffs and would substantiate the reasonableness of 
defendants' fee request. 
8. The plaintiffs request additional fees of7.7 hours at $200.00 per hour for a 
sum of $1,540. Further, a correction in the original affidavit had 
courtroom charts at $161.00 which was a typographical error and should 
have been $276.66 (see attached invoice) for a total additional request of 
$1,655.66. 
9. Further, the undersigned sayeth naught. 
Dated this J.:i day of February, 2011. 
Robin D. Dunn 
Attorney for the Defendants 
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f _./ ' 
. -
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this i:.L day of February, 2011. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing: Rig!>,-, ~daho 
Commission: t{~ttlt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 0::L day of February, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons( s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
X- Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho FaDs, ID 83405 
208.523-7254 (Facsimile) 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy To: Honorable Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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100002 
DUNN LAW OFFICES PLLC 
208-745-9202 
390-0050 
Quantity :Itern Number 
:Itern Description 
48.00 1B&W10 
SqFt KIP bonds 
12.00 
60.00 
Received 
B 
Invoice 
:List Price :Sale Price : 
: 
0.5000 
6.0000 
1802 
IDAHO 
10933 W. 
BOISE, I 
(208) 522 - 001 if(~,08 ) 3 76-57 
Tax ID 82-0292~9g 
Invoice Date:Ol.10.11 
Page: 1 
Salesperson: 4 
Invoice :PS145146 
Due Date:01.l0.l1 
Disc Date:Ol.10.11 
Tirne:12:44 PM 
:Extension :Tx 
: 
24.00 Y 
72.00 Y 
165.00 y 
261 . 00 
261.00 
15.66 
276.66 
276.66 
0.00 
i.' / 
• 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Countty Lane 
Rigby,ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------) 
Case No. CV-09-015 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
]NOV REQUEST 
IRCP, Rule 50(b) 
This matter came on for jury trial on the 11th day of January, 2011; the evidence 
was presented on the 11th, 12th 13th and 14th days of January 2011; the case was 
submitted to the jury late in the afternoon of January 14, 2011; and, the jury returned 
for deliberation, after the weekend and holiday, on the 18th day of January, 2011. 
The jury concluded its deliberation and rendered a special verdict in favor of 
the defendants on all causes of action. No damages were awarded since the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. 
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The plaintiffs have now requested of the above-named court to grant 
judgment to the plaintiffs notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule states as follows: 
(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. A motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict shall be served not later than fourteen (14) days after 
entry of the judgment and may be made whether or not the party moved for a 
directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict shall be served not later than fourteen (14) days after 
discharge of the jury. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a 
new trial may be prayed for in the alternative, in conformance with the requirements 
of Rule 59( a); and a motion to set aside or otherwise nullify a verdict or for a new 
trial shall be deemed to include this motion as an alternative. If a verdict was 
returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and 
either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment. If no verdict was returned the 
court may direct the entry of judgment or may order a new trial. The failure of a 
party to move for a directed verdict, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for 
a new trial shall not preclude appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence when 
proper assignment of error is made in the appellate court. 
IRCP Rule 50, Directed verdicts--Judgments notwithstanding verdict 
----------- Excerpt from page 154. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial by jury principle is engrained in the American judicial system and 
allows for the collective knowledge of jurors to render various legal decisions. 
§ 7. Right to trial by jury 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, three-
fourths of the jury may render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that in all 
cases of misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict. A trial by jury 
may be waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open 
court, and in civil actions by the consent of the parties, signified in such manner as 
may be prescribed by law. In civil actions the jury may consist of twelve or of any 
number less than twelve upon which the parties may agree in open court. Provided, 
that in cases of misdemeanor and in civil actions within the jurisdiction of any court 
inferior to the district court, whether such case or action be tried in such inferior 
court or in district court, the jury shall consist of not more than six. 
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ID CONST Art. I, Sec. 7, Right to trial by jury. 
In this case, a jury of 12 people made decisions on the issues presented. A 
civil trial requires that 9 of the 12 jurors agree on issues of liability and, if liability is 
determined to be applicable, upon potential damages. In the instant case, a jury was 
convened and entered its decision in favor of the defendants. 
In the instant case, the verdict form is very clear that the jury reached its 
decision on the issues of liability and determined that the plaintiff did not meet its 
burden on any of the theories presented. Quite simply, the jury did not accept the 
testimony and arguments of the plaintiffs. 
Furthermore, the objections at trial between the parties were few in nature 
and centered on evidentiary issues. The plaintiffs do not cite any objections that rise 
to the level of the JNOV standard or of a new trial. Moreover, any matters contained 
within the plaintiffs' Memorandum were already considered by the above-entitled 
court during or prior to the trial. 
"In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion for directed verdict or a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, this Court applies the same standard as that applied by 
the trial court when originally ruling on the motion." Watennan v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co.,146 Idaho 667, 672, 201 P.3d 640,645 (2009). "[W]e determine whether there 
was sufficient evidence to justify submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all 
adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the party 
opposing the motion for a directed verdict." Todd v. Sullivan Constr. LLC, 146 
Idaho 118, 124, 191 P .3d 196, 202 (2008). This Court "must simply detennine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the julY's verdict. Substantial evidence is 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." HoweD v. Eastern Idaho R.R., Inc., 135 Idaho 733, 737,24 P.3d 50,54 
(2001) (citation omitted). 
A trial judge may grant a new trial on the ground that the evidence was 
insufficient to justify the verdict if: (a) "after making his or her own assessment of 
the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the judge determines that 
the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence" and (b) the judge 
"conclude[s] that a different result would follow a retrial." Hudelson v. Delta Ind 
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Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244,248,127 P.3d 147,151 (2005) (citation omitted). We 
review a trial court's decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. 
Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co. ,2010 WL 2163391, (Idaho 2010) 
------------ Excerpt from page 2010 WL 2163391 *11. 
The above-entitled court had a very detailed special verdict form that asked, 
in an orderly fashion, various questions of the jury. It is beyond dispute that the jury 
answered each and every question on the special verdict form favorably to the 
defendants. Furthermore, both parties, via their legal counsel, approved the special 
verdict form and the format of such verdict form. Neither party can argue that the 
jury was not well instructed as to the law as few objections existed by either party to 
the legal instructions presented. The jury followed the special verdict form and 
received proper jury instructions. 
A trial court will deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if 
there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds 
could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury. Id. (citing Hudson v. 
Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478, 797 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1990». A trial court is not free to [146 
Idaho 775) weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. making its own 
independent findings offset and comparing them to the juf,Y's findings. Griff, Inc., 
138 Idaho at 319,63 P.3d at 445. A trial court reviews the facts as if the moving party 
admitted any adverse facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip. Co., Inc., 137 Idaho 578, 580, 51 P.3d 392, 
394 (2002). 
Bates v. Seldin, 203 P.3d 702,146 Idaho 772, (Idaho 2009) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 203 P.3d 704-203 P.3d 705. 
The plaintiffs, in their motion for a JNOV, fail to recognize the very verdict 
form and instructions they approved. Instead, the memorandum is simply are-hash 
of the plaintiffs closing argument. The jury did not accept or agree with the plaintiffs 
on their evidence or theories. 
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DISCUSSION 
The defendants will address points in the plaintiffs' memorandum and also 
some of those points that the plaintiffs omitted as follows: 
1. No question exists that the court made detailed jury instructions with a detailed 
verdict form. As such, it was readily ascertainable how each juror stood on the 
five (5) claims that were submitted to the jury. Thus, the first question for 
response is whether the court properly instructed the jury. The plaintiffs make 
few claims that the jury was not properly instructed. The court made rulings on 
any objections to the law via instructions. Thus, the court should not be required 
to second guess itself on the state of the law provided to the jury. 
2. The defendants requested a directed verdict on each and every count of the 
plaintiffs' case at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence. The court ruled on 
the directed verdict issues. Thus, the court had already determined that factual 
disputes existed that the jury must decide. Since the court determined there were 
factual issues in dispute, JNOV would be inappropriate since the factual 
determinations were for the trier-of-fact. The law is clear that the court cannot 
second-guess a jury but rather must find sufficient evidence in the record to 
support the decision. (Bates v. Seldin, supra.) The court has already determined 
that issue by allowing the jury to make the factual fmdings and applying the 
given law to the facts. Thus, since the jury had the proper law and determined 
the facts, JNOV is inappropriate. 
3. It is beyond dispute that Jorja Shippen, co-defendant and wife of Robert Shippen, 
had no dealings in this case. Thus, the parties, the jury and the court must all 
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concede she had no individual liability; and, the jury was correct in respect to 
their decision with the special verdict form. 
4. Various factual determinations in regards to Mr. Shippen were the key to this 
case. From the very commencement of this case, counsel for the plaintiff was 
informed of the defense posture of the defendants. Quite simply, Mr. Shippen 
informed the plaintiffs of the irrigation (sub-water) problem during construction 
and prior to any contractual relationship between the parties. The defendants 
never varied from that position that Mr. Shippen informed Mr. Goodspeed of the 
water issue during construction AND prior to any contractual relationship with 
the plaintiffs. Common sense must prevail somewhere. Why would the subwater 
issue even come to light if Mr. Shippen were not installing a leaching system with 
sump pump. The jury believed the testimony of Mr. Shippen that he told Mr. 
Goodspeed, when Goodspeed observed the construction of the sump system, of 
the prior water issues. Disclosure removes any possibility of fraud or breach of 
any contractual issues. The jury accepted, as would any rational person, that 
there was proper disclosure since Mr. Goodspeed observed the installation of the 
sump pump and leaching system. It is implausible for Mr. Goodspeed to be 
present at the construction of such a system and not ask questions regarding this 
installation. Further, Mr. Shippen testified that Mr. Goodspeed stated: "they had 
high ground water in Tennessee and he was not concerned". 
5. No water damage ever occurred during the one (1) year builder's warranty. 
Contrary to any statements of the plaintiffs in their memorandum, water never 
invaded the house during the one year from purchase in July of 2007 through July 
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of 2008. 
6. Mr. Goodspeed testified of his lack of maintenance on the sump pump and 
"blowing" out the pipes before the winter of 2007 and into the spring of 2008. 
The water on the video contained in exhibit 6 was well after a lawsuit had been 
commenced by the plaintiffs; well after the one year warranty and after 
Goodspeed had Mr. Shippen leave the property when adjusting the sump pump. 
Furthermore, testimony existed of ''water ponding" in the middle of the lawn 
which suggests the drainage line to the leaching system was cut. 
7. Errors and misstatements of the plaintiff in their memorandum on pages 2-5 are 
as follows: 
A. Ray Keating never testified that an enhanced septic system was for the 
purpose of sub-water. He testified that a 3 foot minimum depth was 
required in most of Jefferson County. Ray Keating indicated that multiple 
factors determine enhanced systems, including but not limited to, size of 
lot, soil, drainage, water levels, type of construction, slope and other 
significant factors. A high water table is one of many factors in 
determining an enhanced system. Furthermore, an enhanced septic 
system has no relation to depth of foundation or of design of a house. 
B. Mr. Shippen never testified that he looked into the foundation hole for 
testing of subsurface water. He indicated that he looked at a retaining 
wall that was dug much deeper than the foundation for his testing. He 
testified he did not backfill the wall next to the retaining wall and porch to 
observe any potential for water. This wall was well below the foundation. 
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C. The water Mr. Fohrenck observed was four (4) feet in depth which was 
lower than the foundation on the subject house. 
D. Mr. Shippen never testified that water came through the "test hole" into 
the home during construction. The water came from irrigation and not 
through a test hole. 
E. Mr. Shippen indicated he told Mr. Chapple of water during construction; 
and, that Mr. Chapple indicated if it was irrigation water that was not a 
problem. Regardless, Mr. Shippen disclosed the construction water issue 
to Mr. Goodspeed prior to any contractual relationship and prior to any 
purchase. Additionally, Mr. Shippen never viewed the MLS and testified 
he disclosed of water during construction to Mr. Chapple. As important, 
the MLS document was superseded by the contract written by the 
plaintiffs. 
F. Mrs. Goodspeed was never present during any of the inspection of the real 
property by Mr. Goodspeed. She could not testifY to any of the matters 
between Mr. Shippen and Mr. Goodspeed. 
G. Mr. Stoor, real estate agent for the plaintiffs, placed the language in the 
real estate purchase and sale agreement, paragraph 4 as to the installation 
of a leaching system. He did not "dream up" this language and was on 
notice to place the same in the contract. The contract was written by 
Stoor, agent for the plaintiffs. He testified that the entire contract was 
reviewed and the plaintiffs went through and understood each and every 
paragraph. Mr. Stoor was extensively examined concerning paragraph 32 
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of Exhibit 3 (real estate contract) and he stated the plaintiffs specifically 
understood the language "supersedes all prior Agreements between the 
parties respecting such matters. No warranties, including, without 
limitation any warranty of habitability, agreements or representations not 
expressly set forth herein shall be binding upon either party." The 
defendants cross-examined Mr. Stoor extensively on this issue to the point 
that the court asked counsel "to move on". Mr. Stoor indicated the 
plaintiffs understood this paragraph. Also, the court previously ruled on 
this issue at trial. Plaintiffs now ask the court to once again, second-
guess, the reasoning applied at trial. 
H. Mr. Shippen never stated to Mr. Goodspeed that "nothing could be done" 
in regards to subsurface water but rather "nothing could be done about 
subsurface water" in general. The testimony of Roger Warner to the jury 
indicated systems, such as leaching systems, could control subsurface 
water issues but not subsurface water itself. A big difference exists in the 
statements plaintiff makes to the court and takes out of context and of the 
context of reality. 
I. Mr. Goodspeed, via testimony of both Dave Chapple and Mr. Shippen, 
indicated that the purpose of the purchase on the subject property was to 
live in the same during his contract (employment with the INL) in Idaho 
and then "turn" the property. 
J. The premises never flooded in the year 2007. The premises never flooded 
in 2008 when Mr. Shippen was monitoring the sump pump into October of 
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said year. 
A misrepresentation cannot occur if Mr. Shippen specifically disclosed the same to 
Mr. Goodspeed. The jury believed this disclosure occurred. The plaintiffs did not and 
could not meet the burden of "clear and convincing evidence" in proving any fraud or 
fraudulent claim. Likewise, the plaintiffs could not prove any breach of contract by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
8. The real estate contract (Exhibit 3) required the installation of a sump pump and 
leaching system. This system was installed and was functional during the time Mr. Shippen 
monitored the system. Mr. Shippen monitored the system even after the one year warranty 
had expired until Mr. Goodspeed said he was going to sue him. That year was after July in 
the Fall of 2008. 
9. The court has already considered and re-considered the issue of punitive 
damages. Once again, the memorandum of the plaintiff only asks the court to second guess 
a matter that has been heard over and over. The court, at the conclusion of the defendants' 
testimony, believed there was insufficient evidence to submit punitive damages to the jury. 
The court has already exercised its discretion on this issue. The jury indicated that the 
defendants did not commit fraud. There are no other legal theories that the plaintiffs can 
rely upon to support such a contention for punitive damages. The statute on punitive 
damages requires "oppressive, malicious or outrageous conduct". None of those events 
occurred. The jury indicated fraud did not occur. Thus, the plaintiffs have nothing left to 
argue. 
10. Plaintiffs mistake quantity of evidence with quality of evidence. Plaintiffs try to 
indicate that five witnesses dispute that Mr. Shippen did not disclose the water problem to 
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Mr. Goodspeed. Who are those five witnesses? Neither Jorja Shippen nor Shellee 
Goodspeed was present during the disclosure conversation. Neither of the realtors who 
represented each of the parties was present. Thus, there are only two witnesses, to-wit: Mr. 
Shippen and Mr. Goodspeed who were present during the conversation. Mr. Shippen is 
installing a sump pump and leaching system. It is unthinkable that Mr. Goodspeed did not 
question this installation process since he was present. Who did the jury believe of the two 
witnesses present? The answer is clear-they believed Mr. Shippen. 
11. The house in question had no flooding in 2007 or 2008. The first admission 
appears on page 10 of plaintiffs' memorandum. Until that point, the plaintiffs try to disguise 
the flooding. Plaintiffs finally indicate in the second to last line and final line as follows: 
"the landscaping flooded in 2007". The house did not flood. What caused the landscaping 
flooding is unknown and has nothing to do with the house. Was it faulty installation of a 
sprinkler system? We know that there was a "flooding or ponding" issue in the middle of 
the yard in later years. That certainly was not subsurface problems related to the leaching 
system. However, no evidence, whatsoever, exists as to flooding in the house in 2007 and 
2008. 
12. The court already considered, in great detail, jury instructions. What more could 
the court do? Once again, the plaintiffs merely ask the court to second guess that which it 
has already considered. 
13. The plaintiffs own admissions in their memorandum support the position of the 
defendants. The plaintiffs indicate that jury instruction #9 and #18 were correct 
propositions of law. The jury had these instructions and applied such instructions to the 
contested facts. The jury correctly applied instruction #9 to fraud; and correctly applied 
JNOV RESPONSE BY DEFENDANTS 
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instruction #18 to express warranties. The jury perfonned their function properly and 
evidence upheld their findings in the special verdict fonn. 
14. Both Mr. Goodspeed and his realtor admitted the real estate contract (Exhibit 3) 
were explained before signature and submission to the defendants. The court is well aware 
of the defense counsel's constant cross-examination on this point. The court considered the 
argument of waiver of warranties and was not previously persuaded by the same argument 
now being tendered. Regardless of plaintiffs argument, the construction water had been 
disclosed by Mr. Shippen and was readily apparent by the plaintiffs inclusion of such 
language in the real estate contract. The jury made no error on the factual detennination or 
upon the application oflaw. 
15. The plaintiffs set forth a damage chart on page 14 of their briefing. The chart is 
inapplicable since the jury did not find liability under any of the numerous theories of the 
plaintiffs. Furthennore, the damages have no basis in the legal theories advanced. 
Remodeling, improvements, installation of driveways have nothing to do with the contract 
between the parties. The court will recall that no expert testimony was offered on damages 
by anyone. Mr. Goodspeed indicated, in his lay opinion, that the real property was of no or 
zero value. 
In sum, the plaintiffs have re-tendered their closing argument to this court. The 
same general arguments were made to the jury which was not accepted by the collective 
minds of the jurors. Jury verdicts are paramount and the jury function should retain its 
valued position in our system of justice. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons tendered above, the request by the plaintiffs for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a new trial should be denied. Additional attorney fees 
should be granted for responding to the motion of the plaintiffs. 
DATED this ILl day of February, 2011. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the R day of February, 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons( s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
.X- Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
208.523-7254 (Facsimile) 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy To: Honorable Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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Telephone (208) 522~3001 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH: ICIAL DISTRICT 
II 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO) IN AND FOR THE CGUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
I 
VlILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and I 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and i 
wife~ 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBER.T and JORTA SHIPPEN, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 
( 
casero.: CV-09-015 
PLA~hTIFFS' MOTION TO 
STRllKE SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFF~OAVIT: ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND1ICOSTS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs by and through their att 'mey of record, Weston S. Davis of 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A., and hereby move the Court to' Strike the supplemental affidavit of 
Robin Dunn in Support of his request for fees as it is untime,ly under I.R.e.p. 7(b)(3)(B), which 
requires all affidavits to be filed with the motion they support. :1 This additional reque't for fee, was 
also not made within fourteen (14) days of the date of the judg$,:le:t'lt as required by rule 54(d and e). 
Additionally, this affidavit should not be considered as DefendLts seek to have the Court augment 
their initial request for fees without explaining the need for an!lditiOnaI7.7 hours or $1,540.00 of 
worle 
JUL. 1. 2011 11:46AM NE PARRY NO. 093 P. 2/2 
I 
Therefore, due to fue lack offoundation and untimely lfue affidavit, it should be stricken. 
Plaintiffs request oral argmneot 011 this motion. 
DATED this ~ day of February, 2011. 
HOll. Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIt: I TTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - 2 
FEB. 23.2011 4:43PM NELS ARRY 
WESTON S. DAVIS (I.S.B. # 7449) 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. 361 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SRVENTHiJUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CG>UNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SllA WN GOODSPEED and I 
SHELLER BETH GOODSPEED, husband and i 
wife, I 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
ROBERT and JORJA SHIPPEN, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV -09-015 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S 
I 
RES:rONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
JNOV REQUEST 
P. 1 
CO:ME NOW Plaintiffs, William Goodspeed and Shellee Goodspeed, by and through 
counseloftecord, and hereby reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs JNOVrequest as 
follows: 
Plaintiffs' memorandum supporting the legal authority and facts are sufficiently pled 
before this Court and the Plaintiffs hereby reincorporate their memorandum by reference into this 
reply. The fucts simply show that no reasonable juror could have reached the conclusion the 
jurors in this case reached. 
Defendants have mischaracterized plaintiffs' argument and the evidence submitted to the 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S JNOv REQUEST - 1 
FEB.23.2011 4:44PM NELS ARRY NO. 361 P. 2 
jury. Defendants argue the only people who could have knOW~l about the disclosure or non-
disclosure was Mr. Shippen and Shawn Goodspeed. This ign~res Mrs. Shippen's testimony that 
she never contacted her agent, Dave Chapple, to disclose the house flooding and Mr. Chapple's 
testimony that neither of the Shipp ens contacted him to disclose the sub-water flooding of2006. 
Randy Stoor and Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed both testified:that neither the Shipp ens nor their 
agent ever disclosed the sub-water issues to them. Furthennole... the only witnesses that could 
have corroborated Mr. Shippen's testimony regarding his alleged disclosure to Shawn Goodspeed 
(Mr. Shippen's own sons) did not testify. Mr. Stoor and ShaWn Goodspeed testified the reason 
the Goodspeeds took the Shipp ens up on the leaching syste1n -Was to prevent snow melt and rain 
melt from coming into the basement due to the inward sloping landscaping. Shawn and Shellee 
. 
both testified they relied on the Shippens' MLS representation:: that the house had not and would 
not have sub-water issues. 
The MLS listing made by the Shippens' own real esta1le agel1.t, a listing prOcess the 
Sbippens are familiar with and have used on over 95% oftheii houses, was never changed and 
was never requested to be changed. The Shippen's own agent~ a non-party to this suit, testified 
. 
he obtained the infonnation in the MLS listing from Robert SIUppen and that Mr. Shippen never 
called to ha"e the language removed. I As a result, the warranty that the house had never flooded 
was never removed. Because the builder's warranty was ambilguous and not defined in the 
contract, the MLS listing was the source of defining the scope !of the warranty. The warranty that 
the house bad not flooded was breached at the time the Goodspeeds purchased the property 
1 Interest.in~ly. Defendants argue Mr. Cbapple exceeded the sc~pe of his authority. but they never sued 
Mr. Chapple in this action and Mr. Chapple did nothing more than use the Shippens' representlllions in me MLS 
listing-sorp.ething the Sbippens had their agents do 011 at least 20 other properties. 
Additionally, the Shippcns cannot claim they:never saw the MLS listing where Mr. Shippen himself filed an . 
MLS chan~e fonn request. 
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because in fact it had flooded. Further, because the alleged di~claimer of the warranty boilerplate 
language and was not clear and conspicuous (i.e. boilerplate l~guage), the disclaimer is 
invalid-especia11y where the Sel1er did not draft the disclaimer and never evidenced an intent to 
emphasize the disclaimer to the buyers. The Defendants then,· cannot argue it was their intent to 
disclaim. the warranty. and a disclaimer for a warranty on a residence is construed against the 
builder/seller. 
With regard to the MLS warranty> the MLS listing stated that the "property" (uot 
"house'') had never had sub-issues and would not. The testimbny was that the property (i.e. the 
yard) suffered flooding in 2007. So whether the warranty wasi limited to one year or not, there 
was still a breach within the one year period oftime when theIYard flooded in 2007 and again . 
every year after that. Plaintiffs claim no water damage OCCUIT~d in 2007. The Goodspeeds still 
, 
incurred damages in 2007 of the purchase ofa second pump (S150,00) used in addition to the 
Shippen pump to keep water out of the house. 
There was never any testimony that the sub-water came from inigation water~ as 
Defendants now allege in their response. In fact, the clear we~ght of Defendants ) own testimony 
proves otherwise. Mr. Shippen, Mrs. Shippen, and Roger Watner all testified that the sub-water 
is. highest during the period of tixne surrounding Labor Day ~ekend, This was the time the 
Goodspeeds experienced flooding in 2007) 2008. and 2009. If the flooding were caused by a 
sprinkler line, the flooding would have occurred much sooner: Also, Shawn Goodspeed testified . 
that there was no change to the pressure in his sprinkler system at any time and that the pump 
installed by Mr. Shippen was working in the same manner in 2008 and 2009 as it was in 2007. 
the year the Goodspeeds purchased the property. Shawn also testified that leaching system 
drainage area on the west side of his lot was wet from the leaching system pumping out water, so 
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Defendants cannot argue a failure to winterize the pump was the cause of the flooding if the 
pump was pumping enough water out into ahother areas of the yard to flood it. 
Defendants argue without any evidence presented below that it is obvious the drainage 
line to the leaching systeJn was cut, causing flooding to the back patio area. This was never 
argued at trial and no evidence was presented to even. hint at ~s argument Defendants never 
established where the leaching system line was positioned in the back yard, much less what 
aetivity would have cut the leaching line. Defendants only argued the system was not winterized. 
Incidentally, the back patio area was the same area that Dan Fbhmnck testified he saw water in 
July of2006 before a sprinkler system was installed 
The Shipp ens did not refute that they have known aboUt sub·water in the area their whole 
lives and that Paul Jenkins specifically told them about sub-water in this subdivision when they 
purchased the lot in 2005. Contrary to Defendants' assertion:iln their response, Robert Shippen 
did testify that when construction began. he observed the foun'dational hole that Justin Fullmer 
excavated and that he looked in the foundational hole after it was dug in approximately May 
2006 to see if there was any sub-water in the hole. After that, Mr. Shippen continued to monitor 
the sub-water level in the summer of2006 through the hole aioll1'ld the retaining wall in the back 
yard. Dan Fohrenck testified that the sub-water around the back patio was only a few iltches' 
from coming into the house in July 2006, not four feet as Defendants' alleged. Mr. Shippen ' 
testified that he saw water rise in that retaining wall hole untillit rose out of the hole; that the sub-
water continued to rise and flood the basement to a depth of 1 ... 2" in 2006; that he personally 
cleaned it up; and that he told his wife about it. No sprinklers :were installed at that time, th~ 
Defenc'bnts cannot argue that subsequent flooding was causediby a undefined alleged defect in a· 
functioning sprinkler system if the same flooding was happeni!ng before the system was installed 
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and was an issue in that area well before the Goodspeeds moved in. 
Further, Defendants argue in their response that the sumP pwnp system was functional 
while Mr. Shippen was monitoring it. This cannot be true, however, because the yard was 
flooding in 2007, the year that Mr. Shippen was monitoring the system. Defendants also claim in 
their response the leaching system line.was cut and was the obvious cause of the flooding. Thus, 
if the yard was flooding in 2007 and if the line was cut as Defendants allege in 2007, the system 
was not functioning when Mr. Shippen was monitoring it and -therefore there was a breach of the 
warranty. 
Defendants ask the question why the Goodspeeds never questioned the need for a 
leaching system if sub-water was Xlot going to be an issue. The MLS listing itself gives the 
answer-even though ''this particular home has not had sub-issues", the pump was to give the 
buyer peace of mind against there ever being any sub-water issues. Based upon the evidence, it 
is clear that the builder did not know this system would take care olthe SUb-water issues, and that 
alone was a misrepresentation upon whieh the Goodspeeds could rely, even if they saw Mr. 
Shippen installing the system, and even ifhe disclosed. the fio@ding of 2006. Thi~ is becaW!e the. 
law prohibits the Sbippens from making representations they did not know to be true. Public . 
policy allows the bu.yers to rely on the skill of the builder. rather than require that the buyer go 
hire an inspector to independently establish the fact for the buYer. Defendants have routinely 
evaded this point. 
Defendants argue that Mr. Warner testified that a sump pump could resolve the problem. 
Mr .. Warner testified that while a leaching system could help fbr a little while, eventually the use 
of a pump would be like putting a pump in a lake to bailout a-boat. Mr. Warner's own pre-trial 
deposition had to be used at trial to help him remember that he made this statement. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 'PLAINTIFF'S JNOV REQUEST - 5 
FEB.23.2011 4:45PM NEL ARRY NO. 361 P. 6 
Mr. Chappel and M'r. Shippen claimed that Mr, GoodSpeed wanted to make a profit off 
of this house after his contraet with the INL was up. Howevet) what they failed to explain was 
why when Mr. Goodspeed was four month$ into his employment contract (from which he was 
never terminated and which had not even come close to eXpiration) and only two months into his 
house why he contacted Robert Shippen and began complaining about sub-water. Initial 
complaints proceeded the real estate crash and were fat in ad'Vbnce of anyone's knowledge of the 
long lasting effects ofthe crash. This same sub-water complaint consistently came around Labor 
Day each year when the property ahdJor the house began to flGod. Mr. Goodspeed testified he 
had to quit his job to find a higher paying job to furtd the litiga.tio1\-a poult Defendants never 
disputed. The evidence was clear the Goodspeeds were not trying to get out of the house becaus~ . 
they could not ''tum'' a profit 
" 
As to the value of the property, Mr. Goodspeed testified the house was worth 
5290,000.00 to $295,000.00 without the defect and worth notiing with the defect. Agairt., 
, 
Defendants rely on the arguntent that expert testimony must be brought forth to prove damages-a. 
point this court quickly corrected Defendants on with the analbgy of a child who breaks his arm ' 
on a bicycle. Plaintiffs set forth their damages with specificity under a clear basis in law. 
Therefore Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court reVerse the jUlY'S holding in light of 
the clear weight of the evidence and law as no reasonable juro:r could have found ill favor of the 
Defendants. 
DATED this ~ day of February, 2014 
~~i; 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
Case No. CV-09-015 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM RE: 
ATTORNEY FEES ON 
ISSUE OF COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
The court requested the defendant to indicate whether the purchase of a real 
estate lot and home triggered the "commercial transaction" language of Idaho Code 
Section 12-120. This memorandum of defendants indicates that the instant case was 
a commercial transaction as a secondary source for the award of attorney fees. (The 
contract itself provided for fees and is the primary source.) 
The court requested that two cases be reviewed. Those two cases are not 
applicable to the instant cause before the court. 
1 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
§ 12-120. Attorney's fees in civil actions 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, in any action 
where the amount pleaded is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, there 
shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a 
reasonable amount to be fIXed by the court as attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be 
awarded attorney's fees, for the prosecution of the action, written demand for the 
payment of such claim must have been made on the defendant not less than ten (10) 
days before the commencement of the action; provided, that no attorney's fees shall 
be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the 
plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at least equal to 
ninety-five percent (95%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff. 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall also apply to any 
counterclaims, cross-claims or third party claims which may be filed after the 
initiation of the original action. Except that a ten (10) day written demand letter 
shall not be required in the case of a counterclaim. 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, 
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailingparty shaD be aUowed a reasonable 
attomey's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean aU transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to 
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
ID ST Sec. 12-120, Attorney's fees in civil actions 
------------ Excerpt from page 6224. 
CASE LAW REQUESTED BY THE COURT 
The court requested the defendants to review two (2) cases: 
The transaction involved in this case--the refinancing of the Bajtektatevics' home 
loan--was clearly made "for personal or household purposes," and does not 
constitute a commercial transaction as contemplated by> Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
155 P.3d 691, 143 Idaho 890, Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Home Loans, Inc., (Idaho 
2007) 
------------ Excerpt from page 155 P .3d 694. 
2 
This matter was not a purchase of a home but rather a refinance "for personal 
or household purposes". Individuals refinance their homes often for purchase of 
other goods, for lower interest rates and other maters. This case is inapplicable to 
the instant case since the cited case above was not a PURCHASE OF A HOME. 
The purchase of a home is a commercial transaction and this case is distinguishable. 
The second case is not applicable because the prevailing party did not cite 
any statutory authority. Thus, the case is inapplicable to the instant case where a 
house was purchased in a commercial setting. 
They cite no authority for that award. They simply state, "If Perreira is found to be 
the prevailing party on appeal, Perreira requests that attorney fees be awarded for 
costs and fees reasonably incurred in the appeal." Because they have failed to cite 
any statutory or contractual authority for awarding attorney fees, we will not address 
that issue. 
PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 200 P.3d 1180,146 Idaho 631, (Idaho 2009) 
------------ Excerpt from page 200 P.3d 1190. 
Both cases that the court suggests stand for the proposition of non-
commercial transactions in home purchases are distinguishable or non-applicable to 
the instant case. A real estate purchase is neither a personal or household purchase. 
OTHER CASE LAW 
I.C. § 12-120(3) (italics added). A two-prong test exists for awarding attorney fees 
under> I.C. § 12-120(3). First, an alleged commercial transaction must be integral to 
the claim. Second, the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which a party 
is attempting to recover. Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 78, 910 P.2d 
744, 750 (1996) (citing Brower v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 792 
P.2d 345 (1990).) 
Andrea v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 968 P .2d 1097, 132 Idaho 188, (Idaho App. 1998) 
------------ Excerpt from page 968 P.2d 1099. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a 
civil action to recover in any commercial transaction. Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, 
LLC,143 Idaho 723, 729, 152 P.3d 594, 600 (2007). 
3 
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 177 P.3d 955, 145 
Idaho 208, (Idaho 2008) 
------------ Excerpt from page 177 P.3d 965. 
The case that is most applicable to the instant case states as follows: 
McPhee also claims entitlement to an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal in 
connection with the breach of contract claim pursuant to> I.C. § 12-120(3). That 
statute mandates an award of fees to the prevailing party in civil actions that are 
based on, among other things, a contract for services or a commercial transaction. 
See Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 274-75, 869 P.2d 1365, 
1369-70 (1994); Karterman v.Jameson, 132 Idaho 910, 916, 980 P.2d 574, 580 
(Ct.App.1999). When a party has alleged the existence of a contract of the type 
encompassed in this statute, the prevailing party is entitled to recover fees even 
though no liability under the alleged contract was established. Farmers Nat'l Bank 
v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73, 878 P.2d 762, 772 (1994). Johnson's breach of contract 
claim here was predicated on an alleged contract for services, which also constituted 
a commercial transaction. Therefore, McPhee is entitled to recover his attorney fees 
incurred on appeal with respect to the contract claim only. 
210 P.3d 563, 147 Idaho 455, Johnson v. McPhee, (Idaho App. 2009) 
------------ Excerpt from page 210 P.3d 578. 
The foregoing case, Johnson, involved a real estate contract and was a 
commercial transaction. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case was a commercial transaction. In any event, the contract 
provides for attorney fees in the case at bar. Under either theory, defendants are 
entitled to fees. 
Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a 
walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, 
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a 
plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money judgment may be more 
exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts 
must not ignore the value of a successful defense. 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d 130, 141 
Idaho 716, (Idaho 2005) 
------------ Excerpt from page 117 P.3d 133. 
4 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2011. 
~c 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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~ Facsimile Transmission 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
208.523-7254 
QCX:UC 
ROQin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Hon. Gregory Anderson, District Judge, Bonneville County 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAIt~1 IA'rR'-lfJ§> W2:rlj~ COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
O!~ I i:;",1 L(;Jk f 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOOJJ)SPIEEl)Q;UMT Y , I Dr HO 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ROBERT SHIPPEN and JORJA SHIPPEN, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
Case No. CV-09-15 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, NEW TRIAL, AND 
RECONSIDERATION 
FflED IN CHAMBERS 
at Idaho Falls 
, Bonneville CounfY -. 
Y-lonor~hle Judge 1,;;;1~1.....IeX.JI.,Lu..J..u. 
P;--,':;) ; 
1 :,':le ,--::~~..L.-t-~==---_ 
This cause having come before this Court pursuant to Goodspeeds' February 9, 2011, 
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and reconsideration; this Court 
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing; 
NOW, THEREFORE: 
Goodspeeds' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied. 
Goodspeeds' motion for reconsideration is denied. 
Goodspeed's motion for new trial is granted on the issue of breach of implied w~~lijlflllll/II" 
#~\~.~ ... ~~ .. ~/~:~ 
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GREGORY S. ANDERSON 
-'r" 
DATED this _i_ ..... __ day of April 2011. 
Senior District Judge 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BAC~G~otr~D( ~ =~ i \ ~= I. 
This matter was tried before a jury in January 2011. Evidence was presented on January 
11, 12, 13 and 14. The case was submitted to the jury the afternoon of Friday, January 14,2011. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on January 18,2011. The evidence 
presented at trial is summarized below. 
On or about August 20, 2005, Robert and JOlja Shippen purchased a lot at 37089 East 
319 North, Rigby, Idaho. Shippens thereafter constructed a home (hereafter "Home") on the 
property. While the Home was under construction, Mr. Shippen hired Dave Chapple of Wins tar 
Realty to list it for sale. Based on a conversation with Mr. Shippen, Mr. Chapple created an 
MLS listing, which stated in part: 
PUBLIC INFO: ... ** THERE HAS BEEN CONCERN ABOUT SUB WATER 
IN JEFFERSON COUNTY, HOWEVER THIS HOME HAS NOT HAD SUB 
ISSUES AND TO GIVE THE BUYER PEACE OF MIND BUILDER WILL 
INSTALL A LEACHING SYSTEM AROUND THE HOME AND PROVIDE 1 
YEAR WARRANTY ON CONSTRUCTION** 
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PRIV ATE INFO: There has been some concern about sub water in Jefferson 
County. This particular home has never had sub issues but to give the buyer 
peace of mind the builder is going to install a leaching system with a drainage 
field from the east side to the west side of the home to prevent the possibility of 
there every being any sub issues. 
In the Summer of 2007, Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed began looking for property in 
Eastern Idaho. They were looking for a house with a basement where her father could live. 
After reading the MLS listing on the Home, Goodspeeds came to Idaho and, while visiting the 
Home, spoke with Mr. Shippen as he was working on the leaching system. The substance of that 
conversation is disputed. Mr. Shippen testified he told Mr. Goodspeed the basement of the 
Home had flooded during construction in 2006. I Mr. Goodspeed denies Mr. Shippen made that 
disclosure. 
On or about July 2,2007, Goodspeeds and Shippens executed a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement (hereafter, "Agreement"), and Shippens transferred the Home to Goodspeeds by 
warranty deed. The basement of the Home flooded in the fall of 2008 and again in the fall of 
2009. 
On January 6,2009, Goodspeeds filed suit against Shippens. Goodspeeds'Second 
Amended Complaint, filed on September 23, 2009, alleges breach of express warranty, breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of implied warranty of habitability, 
unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment of known defect, fraudulent misrepresentation of 
known fact, and fraud in the inducement. 
On September 29,2010, Goodspeeds filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to 
Add Claim for Punitive Damages. On November 1, 2010, this Court granted that motion. As 
1 At trial, when asked ifhis conversation with Mr. Goodspeed occurred in June 2006, Mr. Shippen responded "yes." 
Mr. Shippen also testified the conversation occurred a month or two prior to the sale of the Home, which occurred in 
July 2007. Thus, it appears, Mr. Shippen was either mistaken or simply misspoke regarding the year in which the 
conversation occurred. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, NEW TRIAL, AND RECONSIDERATION - 2 
stated above, the case proceeded to trial in January 2011. After reviewing the evidence 
presented during,the trial, this Court found insufficient evidence to support a claim for punitive 
damages. Therefore, it declined to instruct the Jury regarding punitive damages. This Court 
entered judgment in favor of Shippens on January 26, 2011. 
On February 9, 2011, Goodspeeds filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or alternatively for a new trial. Their supporting brief also seeks reconsideration of this 
Court's decision not to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. On February 14,2011, 
Shippens filed a brief in opposition to Goodspeeds' motion. On February 23, 2011, Goodspeeds 
filed a reply brief. On February 28,2011, this Court heard oral argument regarding Goodspeed's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.2 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
Whether to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) "is purely a 
question oflaw and the trial court's decision will be freely reviewed by an appellate court 
without special deference to the views of the trial court." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 
727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). 
Under Rule 50(b) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, "[i]fa verdict was returned the 
court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial 
or direct the entry of judgment. LR.C.P. 50(b). The party moving for a JNOV "admits the truth 
of all the adverse evidence and all inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it." Leavitt v. 
Swain, 133 Idaho 624, 628, 991 P.2d 349, 353 (1999). The court must determine whether there 
is substantial evidence upon which a jury could have found for the non-moving party. Id. The 
2 At the hearing on February 28, 2011, the Court also heard oral argument on a motion for attorney's fees and costs 
filed by Shippens on January 26, 2011. This Court will issue a separate decision with regard to attorney's fees and 
costs after a fmal judgment has been entered in this case. 
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court may not reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses and will not grant 
a JNOV unless it finds that there could have been but one conclusion as to the verdict that 
reasonable minds could have reached and the jury failed to reach it. Id. Conflicting 
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to withstand a motion for JNOV. Id. The function of Rule 
50(b) "is to give the trial court the last opportunity to order the judgment that the law requires." 
Quick, at 763, 727 P.2d at 1191. 
stated, 
Regarding a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Idaho Supreme Court 
When a trial judge receives such a motion, the judge begins the inquiry by asking 
him or herself whether there is substantial evidence in the record upon which the 
jury could properly find a verdict for the party against whom the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is sought. See Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 
727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). The judge's task in answering this question is to 
review all the evidence and draw all the reasonable inferences therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. (The 
party seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict admits the truth of all the 
other side's evidence and every legitimate inference that can be drawn from it. 
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-53, 678 P.2d 41, 44-45 (1984).) The 
judge is not an extra juror, though; there is no weighing of evidence or passing on 
the credibility of witnesses or making of independent findings on factual issues. 
Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1,4,592 P.2d 57, 60 (1979), Instead, the judge must 
determine whether the evidence is substantial--that is, whether it is of sufficient 
quality and probative value that reasonable minds could arrive at the same 
conclusion as did the jury. Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736, 518 
P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974). 
Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 830, 136 P.3d 297,301 
(2006). 
B. Reconsideration 
The decision or grant to deny relief pursuant to a motion to reconsider is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and, absent a manifest abuse of discretion, will not ordinarily be 
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disturbed on appeal. Win o/Michigan, Inc. v. Yrekd United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 754, 53 P.3d 
330,337 (2002); Kirklandv. State, 143 Idaho 544, 547,149 P.3d 819,822 (2006). 
C. New Trial 
On a motion for new trial, a trial court has broad discretion and may weigh 
the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 
P.2d 1187 (1986). Unlike the rule which applies to motions for directed verdict or 
j.n.o.v., a trial court may set aside the jury's verdict and grant a new trial pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 59(a) even though there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. 
Id. A trial court is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. Id. 
Jones v. Panhandle Distributors, Inc., 117 Idaho 750, 754, 792 P.2d 315, 319 (1990). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Fraud 
Goodspeeds argue they met their burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence. They allege Mr. Shippen made two misrepresentations in the MLS listing that induced 
them to purchase the Home. The first allegation of fraud is based on the representation that the 
Horne "never had sub issues." The second allegation of fraud is based on representations that 
the leaching system would "prevent the possibility of there every being any sub issues." 
To prevail on an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, the following elements must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence: 
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge 
of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by 
the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance 
of its falsity; (7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his 
consequent and proximate injury. 
G & M Farms v. Funk frr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 518, 808, P.2d 851, 855 (1991). 
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1. Sub-Water 
Goodspeeds do not dispute their fraud claim on the sub-water issue would fail if Mr. 
Shippen disclosed to Mr. Goodspeed that the Home had flooded in 2006. However, Goodspeeds 
argue that no reasonable jury could have believed Mr. Shippen made that disclosure. 
Mr. Shippen testified that in June of2007, Goodspeeds visited the Home while he was 
working on the leaching system. Mr. Shippen's testimony proceeded as follows: 
Mr. Shippen: Then Mr. Goodpeed come down and was visiting with me, uh, I 
told him what I was doing there, that I was, that I put, uh, the lift 
pump in for the drainage system--explained to him how I had run 
a line over and I had excavated out of the ground and I had put in 
about, I think it was 15, well it would have been more that, it 
would have been two truck loads of gravel--crushed washed 
gravel-and I had dug down to the gravel below the dirt in the 
existing field so there would be no way for the water to hold up so 
it could just go through the gravel into the other gravel. I told him 
I did this because the previous year during construction I had 
gotten one inch of water from the irrigation. 
Mr. Dunn: And you told that to the plaintiff, Mr. Goodspeed? 
Mr. Shippen: Yes, um hum. 
Mr. Dunn: And you are positive you did that? 
Mr. Shippen: Yes, I am. 
Mr. Dunn: And as a result of what you told the plaintiff, what did he say? 
Mr. Shippen: He said that he wasn't really concerned about it. He'd just come 
from Tennessee and they had a high ground water in Tennessee 
and he didn't think it would be an issue. Vb, He asked me if I 
thought it was, I remember, and I said I don't think it is-this 
should take care of it if you do have a problem. 
Mr. Shippen: That's when I told him that that I'd gotten the water and it was an 
inch deep and, you know, that I had monitored it, started going out 
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after a day, and then I'd cleaned it up. I told him I didn't think 
there would be water in the future. 
Goodspeeds allege the following evidence proves that Mr. Shippen did not disclose the 
2006 flooding: 
• Mr. and Mrs. Goodspeed testified there was no disclosure by Mr. Shippen about 
sub-water at any time. 
• Dave Chapple testified Mr. Shippen never told him to remove the language 
regarding sub-water issues from the MLS listing or that the property had flooded. 
• Randy Stoor mentioned he never heard any communication from Mr. Shippen or 
Mr. Chapple regarding sub-water on the property. 
• Mrs. Shippen admitted Mr. Shippen told her about the 2006 flooding, but she 
never said anything to Goodspeeds or their realtor about the sub-water 
• None ofMr. Shippen's alleged witnesses to his conversation with Mr. Goodspeed 
ever testified. 
• All writings point to no disclosure of the flooding. 
Plaintiff's Brief in Support at 4. Goodspeeds also allege Mr. Shippen's testimony is tainted by 
the fact that his deposition was used to correct him on numerous issues at trial. 
There was nothing inherently incredible about the testimony given by Mr. Shippen at 
trial. The discrepancies between Mr. Shippen's deposition testimony and his testimony at trial 
were negligible. The fact that other people were unaware of the alleged disclosure does not 
prove that the disclosure did not occur. 
This Court concludes that there was substantial evidence, including Mr. Shippen's 
testimony, on which the jury could have found Mr. Shippen disclosed the 2006 flooding to 
Goodspeeds, and that Goodspeeds knew the representation in the MLS listing regarding sub-
water was false. 
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2. Leaching System 
Goodspeeds allege the representation in the MLS listing regarding the leaching system's 
ability to "prevent the possibility of there every being any sub issues" was fraudulent. 
In addition to the representations in the MLS listing, Mr. Shippen made a representation 
about the leaching system during the conversation he had with Mr. Goodspeed in June 2007. 
When Mr. Goodspeed asked Mr. Shippen ifhe thought sub-water would be an issue, Mr. 
Shippen replied that he didn't think it would be and, if it was, the leaching system "should take 
care of it." Mr. Shippen's representations were affirmative statements about thefuture 
performance of the leaching system that would be installed. 
Shippens allege Mr. Shippen's disclosure in June 2007 ''removes any possibility of 
fraud." Brief in Opposition at 6. Shippens also argue there is substantial evidence the jury could 
have relied on to conclude the system was adequate-as represented-but had been damaged by 
Goodspeeds after they purchased the Home. 
In Sharp v. Idaho Inv. Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 122-23,504 P.2d 386, 395-96 (1972), the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated ''there is a general rule in law of deceit that a representation 
consisting of promise or a statement as to a future event will not serve as basis for fraud, even 
though it was made under circumstances as to knowledge and belief which would give rise to an 
action for fraud had it related to an existing or past fact." The court stated further, "Assuming 
that Neilson's statements were in fact promises or statements that a certain act would be done, we 
can find no evidence establishing any of the elements offraud, i.e. intent, knowledge of falsity, 
etc. Actually, these statements of Neilson can be characterized as 'puffing.'" Id. 
In Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 615, 114 P.3d 974,985 (2005), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held, 
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"An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future 
events." Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 207, 61 P.3d 
557,564 (2002) (other citations omitted). "[T]here is a general rule in [the] law of 
deceit that a representation consisting of [aJ promise or a statement as to a future 
event will not serve as [a] basis for fraud .... " Sharp v. Idaho Inv. Corp., 95 
Idaho 113, 122, 504 P.2d 386, 396 (1972) (other citations omitted). 
"[T]he representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern past or 
existing material facts." Magic Lantern Prods, Inc. v. Do/sot, 126 Idaho 805, 807, 
892 P.2d 480, 482 (1995) (overruled on other grounds by Great Plains Equip., 
Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 36 P.3d 218 (2001)) ..... A 
"promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is actionable, if it 
is proven that the speaker made the promise without intending to keep it." Id 
(citing First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 268, 805 P.2d 468, 
474 (1991)). 
Mr. Shippen's representations about the leaching system were statements about future 
events. Under the general rule, Mr. Shippen's representations concerning the leaching system 
would not be actionable as fraud. 
Goodspeeds have not alleged any exceptions to the general rule are applicable in this 
case. Even if Mr. Shippen's representations about the capacity of the leaching system 
constituted a promise to install a system of a certain quality, such a promise would not be 
actionable as fraud unless accompanied by evidence that Mr. Shippen made the promise without 
intending to keep it. Such evidence was not presented in this case. In fact, Mr. Shippen 
testified he thought the leaching system he designed and installed would be adequate. 
3. Conclusion 
Considering all evidence adverse to Goodspeeds as true and drawing all reasonable 
inferences from that evidence in favor of Shippens, this Court concludes there is substantial 
evidence in the record upon which the jury could have found Shippens did not commit fraud. 
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B. Punitive Damages 
If this Court finds Shippens committed fraud, Goodspeeds ask it to reconsider its prior 
decision to not submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. 
Having concluded the jury verdict with regard to Goodspeeds' fraud claim should be 
upheld, there is no basis for punitive damages. 
C. Breach of Express Warranty 
1. MLS Listing 
Goodspeeds argue no reasonable jury could have found Shippens did not a breach an 
express warranty. Goodspeeds assert that, because this Court instructed the jury that the term 
"Standard Builder's Warranty" was ambiguous, the jury was free to consider parol evidence and 
"should have found the MLS listing ... acted as a warranty" because it "is the only document in 
writing explaining any coverage as to what was included in the builder's warranty." Plaintiff's 
Brief in Support at 9. 
If the terms of a contract are determined to be ambiguous, the interpretation of the 
document is a factual question that focuses upon the intent of the parties. Page v. Pasquali, 150 
Idaho 150,244 P.3d 1236 (2010). 
In ascertaining the intent of the parties regarding the term "Standard Builder's Warranty," 
the jury could have considered the MLS listing, but there is no rule of law or logic that would 
require the jury to do so. 
The express warranty alleged to have been included in the MLS listing was limited to 
sub-water flooding. Sub-water flooding is not common. Therefore, it would not necessarily be a 
"standard" construction problem. 
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Considering the limited scope of the MLS listing, the jury could have concluded that the 
representations in the MLS listing did not constitute a standard builder's warranty. 
2. Mr. Stoor's Testimony 
It was Goodspeeds' burden to prove an express warranty was breached. This Court is 
aware of Mr. Stoor's testimony regarding the definition of a "Standard Builder's Warranty." Mr. 
Stoor gave an ambiguous opinion about what a standard builder's warranty would cover. The 
jury was not obligated to adopt his view. 
3. Conclusion 
Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Shippens, the status of 
the evidence is such that the jury could have found Shippens did not breach the express warranty 
provisions of the Agreement. 
D. Requested Jury Instruction/New Trial 
Goodspeeds argue this Court erred by not giving the following jury instruction that they 
proposed: 
Disclaiming a warranty requires a conspicuous provision (text in large, 
bold, or capital letters) which is clear and unambiguous, fully disclosing the 
consequences of its inclusion. This places a heavy burden on the builder to show 
the buyer has relinquished the protection afforded to the buyer by public policy 
and that the buyer has done so knowingly. By this approach, boilerplate clauses 
(ready made or form language), however worded, are rendered ineffective thereby 
affording the consumer the desired protection without denying enforcement of 
what is in fact the intention of both parties. A knowing waiver of this protection 
will not be readily implied and should be obtained with difficulty. 
Shippens argue the proposed instruction on warranty disclaimers was unnecessary 
because Mr. Goodspeed admitted that he read paragraph 32 and his realtor, Mr. Stoor, 
explained it to him before he and his wife signed the Agreement. 
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This Court declined to give the proposed jury instruction on warranty disclaimers because 
the Court was lead to believe Goodspeeds had waived the implied warranty of habitability. 
During the jury instruction conference, Shippens' counsel erroneously represented to this Court 
that Goodspeeds acknowledged having read and understood paragraph 32 prior to signing the 
Agreement. Adding to this Court's misunderstanding was Goodspeeds' counsel's failure to 
adequately rebut the alleged acknowledgment. 
1. Waiver 
The Idaho Supreme Court has said the following regarding disclaimer of the implied 
warranty of habitability: 
The majority of states permit a disclaimer of an implied warranty of 
habitability, but the disclaimer must be clear and unambiguous and such 
disclaimers are strictly construed against the builder-vendor. Belt v. Spencer, 41 
Colo.App. 227, 585 P.2d 922,925 (1978); Bridges v. Ferrell, 685 P.2d 409, 411 
(Okla.Ct.App.1984); Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo.1978) (en 
banc). We agree with these courts and particularly with the Missouri Supreme 
Court: 
"[O]ne seeking the benefit of such a disclaimer must not only show a 
conspicuous provision which fully discloses the consequences of its 
inclusion but also that such was in fact the agreement reached. The heavy 
burden thus placed upon the builder is completely justified, for by his 
assertion of the disclaimer he is seeking to show that the buyer has 
relinquished protection afforded him by public policy. A knowing waiver 
of this protection will not be readily implied." Crowder, supra, at 881 n.4 
(emphasis in original). 
The Court explains its approach: "By this approach, boilerplate clauses, however 
worded, are rendered ineffective, thereby affording the consumer the desired 
protection without denying enforcement of what is in fact the intention of both 
parties." Id, at 881. Accord Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co., Inc., 76 
m.2d 31, 27 Ill.Dec. 746, 751, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (1979) (emphasis added). 
The disclaimers in the instant case fall woefully short of fulfilling these 
requirements. Because the implied warranty of habitability is a creature of public 
policy, public policy dictates that it be waived only with difficulty. The party 
asserting that it has been waived bears the burden of proving that it has been 
knowingly waived. Clearly, when no mention is made of the implied warranty of 
habitability in a contract, and the contract contains only general language stating 
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there are no warranties other than those contained within its four corners, any 
purported waiver of the implied warranty of habitability is ineffective. 
Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 45-46, 740 P.2d 1022, 1030-31 (1987). 
"Conspicuous," with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or 
presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have 
noticed it. Whether a term in "conspicuous" or not is a decision for the court. 
Conspicuous terms include the following: 
(A) A heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, 
or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or 
lesser size; and 
(B) Language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the 
surrounding text, of in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding 
text of the same sice, or set of from the surrounding test of the same size 
by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language. 
I.C. § 28-1-201.3 
Paragraph 32 of the Agreement states, in part: ''No warranties, including, without 
limitation any warranty of habitability, agreements or representations not expressly set forth 
herein shall be binding upon either party." 
Although paragraph 32 specifically disclaims the warranty of habitability, it is not in bold 
face type, large text, or capital letters. There are no symbols or other marks that set it apart from 
the surrounding text. And, it appears among other boilerplate at the end of the Agreement. 
Whether paragraph 32 constitutes a conspicuous disclaimer of the implied warranty of 
habitability appears to be a mixed question oflaw and fact. However, "if reasonable minds [can] 
not differ on issues of fact-then those issues become questions of law upon which the court 
may freely rule." Sorensen v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 
761, 118 P.3d 86, 93 (2005). 
3 This Court acknowledges the Agreement in this case does not concern the sale of goods. Nevertheless, the 
definition of "conspicuous" from the Idaho Commercial Code is relevant and informative on the issue before the 
Court. 
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This Court concludes paragraph 32 is a boilerplate disclaimer. Furthermore, this Court 
finds reasonable minds could not differ in finding that paragraph 32 falls short of the 
requirements for a conspicuous disclaimer. This Court, therefore, concludes the implied 
warranty of habitability was not effectively disclaimed by the mere inclusion of paragraph 32 in 
the Agreement. 
2. Actual Notice of Waiver 
After reviewing the testimony of Goodspeeds and Mr. Stoor, this Court concludes there 
was evidence that Goodspeeds read the Agreement and that Mr. Stoor generally explained it to 
them. However, there is no evidence that paragraph 32 was expressly brought to Goodspeeds' 
attention and explained to them. Therefore, this Court concludes the evidence at trial did not 
clearly show Goodspeeds were aware of and agreed to paragraph 32 and its consequences. 
3. Jury Instruction 
The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the following standard regarding jury instructions: 
If the court's instructions, considered as a whole, fairly and adequately 
present the issues and state the applicable law, then no error is committed. See 
Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Waller, 80 Idaho 105, 326 P.2d 388 (1958); 
Union Seed Co. of Burley v. Savage, 76 Idaho 432, 283 P.2d 918 (1955); Koehler 
v. Stenerson, 74 Idaho 281, 260 P.2d 1101 (1953). 
McBride v. Ford Motor Co., 105 Idaho 753, 760, 673 P.2d 55, 62 (1983). 
A requested jury instruction must be given if it is supported by any 
reasonable view of the evidence, Bailey, 139 Idaho at 750,86 P.3d at 464, but the 
determination of whether the instruction is so supported is committed to the 
discretion of the district court. State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 552, 21 P .3d 483, 
489 (2001). Clearly, a requested jury instruction need not be given if it is either an 
erroneous statement of the law, adequately covered by other instructions, or not 
supported by the facts of the case. State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 89, 831 P.2d 
555, 557 (1992). Even so, when the instructions taken as a whole do not mislead 
or prejudice a party, an erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error. 
Bailey, 139 Idaho at 750, 86 P.3d at 464. 
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Craig Johnson Const., L.L.c. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797,800, 134 P.3d 648, 
651 (2006). 
When a jury verdict is rendered on the basis of incorrect instructions, the appropriate 
remedy is the granting of a new trial. Walton v. Portlatch Corp., 116 Idaho 892, 781 P.2d 905 
(1985). 
Question No.4 of the Special Verdict Form asked the Jury "Did Robert and/or JOIja 
Shippen breach the implied warranty of habitability?" The jury answered "no" with regard to 
both Mr. and Mrs. Shipppen. There are at least two possible explanations for the jury's answer. 
First, it is possible the jury determined the implied warranty of habitability was not breached 
because it had been disclaimed by Goodspeeds. Therefore, the jury should have been instructed 
on how to determine if the implied warranty of habitability had been waived. Second, the jury 
may have decided there were insufficient facts to support finding the implied warranty of 
habitability had been breached. 
4. Conclusion 
The jury should have been instructed regarding disclaimer of the implied warranty of 
habitability. This Court cannot rule out the possibility that the proposed jury instruction may 
have provided needed guidance to the jury regarding the existence and/or waiver of the implied 
warranty of habitability. Failure to give the instruction may have been prejudicial to 
Goodspeeds. 
Pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Goodspeeds are entitled to 
a new trial on their breach of implied warranty of habitability claim. 
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; 
, 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Goodspeeds' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for 
reconsideration are denied. Goodspeed's motion for new trial is granted on the issue of breach 
of implied warranty of habitability. 
+i-t 
DATED this \ 1- day of April 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this \4 day of April 2011, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by 
causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Weston S. Davis 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P .A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Robin D. Dunn 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
CHRISTINE BOULTER 
Clerk of the District Court 
Jefferson County, Idaho 
By ~l1·'1iMI~ 
Deputy lerk 
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SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
William Shawn Goodspeed, etal. 
vs. 
Shippen Construction, Inc., etal. 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 
RIGBY, IDAHO 83442 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV-2009-000001S 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Status Conference 
Judge: 
Courtroom: 
Tuesday, May 24, 2011 09:00 AM 
Gregory S. Anderson 
Telephonically in Chambers in Bonneville County 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Tuesday, May 03, 2011. 
Weston S Davis 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, lD 83405 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, lD 83442 
Mailed ~-
Courthouse Box ~ 
Dated: Tuesday, May 03, 2011 
Christine Boulter 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: d}t~ 
v Deputy Clerk 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
Paul Ziel, Esq., ISB #7497 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dunnlawoftices.com 
Robin D. Dunn, Attorney for Defendants 
2011 MAY 24 PH 4; 46 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and ) 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
ROBERT AND JORJA SHIPPEN, 
hus band and wife, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
Case No. CV-09-015 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
I.A.R. 11; 17 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS; AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants appeal against the above named Respondents to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order Re: Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, New Trial, and Reconsideration entered in the above entitled action on the 14th 
day of April, 2011, the Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, presiding. 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment/ order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant 
to Rule 11(a)(5) I.A.R., as follows: 
(a) Civil Actions. From the following judgments and orders of a district court in a civil 
action: .•. 
(5) An order granting or refusing a new trial, including such orders which contain a 
conditional grant or denial of a new trial subject to additur and remittitur. 
I.A.R. Rule 11, Appealable judgments and orders 
------------ Excerpt from page 610. 
3. The issue(s) on appeal include, but are not limited, to the following: 
a. Did the Court err by granting a new trial on the issue of "Breach of 
Implied Warranty of Habitability" which set aside the jury verdict on this 
isolated count in the plaintiffs' third amended complaint. 
b. Attorney fees and costs should be awarded to the Appellants. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is requested including the third amended complaint of 
the plaintiffs and the answer to such amended complaint filed by the defendants. 
6. The Respondents request that the following documents be included in the 
clerICs record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
-The repository of the case; 
-The jury trial minute entry consisting of 33 pages; 
-Trial Exhibit: Plaintiffs' Number 3 
-The court's memorandum decision and order dated April 14, 2011. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
J 
7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That a copy of the notice of appeal has been served on the certified 
short hand reporter and specifically requests the trial testimony of William Shawn 
Goodspeed, Randy Stoor and Robert Shippen to be provided in a transcript form; 
b. That the Appellants have made contact with the clerk of the district 
court and are in the process of obtaining the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's 
record; 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid or will be paid; 
d. That the estimated fee for preparation of the pertinent portions of the 
trial transcript of the short hand reporter's record has been paid or win be paid; 
e. That appenate filing fee has been paid; and 
f. That service has been made upon an parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 2011. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
-1QL Hand Delivery (To Court in Jefferson) 
.1QL Postage-prepaid mail 
~ Facsimile Transmission 
Jefferson County Clerk 
Courthouse Way 
Etigby, Idaho 83442 
Weston S. Davis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
208.523-7254 (Facsimile) 
Karen S. Konvalinka 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy To: Honorable Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF .TIlF,u!iJ"~~¥:~'~AHe 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED and 
WILLIAM SHA WN GOODS~EED 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-2009-15 
vs. MINUTE ENTRY 
SHIPPEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Defendants. 
May 24, 2011, at 10:30 A.M., a status conference came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Karen Konvalinka, Court Reporter, and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk, 
were present. 
Mr. Weston Davis appeared by telephone on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. Robin Dunn 
appeared by telephone on behalf of the defendants. 
Mr. Davis noted his clients wanted to proceed with trial on the remaining limited issue. 
Mr. Davis requested the Court allow the parties to engage in discovery up to 30 days prior to 
trial. 
Mr. Dunn anticipates filing an appeal today. The Court noted the filing of an appeal 
would stay these proceedings 14 days unless an order is entered extending they stay. 
The Court noted a decision regarding an award of attorney fees and costs has not been 
made an Idaho Appellate Rule 13 allows for that and inquired if that was appropriate at this time. 
MINUTE ENTRY - I 
Mr. Dunn requested the Court rule on the issue of attorney fees. 
Mr. Davis requested the Court reserve the issue of fees until the case is finalized. 
The Court and counsel had a discussion regarding the entry of a final judgment. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Weston Davis 
Robin Dunn 
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~%.~ 
GREGORY S. ANDERSON ~\\\"\II""/Jlll 
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WESTON S. DAVIS (I.S.B. # 7449) 
NELSONHALLPA.RRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. 691 
i 
IN !HE DISTRICT COO'RT OF THE SEVENTH~IC1AL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CCDUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
. 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and : 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and i 
~~ I 
I 
I 
Case ;No.: CV-09-015 
, 
P. 
PlaintiffslRespondents. 
VS. 
NOT1CE OF REQUEST TO 
S'UP~LEMENT TRANSCRIPTS 
ANDjRECORD ON APPEAL AND 
RE~fEST FOR APPELLANTS TO 
BEAK COSTS 
ROBERT and JORJA SHIPPEN, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants! Appellants. 
i 
I.A.R~ 19 
COME NOW PlaintiffslRespondents, William Goodst1eed and Shellee Goodspeed~ by and 
I 
I, 
through counsel of record, and hereby requests pursuant to 11aho Appellate Rule that the record 
I 
requ~ted by Appellants be augmented from the sections of the record chosen by Defendants to 
I 
h 
represent themselves on appeal. I 
Respondents request that in addition to the 
Repository of the ease; " 
The jUlytriaJ minute entry consisting of33 pag~s; 
NOTICE OF REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT TRANSCRIPTS AND RECPRD 
ON APPEAL AND rtEQUEST POR. APPELLANTS TO BEAR COSTS -! 1 
I 
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• Trial Exhibit Plaintiff's Number 3; ; 
• The Court's memorandum decision and order ~ted Apri114, 2011; and 
the transcript testimony of William Shawn ~odspeed, Randy Stoor, and Robert 
Shippen. . 
• 
requested by Appellants. that the following lllso be included in'lthe record to complete the record on 
I 
the issue of the disclaimer of the warranty of habitability, whi~ is the subject oftbis appeal: 
I 
• Trial Exhibit: Plaintiffs' Numbers 1,2,3, 11. fis, and 19; and 
• The transcript ttstimony of Shellee Beth GPodspeed, Dave Chappel (already 
transcribed from prior video deposition), and Jbrja Shippen. 
I 
! 
Further, pursuant to I.A.R. 19(a), the costs for the productio, of such records are to be born by 
Appellant and paid within 14 days of the date or this Notice. :, 
I 
As it relates to the production of the additional ~scripts. pursuant to LA.R. 19(b), 
Respondents request that Appellants bear the cost of the pr~uction of said transcripts, where 
Appellants have only selected a portion of the testimony that r~lates to the warranty of habitability 
i 
and its disclaimer. All relevant testimony to this issue should 'be included. 
Respondents give notice of their intent to present oral aigument on the issue of costs relating 
to the production of the transcripts. 
DATIlD this ~ day of June, 201!. c.....,v-~:..A~,.;: __ ~-=_~~ ___ =-=---__ __._ ~STO~ S. DAVIS 
i 
NOTICE OF REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT TRANSCRIPTS AND RECpRD 
ON APPEALA'ND REQUEST FOR APPELLANTS TO BEAR. COSTS -;.2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERvjCE 
.J hereby certify that I strved a true copy of the foregolpg document upon the following 
this -.1L day of June, 2011, by hand delivery, mailing with tJ:ie necessary postage affixed thereto, 
facsimile, or overnight mail. : 
Jefferson County Clerk 
JeffersOn County Courthouse 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant COWltty Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442-0277 
Hon. Dane Watkins 
Hon. Gregory Anderson 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls. ID 83402 
Karen Konvalinka 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, lI> 83402 
I. 
[ ] Mail~ 
ill] and Delivery ax : 208.745.6636 [ E-Mai~: 
[ ] Ovemi~t Mail 
[ ] CourtllPuse Box 
[ ] Mailing 
l ] Hand :r,elivery 
~ax :. 208.745.8160 
[ ] E-Mail. 
[ ] Ovemikht Mail 
[ ] Courthpuse Box 
i 
! 
[ ] Mailing 
[ J Hand Delivery 
~Fax:; 208.5:14.7909 
[ ] E-Mail! 
[ ] OvemiSht Mail 
[ ] Courthbuse Box 
i 
! 
[ ] Maili~ 
[ ~Hand ~elivery 
~ Fax i' i08.522.1300 
[ ] E-Mail~ 
[ ] Ovemi~t Mail 
[ ] Courth~use Box: 
~-:----~&~~--
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NOTICE OF REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT TRANSCRIPTS AND RECQRD 
ON APPEAL AND REQUEST FOR APPELLANTS TO BEAR COSTS - f 
IDAHO SUPREME CO~ ... 
Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-2210 
CHRISTINE BOULTER, CLERK 
Attn: NANCY 
JEFFERSON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
210 COURTHOUSE WAY STE 100 
RIGBY, ID 83442 
dDAHO COURT OF ApPEALS 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED (T) 
Docket No. 38829-2011 WILLIAM SHAWN 
GOODSPEED v. ROBERT 
D. SHIPPEN 
Jefferson County District Court 
#2009-15 
A NOTICE OF APPEAL in the above-entitled matter was filed in this office on MAY 27, 
2011. The DOCKET NUMBER shown above will be used for this appeal regardless of eventual 
Court assignment. 
The CLERK'S RECORD and REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT(S) must be filed in this office 
on or before SEPTEMBER 1,2011. 
The REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT(S) MUST BE LODGED with the District Court Clerk 
or Agency **35 DAYS PRIOR** to the date of filing in this office. 
THE REPORTER SHALL FILE A NOTICE OF LODGING WITH THIS COURT. 
THE FOLLOWING TRANSCRIPTS (PURSUANT TO LA.R. 25) SHALL BE LODGED: 
JURY TRIAL (NO DATES LISTED ON ROA) 
06/02/2011 DB 
For the Court: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
---.. 
"........ 
IDAHO COURT OF ApPEALS 
Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-2210 
CHRISTINE BOULTER, CLERK 
Attn: NANCY 
JEFFERSON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
210 COURTHOUSE WAY STE 100 
RIGBY, ID 83442 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE FILED 
Docket No. 38829-2011 WILLIAM SHAWN 
GOODSPEED v. 
ROBERT D. SHIPPEN 
Jefferson County District Court 
#2009-15 
Enclosed is a copy of the CLERK'S CERTIFICATE for the above-entitled appeal, which 
was filed in this office on MAY 27, 2011. 
Please carefully examine the TITLE and the CERTIFICATE and advise the District Court 
Clerk (or the Agency secretary, if' applicable) AND this office of any errors detected on this 
document. 
. The TITLE in the CERTIFICATE must appear on all DOCUMENTS filed in this Court, 
including all BRIEFS. An abbreviated version of the TITLE may be used if it clearly identifies 
the parties to this appeal when the title is extremely long. 
06/02/2011 DB 
For the Court: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
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WESTON S, DAVIS (l.S,B. # 7449) 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and I 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband and ~ 
. I WIfe, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
ROBERT and JORJA SHIPPEN, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No.: CV-09-015 
ORDER ON COSTS OF 
PRODUCTION OF RECORD 
This cause having come up before this Court on Plaintiff's Request for Appellants to 
Bear Costs; and both parties through counsel of record thereafter stipulating to the same with a 
copy of said stipulation being filed with this Court; and this Court otherwise being tully advised 
in the premises; 
NOW, THEREFORE, it shall be the order of this court and it is hereby ordered that 
Defendants/Appellants shall bear the costs of the clerks' production/transcription of the 
following: 
1. Trial Exhibit: Plaintiffs' Numbers 1,2,3, 11, 18, and 19; and 
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-
2. The transcript testimony of Shellee Beth Goodspeed, Dave Chappel (already 
transcribed from prior video deposition), and Jorja Shippen. 
",.:l 
ENTERED this ~ day of June, 2011. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'l:iJJ--I hereby certify that on this ~ day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order was served upon the following by first class mail, postage prepaid, or by hand 
delivery: 
Jefferson County Clerk 
Jefferson County Courthouse 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442-0277 
WESTON S. DAVIS, ESQ 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Karen Konvalinka 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
~ailing 
. [ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 208.745.6636 
[ ] E-Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Courthouse Box 
t:xLIy1ailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 208.745.8160 
[ ] E-Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Courthouse Box 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 208.523.7254 
[ ] E-Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
~ourthouse Box 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 208.524.7909 
[ ] E-Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
'-..[., .. 1-Courthouse Box 
CLERK OF ;~URT 
cft~;;;>:~ 
By: ( ~) 
Deputy Clerk ; 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O'r~~j2,~t~ OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON ~stli';C'. ,.o~ 
:t col' c 2,/ 
WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED and 
SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, husband 
and wife, 
Case No. CV-09-15 
t/ -it jP u.fl .9 
T./(/ 
4..yo 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT SHIPPEN and JORJA SHIPPEN, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
-----------------------------) 
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This matter was tried before a jury in January 2011. The case was submitted to the jury 
the afternoon of Friday, January 14, 2011. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants on 
January 18,2011. This Court entered judgment in their favor on January 26,2011. 
On January 26, 2011, Defendants filed a motion for attorney fees and costs. 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively for a 
new trial on February 9, 2011,. 
On February 28,2011, this Court heard oral argument regarding Defendants' motion for 
fees and costs and Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. On 
April 14,2011, this Court entered a memorandum decision granting Plaintiffs' request for a new 
trial on Plaintiffs' claim of an alleged breach of a warranty of habitability. Footnote 2 of that 
decision stated, "This Court will issue a separate decision with regard to attorney's fees and costs 
after a final judgment has been entered in this case." 
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II. DISCUSSION 
Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party 
who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs, 
itemizing each claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be filed 
later than fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment. Such memorandum must 
state that to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the items are correct and 
that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule. Failure to file such 
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a waiver 
of the right of costs. A memorandum of costs prematurely filed shall be 
considered as timely. 
Defendants filed a memorandum of costs based on the judgment entered by this Court on 
January 26, 2011. Defendants urge this Court to consider their motion for attorney's fees despite 
this Court's April 14, 2011, order granting Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. Plaintiffs object. 
In Sanchez v. Galey, 115 Idaho 1064, 772 P .2d 702 (1989), the district court entered an 
"alternative" Order. The district court described the Order and stated its effect as follows: 
" ... the Order dated January 25, 1985 and entered herein on January 28, 1985 which granted a 
new trial unless a remittitur was accepted, effectively vacated the Judgment and Amended 
Judgment previously entered on the jury's verdict." Id. at 1067, 772 P .2d at 705. The Idaho 
Supreme Court held the district court erred with respect to the effect of is Order stating: 
Id. 
. . . the district court was thus led into the error of asserting that the order of 
January 28, 1985, "effectively vacated the Judgment ... entered on the jury's 
verdict." 
The final judgment, however, has not been vacated specifically [which is 
the ordinary and better practice] nor has it been vacated effectively. The trial 
court's view would have been correct only if Sanchez had properly signified his 
refusal to consent to a reduction in the judgment on the verdict and the alternative 
of a new trial became effective. Then the earlier judgment would have been 
vacated 
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Unlike the Order in Sanchez, the order entered by this Court was not entered in the 
alternative. It simply stated: "Goodspeeds' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is 
denied. Goodspeeds' motion for reconsideration is denied. Goodspeed's motion for new trial is 
granted on the issue of breach of implied warranty of habitability." The order for a new trail in 
this case was effective when entered. Therefore, the judgment was also vacated when the order 
was entered. Cf Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kingsbury, 56 Idaho 475, 55 P.2d 1307, 1311 
(1 936) (holding, "a reversal on appeal from the order denying a motion for a new trial and 
remanding the case for re-trial, as effectually vacates the judgment as a reversal of the judgment 
upon a direct appeal therefrom"). 
Furthermore, to decide whether Defendants are entitled to attorney fees and costs, this 
Court would need to determine whether Defendants are the prevailing parties. See LR.C.P. 
S4(D}(I)(A}. Rule 54(d)(1)(B) provides, "In determining which party to an action is a prevailing 
party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment 
or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." 
In January 2011, the jury found for Defendants on all issues. Pursuant to this Court's 
April 14,2011 decision, Plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial on one of the numerous causes of 
action that were originally tried. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs could obtain the relief they seek-and 
ultimately become the prevailing party-if they successfully prove a breach of the warranty of 
habitability. Accordingly, it would be premature for this Court to issue a decision either granting 
or denying Defendant's motion for attorney fees and costs. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This Court should not render a decision on Defendants' entitlement to an award of 
attorney's fees and costs until a final judgment is entered in this case. 
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DATED this t'" q. day ofJune 2011. 
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